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International Court of Justice

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-10
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA No. 221/39 Most Secret SO only

Berlin 28.11.1939

Stamp: C in C Navy
Op 43./39
Recd. 29 Nov. '39

8 copies
2nd copy

H1146-0002

Subject: Employment of the 7th Flieger Division

MOST SECRET

S.O. only
access only through officer.

1. Should the quick breakthrough of the 6th Army, north of Liege, fail, owing to the demolition of the bridges over the Maas and the Albert canal, the intended employment of the 7th Flieger Division against the bridgehead at G will also be cancelled.
Special orders for this event will be issued.

2. The Führer is of the opinion that the 7th Flieger Division must on the first day of the attack be employed on another task and requests that the following possibilities be examined:

a) The occupation of Watcheren Island and thereby Flushing harbour, or of some other southern Dutch island especially valuable for our sea and air warfare.

b) Taking of one or more Maas crossings between Namur and Dinant with the object of keeping them open until the arrival of the mobile troops employed in the 4th Army sector.

c) Securing of the territory north of Carignan and north-east of Sedan, so that the mobile troops employed in the sector of Army Group A may be able to escape from the wooded heights south-west and south-east of Bouillon.

3. It is requested that the above-named possibilities be explored as quickly as possible and that the following state their opinion:
OKA to 2) a) and b)
Naval War Staff to 2) a)
Reich Minister for Air and C in C Air Force to 2) a) b) and c)

Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces.

Sgd. KEITEL

Distribution:

C in C Army
C in C Navy
Reich Minister for Air and C in C Air Force.

Copy 1
" 2
" 3

OKW
WFA
Chef L
1a
1b
1c

" 4
" 5
" 6
" 7
" 8

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-10.

13 Nov. 1945

I Eve Glazier P/O W.R.N.S. 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German lan uages· and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-10.

Eve Glazier
P/O W.R.N.S. 37371

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-39
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Military Secret

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret WFST/Abt.L(I op)

Fuehrer's Headquarters
(no date)

Top Secret (Chef Sache) 21 copies
Only through officer 3rd copy Ob. d. M.
I op.00845/41
Received 6 June
Enclosures: --

The Fuhrer has authorized the appended time table as a foundation for further preparations for "Barbarossa". If alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces must be informed.

Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed: Keitel

DISTRIBUTION:

C-i-C of Army (Gen. Staff of Army)	1st and 2nd copy
C-i-C of Navy (Command of Ocean Navy)	3rd and 4th copy
C-i-C of Air (Air Leader Staff)	5th and 6th copy
Defense Office Norway	7th copy

OKW

Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab	8th copy
Abt. L	9th to 15th copy
WNV	16th copy
WPr	17th copy
Wohrm.Trsp.Chef	18th copy
Amt Ausl./Abw	19th copy
Abt. Ausl	20th copy
Wi Rue Amt	21th copy

Pencil note:

Correct I op 00910/41
(old Pages 6 and 10 destroyed and replaced by new ones.)
F.M. 11 June 41

-1-

H1146 - 0003

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-39
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Enclosure with OKW/WFSt/Abt.L (I op)
Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret

TIME TABLE BARBAROSSA

State of preparation on 1 June 41

1. General

The time table for the maximum massing of troops in the East was put into operation on the 22 May.

2. Negotiations with Friendly States

a. Bulgaria is requested not to weaken materially her units which are protecting her Turkish frontier.

b. According to the demand of the Supreme Commander of the German troops in Rumania the Rumanians have started a camouflaged part mobilization to defend their frontier against possible Russian attack.

c. Utilization of Hungarian territory for concentrating parts of Army Group South is only considered if it is necessary to push a German unit between Hungarian and Rumanian troops. This question will not be put to the Hungarian authorities till the middle of June.

d. Two German divisions are drawn up in the Eastern part of Slovakia. Reinforcements will be unloaded in the area around Prosov.

e. Negotiations for preparations with the Finnish General Staff have been under way since 25 May.

f. Sweden has not been consulted. Negotiations will be started after commencement of operations.

3. Army:

a. West

Total strength (after departure of 6 Infantry Divisions and introduction of 5 formations of the fifteenth wave from the Reich during the period 22 May--1 June.:

40 Infantry Divisions, 1 Infantry Division(motorized), 1 Police Division, 1 Armoured Brigade.

Attila or (underlining in pencil) Isabella can be executed at ten days warning (this holds good also for the Air Force)

b. North:

Total strength 6 Infantry Divisions, 2 mountain Divisions 1 lines of Communication Division, SS--Battle Group North and 140 GHQ Batteries (Heeresbatterien) for costal defense.

In addition 1 lines of Communication Division and 18 GHQ Batteries are scheduled for transport from the home area to Norway.

H1146-0004

(continuation of C-39)

1 reinforced Infantry Division with Corps troops is scheduled for transport from the home area to Finland. Of these forces 1 Infantry Division, 2 Mountain Divisions and SS - Battle Group North are to be committed for Silver Fox.

It is planned after the beginning of the operations to bring up a further Infantry Division by rail across Sweden for the attack on Hangö.

(c) Balkans:

In the Balkans are stationed, in addition to the formations scheduled for the final occupation, 8 Infantry Divisions and 1 Armoured Division which will be transported in part into the Concentration Area East as OKH Reserve but not before B-Day.

(d) East:

Total strength is raised to 76 Infantry Divisions, 1 Cavalry Division, 3 Armoured Divisions.

The Army Groups and Armies have taken over command in their sectors, partly by means of camouflaged battle Headquarters (Arbeitsstabe).

4.) Navy:

Command of the Baltic has been established, for the present in Kiel, later in Swinemunde. Group North have been supplied with additional protective forces from the West.

5.) Air Force:

Air Fleet 3 has taken over sole command in the conduct of air warfare against Britain.

Air Fleet 2 has been withdrawn from action and transferred to the East.

VIII Air Corps which has been earmarked for Barbarossa will be transferred as soon as possible to the East. Several anti-aircraft Battalions which were given up by Twelvth Army to Air Fleet 4 are still tied down operationally in the South East.

6.) Camouflage:

Second phase of deception of the enemy (Codenames: Haifisch and Harpune) in operation with the aimof giving the impression that landings are being prepared from Norway, the Channel Coast and Brittany. Troop Concentration East (Aufmarsch Ost) will be represented as a deception exercise for the landing in England.

H1146 - 0005

Date	Serial No.	Army	Air Force	Navy	OKW	Remarks
from 1 June	1	Move up of Echelon, to last till 22 June				Main effort in first part by 4b-Echelon (Air Force Components) in second part (from about 10 June) mobile formations of the Army.
		Additional Transfers to the East 4 Corps Staffs 14 Armoured Divisions 12 Infantry Divisions (Motorized)				Offensive Activity of the Airforce With the transfer of flying formations to the East slackening off of offensive activity against Britain and in the Atlantic. With the transport away of anti-aircraft units the anti-aircraft protection of Air Defense Area Centre will be diminished.
	2		"Schlesien" and "Schleswig-Holstein" are ready for action, scheduled as floating batteries.		Armed Forces Area Norway current till 22 June Transport of the last 18 Army Coast Defense Batteries.	
	3		U-Boat School, "Tirpitz" and School Squadron transferred to Drontheim.			Transfer of the Navy Units camouflaged as concentration for "Harpoon".

H1146 - 0006

Date	Serial No.	Army	Air Force	-2- Navy	OKW	Remarks
	4			Minelayers from Area West assigned to Group North, Minelayes of Group North change their bases. Strong concentration of mine-carrying craft in the Baltic.		Camouflage; exercises during the summer months which are unsuitable for mine-laying.
	5			Task Force (German help with construction Cruiser "L") will be recalled from Russia in groups by stages (exclamation mark & line in red pencil at left side)		
5 June	6	See OKW		See OKW		Armed Forces Commander Norway: Transports Stettin-Bottenhaefen: 5 - 14 June reinforced 169th Infantry Division in 7 Echelons. 8 June. First landing in Finland. Transports Oslo-Bottenhaefen: 5 - 12 June XXXVI Corps with Corps troops in 4 Echelons. 9 June. Fist landing in Finland

H1146 - 0007

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Date	Serial No.	Army	Air Force	Navy	OKW	Remarks
7 June	7	Intended start of transporting VIIIth Air Corps and Anti-Aircraft Artillery				Adherance to deadline not yet ascertained with certainty (struck though in pencil)
	8				Armed Forces Commander Norway: Start of movement by road of SS Battle Group North from Kirkenes Southward	
8 June	9			Start of laying of the prepard harbour protective barrages of the East and Middle Baltic and of the Gjedser Submarine net obstruction.		
	10				Armed Forces Commander Norway: First landing in Finland of the transports from Germany. First landing in Finland of the transports from Norway.	)Warning for)Russia. The)occupation)of the)Petsamo area)must be given)up immediat-)ely in the)event of)Russian)offensive)action)against)Finland

H1146 - 0008

Date	Serial No.	Army	Air Force	Navy	OKW	Remarks
from 10 June	12				Battle HQs for 4 Armed Forces Commanders Staffs at action stations.	Scheduled for political administrative areas East.
10 June	13				Armed Forces Commander Norway: Start of movement by road and rail from the Bottenhaefen northwards	
12 June	14			The scheduled minelayers and E-Boat flottillas (S-Flottillen) transferred to Finland		Camouflage as express transports for North Norway via Finland
about 12 June	15				Decision on Barbarossa Conference with the Roumanians	
14 June	16		(original p. 6 marked "new" in pencil)		Hungary: Hint to Hungarian Armed Forces to reinforce their safeguards on the border against Soviet Russia	
	17			Russian ships kept by disguised measures from entering the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Canal and (from 17 June) Gotenhafen. (two strokes in blue pencil at the side)		

H1146-0009

Date	Serial No.	Army	Air Force	Navy	OKW	Remarks
15 June	18				Warning order on adherence to arrange B-Day	
from 17 June	19		Closing of schools in the Eastern area	Inconspicuous withdrawal of German Merchant shipping from Soviet Russian ports		
	20			Suspension of further outward sailings to Soviet Russian ports. Similar measures to be suggested to the Finns through Attache'.		
	21			U-Boats of Group North to take up positions in the Baltic unobserved		
	22		Start of planned aerial reconnaissance of the Baltic		Decision on this point	Depending on General Situation
till 18 June	23			Still possible to continue forming the point of main effort (Schwerpunkt) of the Army without discarding camouflage		
18 June	24		Concentration of Air Force to be concluded (less VIII Air Corps)	Armed Forces Commander Norway Switch of XXXVI Corps Groups from the Artic route to the B		Intention to attack need no longer be camouflaged (Underlined and marked in red pencil

H1146-0010

Date	Serial No.	Army	Air Force	Navy	OKW	Remarks
	25		Order for protection of Fuehrer Headquarters			
19 June	26			Scheduled return into home ports of the shipping space earmarked for transports to Finland		Shortly before start of operations Army: To carry out the closure of traffic of waterways which cross the frontier. Air Force Decree prohibiting take off of civilian air traffic. Navy: Decree prohibiting merchant shipping from putting to sea from Baltic ports. OKW: Order for a general clamp down on foreign intelligence (Military Intelligence (Foreign Branch (Security)).
20 June	27		Conclusion planned of Concentration of VIII Air Corps.			
21 June	28			Minelayers and Mine-carrying Craft (E-Boats) make ready for sea and put out at staggered times for their operational harbours.		
21 June	29	Till 1300 hours latest time at which operation can be cancelled (spaetester Anhaltetermin)			Cancelled by Codeword: "Altona" or further confirmation of start of attack by codeword: "Dortmund".	Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of main effort (Schwerpunkt)(concentration of armour & artillery) must be reckoned with

H1146 - 0011

Date	Serial No.	Army	Air Force	Navy	OKW	Remarks
21/22 June	30			Execution of the measures laid down for blocking the Gulfs of Finland and Riga.		In the event of an encounter with enemy forces the use of arms is authorized (underlined in red pencil)
22 June	31	Invasion Day H-hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and crossing of the frontier by the Air Force. 0330 hours.				Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting owing to weather on the part of the Air Force
	32	Execution of closure of the frontiers of the German Reich which are bounded by the Barbarossa area		Seizure of ships in German, Danish, Norwegian, Dutch & Belgium ports which originate from the Barbarossa area.	Frontiers of the Reich area and of the occupied areas to be closed to all nationals of the Barbarossa area. (Military Intelligence/Foreign Branch (Security))	
	33			Mountain Corps occupies Petsamo area	Artic, East Baltic and Black Seas declared operational zones by wireless etc. Extension of danger zones for mines announced. (dates received by Foreign Office)	

H1146 - 0012

Date.	Serial No.	Army.	Air Force.	Navy.	OKW.	Remarks.
	34.				Report to the Supreme Reich Authorities & Party Offices on the successful closing of the German Reich frontier bordering on the Barbarossa area or the rear boundary of the operational zone (WFSt/Liv)	-11-

35. Distribution of Forces for Barbarossa on Invasion Day.

Total Strength (less the formations under command of Military Commander Norway):

80 Infantry Divisions
1 Cavalry Division
17 Armoured Divisions
12 Infantry Divisions (Motorised)
9 Lines of Communications Divisions.
2 Formations of the Fifteenth Wave &
2 Infantry Divisions as Army Reserves (Already arrival with 4b Echelon)

Air-Fleet 4 with
3 Reconnaissance Squadrons.
12 Twin-Engined Bomber Wings (Kampfgruppen) (1 temporarily)
6 Pursuit Wings.

Air-Fleet 2. with
3 Reconnaissance Squadrons
10 Twin-Engined Bomber Wings
8 Dive Bomber Wings
2 ME 110 Wings (Zerstoerergruppen)
1 ½ Army Cooperation Wings (Schlachtgruppen)
9 Pursuit Wings (2 temporarily)

Air-Fleet 1. with
2 Reconnaissance Squadrons
9 Twin-Engined Bomber Wings
3 2/3 Pursuit Wings (2/3 temporarily)

H1146 - 0013

Date.	Serial No.	Army.	Air Force.	Navy	OKW.	Remarks.
approx. from 25.June	36.	Start of transport forward of 5th Echelon (OKH Reserves) Duration till about 20.July Total available: 22 Infantry Divisions 2 Armoured Divisions 1 Infantry Division (Motorised) 1 Police Division (including 9 Infantry Divisions, 1 Police Division from the West, to which it is planned to bring up 2 formations of the Fifteenth wave.)			Sweden: Negotiations for the use of swedish railways for (a) Bringing up of 163 Infantry Division from South Norway to Rovanieni (b) Supply transports. Employment of a German transport organization and a Signals Liaison Officer.	
	37.				Japan, Manchukuo, Turkey Iran and Afghanistan to be prevailed upon to cut off the sending of any supplies to Russia, by diplomacy	
	38.				Armed Forces Commander Norway: 23.-27.(or 28.)June, State of readiness for attack on Murmansk. 23.30.June. State of readiness for attack on Kandalakscha.	
at earliest 28.June	39.				Finland: Attacking Grp "Ladoga" ready to attack.	Decision necessary five days before start of attack whether point of main effort is to be west or east of Lake Ladoga

H1146-0014

Date.	Serial No.	Army	Air Force.	Navy.	OKW.	Remarks
28.June or 29.June	40.				Armed Forces Commander Norway: Attack on Murmansk.	
1.July	41.				Armed Forces Commander Noeway: Attack on Kandalaksche.	
2.July	42.				4 Armed Forces Commanders Staffs ready on call.	

H1146-0015

H1146-0016

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-39

19 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-39.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc., 33925738

H1146-0017

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C 59
OFFICE OF U S CHIER OF COUNSEL

SEC 24-G/C-59

Führer's HQ
19 February 1941

Top Secret

10 copies
2nd copy

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No.44 187/41, Top Secret, "WFST/Section L (I Op)

S.O. Only
By officer only.

On 18 February the Führer made the following decision regarding the carrying out of operation "Marita":

1. The following dates are envisaged:

Commencement of building bridge: 28 February
Crossing of Danube. 2 March

The final order for carrying out the operation will be given on 26 February at the latest.

It will be decided on 26 February at the latest whether the XIVth Army Corps will march into Bulgaria when bridge-building operations are begun or whether only AA Forces will be moved in.

2. It is for the Bulgarians alone to decide if and when to lay mines off Varna and Burgas.

3. If air attacks are carried out against Bulgaria and Rumania from Greek territory, the Xth Air Corps has freedom of action in operations against Greek territory.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
By Order
signed: Warlimont

DISTRIBUTION:

C-in-C Command of the Army (Operational section)	1st Copy
C-in-C Command of the Navy (Naval situation report)	2nd Copy
C-in-C Command of the Air Force (Air Force Operational Staff)	3rd Copy
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces	
Armed Forces Operational Staff	4th Copy
Section L	5th-9th Copies
Foreign/Military Intelligence	10th Copy

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C 59

I, S/SGT. Charles E.Bidwell Nr.13146054 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C59

S/SGT. CHARLES E.BIDWELL
Nr.13146054.

H1146 - 0018

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-63
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Chief of the High Command of
the Armed Forces
No.22045/40 Top Secret WFA/Dept.L

Berlin
27 January 1940

5 copies
Copy No. 2

Top Military Secret
Chief Matter
Through Officer Only

(illegible notations)

Re : Study "N"
Ref: 22039/40 Top Secret WFA/Dept L (I) 23 Jan.1940

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces desires that work on the Study "N" be continued under his personal and immediate influence and in closest collaboration with the conduct of the war as a whole. For these reasons the Fuehrer has ordered me to take charge of the further preparations.

For this purpose a working staff will be formed within the High Command of the Armed Forces; this staff will at the same time represent the nucleus of the future operations staff.

I request the High Commands of the Services to appoint each one officer suitable as Ia and, if possible, trained in questions of organization and supply. The Office for Intelligence Abroad (Ausl./Abw.) will furnish the Ic, and Armed Forces General Staff Dept. (WFA) will furnish the transport expert, 1 officer for signal communications and 1 officer for general questions of territorial administration.

The date when the staff will convene will be communicated later.

All further preparations will be conducted under the code-word "Weseruebung".

signed: Keitel

(Marginal note in handwriting: "M.K.A. is informed and takes over the appointment of the officer (probably Sea Captain Kamke Ia (initial illegible) 29/I)"

Distribution:

Supreme Commander of the Army	Copy No. 1
" " " " Navy	" No. 2
Reich Air Minister and Supreme Commander of the Air Force	" No. 3
Armed Forces General Staff Department	" No. 4
Department Air	" No. 5.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-63

15 November 1945

I. ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-63.

ERNST M. COHN,
Pfc, 33925738.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-62
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

DOCUMENT A.

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 172/39 Top Secret. WFA/L

Berlin
9 October 1939

TOP SECRET

Stamp
:C in C Navy :
:Op 283/39 :
:Recd. 10.10.39:

8 copies
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access only through office

Directive No. 6
for the Conduct of the War

1. If it should become apparent in the near future that England, and, under England's leadership, also France, are not willing to make an end to the war, I am determined to act actively and aggressively without much delay.

2. If we wait much longer, only will Belgian and perhaps also Dutch neutrality be lost in favor of the Western powers, but the military strength of our enemies will grow on an increasing scale, the neutrals' confidence in a final German victory will dwindle, and Italy will not be encouraged to join us as a military ally.

3. Therefore I give the following orders for the further military operations:

a. Preparations are to be made for an attacking operation on the northern wing of the Western front, through the areas of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried out with as much strength and at as early a date as possible.

b. The purpose of this attacking operation will be:

to defeat as strong contingent of the French operational army, as possible as well as the allies fighting by its side, and at the same time,

to gain as large an area as possible in Holland, Belgium and Northern France as a base for conducting a promising air and sea war against England and as a glacis for the vital Ruhr area.

c. The timing of the attack depends on the readiness of tanks and motorized units for use, - this must be speeded up by every possible effort, also on the weather conditions then prevailing and the weather prospects ahead.

4. The Air Force is to prevent the Anglo-French air force from attacking our own army, and, if necessary, to give direct support to the army's advance. In this connection, it will also be essential to prevent the Anglo-French air force as well as English landing troops from gaining any hold in Belgium and Holland.

(Marginal note in handwriting: "It will also be up to the Air Force to cut the supply lines of those English troops which have already landed. The employment of U-boats in the Channel will soon cease because of heavy losses")

5. The Direction of Naval Warfare must concentrate everything on being able to give direct and indirect support to the operations of the army while this assault lasts.

6. Apart from these preparations for starting the attack in the West according to plan, Army and Air Force must be ready at any time and with increasing strength, in order to be able to meet an Anglo-French invasion of Belgium as far inside Belgian territory as possible, and to occupy as much of

H1146 - 0019

Holland as possible in the direction of the West Coast. (Marginal note in handwriting: "This kind of procedure would be more desirable in every respect")

7. The camouflage used for these preparations must be that they are merely precautionary measures in view of the threatening concentration of French and English forces on the Franco-Luxembourg and Franco-Belgian borders.

8. I request the Supreme Commanders to give me, as soon as possible, detailed reports of their intentions in the basis of this directive and from now on, to keep me informed, via the OKW, of the state of the preparations.

signed: Adolf Hitler

Distribution:

Supreme Command of the Army	Copy No. 1
Supreme Command of the Navy	" " 2
Reich Minister for Air and C. in C. Air Force	" " 3

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Chief Armed Forces, General Staff Dept.	" " 4
Chief L	" " 5
I a	" " 6
I b	" " 7
I c	" " 8

DOCUMENT B.

MOST SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin
15 October 1939 (should read 15 November 1939)

W.F.A. No. 20/39 Most Secret. S.O. only

Subject: "Fall Gelb"

S.O. only
access only through officer

7 copies
Copy No. 2

The queries roused by the Supreme Command of the Army, on the subject of the execution of Directive OKW/WFA/L No. 213/39 Most Secret dated 14 November 1939, were discussed with the Fuehrer today.

The result was as follows:

It is of not inconsiderable significance for the overall strategy of the war to protect the Ruhr areas by moving the plane-spotting organization and the air defense as far forward as possible in the area of Holland.

The more Dutch territory we occupy, the more effective can the defense of the Ruhr area be made. This viewpoint must determine the choice of objectives made by the Army, even if Army and Navy are not directly interested in such a territorial gain. Therefore, the purpose of the Army's preparations must be to occupy - when a special order is received - the area of Holland, at first as far as the Grebbe-Maas line. It will depend on the political and military attitude of the Dutch, as well as on the effectiveness of their flooding, whether it will be necessary and possible to push the objective still farther.

H1146 - 0020

Likewise, preparations must be made to take possession of the West Frisian islands, with the support of the Navy, at first with the exception of Texel, as soon as the Northern coast of Groningen is in our hands; these too are of great significance as bases for the A/C reporting service and England must be deprived of the possibility of seizing them for similar purposes.

signed: Keitel

Distribution:

Supreme Command of the Army (Gen. Staff of the Army)	Copy No.	1.
Supreme Command of the Navy	" "	2.
Reich Minister for Air and C in C Air Force	" "	3.
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces / Sect. L	" "	4, 5 & 6.
Draft	" "	7.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-62

27 November 1945.

I, CLARE BOULTER, P.O., W.R.N.S., 59549, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-62.

CLARE BOULTER
P.O., W.R.N.S.,
59549.

H1146 - 0021

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-72
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 7 November 1939

WFA/Dept. LI No. 207/39 Top Secret Important Matter

5 copies
2nd copy

Important Matter
Only by hand of Officer

TOP SECRET

On 7 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, after hearing reports on the meteorological and the railway transport situation, has ordered: -

A-day is postponed for the time being by three days. The next decision will be made by 1800 hours on 9 November 39.

signed: KEITEL

Distribution:

OKH
OKM
R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L.
WFA
L

H1146 - 0022

H1146 - 0023

TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 10 November 1939

WFA/L I No 208/39 Top Secret Important Matter

8 copies
2nd copy

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

TOP SECRET

On 9 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, after hearing a report on the meteorological situation, has decided:-

The earliest date designated for A-day is 19 November. The next decision hereon will be made by 1800 hours on 13 November.

signed: KEITEL

Distribution:

Ob.d.H.	1st copy
Ob.d.M.	2nd copy
R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L.	3rd copy
OKW:	
WFA	4th copy
L	5th - 8th copy

H1146 - 0024

TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 13 November 1939

WFA/L I No 212/39 Top Secret Important Matter

6 copies
2nd copy

Important Matter

TOP SECRET

Only by hand of Officer

On 13 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander, after receiving a report on the meteorological situation, has decided:

The next decision on A-day will be made on Thursday, 16 November. A-day therefore definitely not before Wednesday, 22 November.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed: KEITEL

Distribution:

Ob.d.H.	1st copy
Ob.d.M.	2nd copy
R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L.	3rd copy
WFA	4th copy
OKW/L	5th and 6th copies

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

H1146 - 0025

TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 16 November 1939

WFA/ Dept L I No 214/39 Top Secret Important Matter

6 copies
2nd copy

Important Matter

TOP SECRET

Only by hand of Officer

1) On 16 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander, after hearing a report on the meteorological situation, has decided:-

The next decision on A-day will be made on Monday, 20 November. A-day therefore definitely not before Sunday, 26 November.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed: KEITEL

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H1146 – 0026

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin, 20 November 1939

WFA/Dept L No 217/39 Top Secret Important Matter

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Important Matter

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On 20 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander, after hearing a report on the meteorological situation, has decided:-

The next decision on A-day will be made on Monday, 27 November. A-day therefore definitely not before Sunday 3 December.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed: KEITEL

Distribution:

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TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 27 November 1939

WFA/Dept L No 219/39 Top Secret Important Matter

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Important Matter

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TOP SECRET

On 27 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:-

1) All mobile units are to be transported immediately to the transit quarters.

2) The next decision on A-day will be made at 1800 hours on 4 December.

3) Earliest date of next A-day 9 December.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed: KEITEL

Distribution:

Ob.d.H.	1st copy
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TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Department for National Defense

No 223/39 Top Secret Important Matter

Important

Only by hand of Officer

Berlin, 29 November 1939

5 copies
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TOP SECRET

Enclosed the time-table for the preparations of the attack in the West No 223/39 Top Secret Important Matter, 2nd copy.

The time table sent on 8 November 1939 under No. 196/39 Top Secret Important Matter to be destroyed. (Marginal handwritten note:- destroyed).

for the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

signed: JODL

Distribution:

Ob.d.H.	1st copy
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TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces - Important Matter - Berlin, 29 November 1939

Department for National Defense - Only by hand of Officer - 10 copies
2nd copy

No 223/39 Top Secret Important Matter

TOP SECRET

Time-Table for the Preparation of the Attack in the West

A-day = Day of Attack

No	Time	Army	Navy	Air Force	Remarks
1)	A-day minus 5 1800 hrs	Decision by Fuehrer as to A-day			1) Next decision 4 Dec. at 1800 hours 2) Attack can be stopped until A-day minus 1 at 2300 hours if disadvantages will be accepted.
2)	A-day minus 1 during the day			Air Force units move to forward airfields	
3)	A-day minus 1 1200 hrs.	Last moment at which an order of the day by the Fuehrer has to reach the C-in-C of the Army, if it is to reach company commanders before the commencement of the attack (telephone transmission unavoidable)			
4)	A-day minus 1 2300 hrs.	Latest moment for stopping the attack			

Distribution:

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H1146 -0029

H1146 - 0030

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 4 December 1939

WFA/Dept L No 226/39 Top Secret Important Matter

8 copies
2nd copy

Important Matter

TOP SECRET

Only by hand of Officer

On 4 December the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:-

1) The next decision on A-day will be made at 1800 hours on 6 December.

2) Earliest date of next A-day 11 December.

for the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed: JODL

Distribution:

Ob.d.H.	1st copy
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OKW:	
WFA	4th copy
Chief L	5th copy
Ia - Ic	6th - 8th copies

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

WFA/ Dept L No 22 230/39 Top Secret

Berlin, 6 December 1939

8 copies
2nd copy

Important Matter

TOP SECRET

Only by hand of Officer

On 6 December the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:-

1) The next decision on A-day will be made at 1800 hours on 12 December.

2) Earliest date of next A-day 17 December.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed: JODL

Distribution:

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H1146 - 0032

TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 12 December 1939

WFA/ No 22/39 Top Secret Important Matter

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2nd copy

TOP SECRET

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

On 12 December the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has ordered:-

1) The next decision on A-day will be made by 1800 hours on 27 December.

2) Earliest date of next A-day therefore 1 January 1940.

3) Christmas leave to be arranged accordingly by the branches of the armed forces.

for the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed: JODL

Distribution:

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H1146 - 0033

 TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

TOP SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 27 December 1939

WFA/ Dept L No 22 244/39 Top Secret Important Matter — 8 copies
2nd copy

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

On 27 December the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has made the following decision:-

In view of general meteorological situation, the date of the attack is further postponed, as far as can be foreseen by at least a fortnight. The next decision will be made at the latest by 1800 hours on 9 January.

The the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed: JODL

Distribution:

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OKW:	
WFA	4th copy
Chief L	5th copy
Dept L Ia-Ic	6th - 8th copies

(handwritten note):
Group W advised by teleprinter 1800 on 27 Dec.

(handwritten) Note:-

According to information L I b (H), the above means that the earliest A-day is the 9 Jan. and the latest day for a decision is also the 9 Jan.
Rectification accordingly by Top Secret messange No 2821 on 28 Dec. to Group West

Initial

(handwritten)

Date	Moon Phase
2 Jan	last quarter
9 Jan	new moon
17 Jan	first quarter
24 Jan	full moon
31 Jan	last quarter

TOP SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin, 30 December 1939

WFA/ Dept L (Ib) No 22247/39 Top Secret Important Matter

Important Matter

To
the High Command of the Navy Only by hand of Officer

Subject: Skl B No 1 Skl Jo Op, 512/39 Top Secret Important Matter

Re: Clarification of date for A-day

Your interpretation that the earliest date for A-day is now the 9 January, but that the next decision will also be made at the latest by 1800 hours of the same day is confirmed as correct.

Should the attack take place in the period between the 9 January and 14 January 1940, Naval High Command will receive the necessary notification (warning-order) early, i.e. 9 days before the commencement of the attack.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed: JODL

H1146 - 0034

H1146 - 0035

TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin, 9 January 1940

No 22007/40 Top Secret Important Matter OKW/WFA LI 8 copies
2nd copy

TOP SECRET

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

A decision on the date of A-day will not be made before 10 January 1940.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed: JODL

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(handwritten) Note:

Has been passed by telephone by the I/Skl Io on 9 Jan 40 to A I Group West.

Initial

TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 11 January 1940

WFA No 22014/40 Top Secret Important Matter Dept L (I) — 9 copies
2nd copy

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

Re: Contingency "Yellow"

On 10 January 1940 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, after receiving reports from the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, the Commander in Chief of the Navy and the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, has ordered the following:-

1) A-day and X-hour

A-day is Wednesday, 17 January 40. (Wednesday, 17 in ink)

X-hour 15 minutes before sunrise at Aix-la-Chapelle on A-day = 0816 hours. (0816 in ink)

The code-name "Rhine" or "Elbe" (see instruction No 8 for the conduct of the war, dated 20 November 39, No 1) will be issued before 2300 hours on A-day minus 1, provided the weather forecast permits.

2) Employment of the 7th Air Div.

The operation is to be carried through according to the instructions so far given, with the following modification:

For the 7th Air Div., besides the "North" and the "South" drives, a third drive (code-name: "Einsatz fortress") is to be prepared for obtaining possession of the heart of the Dutch fortress. The Supreme Command of the Army makes preparations to enable it to break quickly into the Dutch fortress beyond the goal hitherto designated, i.e. the Maas-Grebbe line, should the "Einsatz fortress" be the order given to the 7th Air Div.

The decision on the "Einsatz fortress" will be made at the latest on the morning of A-day minus 1. The "North" and "South" drives can only be considered if by A-day, a sufficient depth of snow improves jumping and landing conditions near Ghent and along the Maas, which at the moment are fraught with difficulties.

3) Air Force Attack on the Enemy Air Force.

If the weather is suitable, the air force will on 14 January 40 attack with all available forces the majority of the occupied enemy air-fields in northeastern and eastern France by surprise, with the principal aim of destroying the fighter and reconnaissance aircraft stationed there. For this attack, the air force is at liberty to fly across Luxemburg and, as far as necessary, also across Belgian and Dutch territory.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed: KEITEL

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TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

TOP SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 13 January 39*

WFA No 3/40 Top Secret Important Matter

5 copies
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Re: Contingency "Yellow"

Important Matter

By hand of Officer Only

On account of the metereological situation, the Fuehrer has decided to postpone A-day, probably to 20 January 40. Latest time for issue of orders re above is 1800 hours on A-day minus 5.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed: JODL

6015

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* Translator's Note: The date is a typing error; it is obvious from the context that the correct date is 13 January 40.

H1146 - 0037

H1146 - 0038

TRANSLATION OF DOC. C-72
(cont.)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 7 May 1940

WFA/Dept L No 22 179/40 Top Secret Important Matter

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TOP SECRET

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

1) The Orders:-

OKW/L No 22 176/40 Top Secret Important Matter, dated 6 May 40 and
OKW/L No 22 177/40 Top Secret Important Matter, dated 6 May 40
are cancelled.

2) The new A-day will be ordered, according to the weather situation, at 1200 hours on A-day minus 1 only. A new X-hour* will be given accordingly.

Next decision at 1200 hours on 8 May.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed: JODL

Distribution:

Ob.d.H.	1st copy
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* X-hour = zero hour

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin, 9 May 1940

WFA/ Dept L No 22 180/40 Top Secret Important Matter 5 copies
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Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer TOP SECRET

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:-

A-day ... 10 May
X-hour .. 0535 hours

The code-words "Danzig" or "Augsburg" to reach the branches * of the armed forces by 2130 hours on the 9 May at the latest.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed: KEITEL

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Chief WFA	4th copy
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* OKH, OKL, & OKM

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO C-72

23 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-72.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

H1146 - 0039

H1146 - 0040

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-75
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

Only by Officer

Armed Forces High Command (OKW)
Joint Operations Staff, Branch L (I Op.)
No. 44 282/41 Top Secret

Führer's Headquarters
5 March 1941

(Various handwritten notations and stamps)

14 copies
2nd copy

Basic Order No. 24

regarding collaboration with Japan

The Führer has issued the following order regarding collaboration with Japan:

1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to take active measures in the Far East. Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.

The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of its adversaries. The "Barbarossa" operation will create particularly favorable political and military prerequisites for this. /Marginal note - "slightly exaggerated"/

2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means available.

For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat experience and for assistance in military economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have the most immediate application in waging war.

In special cases the Führer reserves the decisions to himself.

3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.

This will be subject to the following guiding principles:

a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese intentions.

b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be exploited.

H1146-0041

c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany.

d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of war of the Three Powers.

In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power -- extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented -- will result in weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia).

A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet be fixed.

4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the three participating powers. These will include primarily the problems of economic warfare.

The working out of the details is the responsibility of the "Main Commission" with the cooperation of the Armed Forces High Command.

5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation.

The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command

Signed in draft: Keitel

Correctness certified by
JUNGE
Lieutenant Commander

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- - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C-75

21 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-75.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc. 33925738

H1146 - 0042

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-120
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

DIRECTIVES FROM HITLER AND KEITEL

PREPARING FOR WAR AND THE INVASION OF POLAND

(C-120/A)

Top Secret
Officer Only

The High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) Berlin, 3 April 1939
WFA Nr. 37/39 Top Secret Officer Only L Ia

SUBJECT: Directive for the Armed Forces 1939/40 5 copies
2nd Copy

The Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed Forces for 1939/40 is being re-issued.

Part I ("Frontier Defence") and Part III ("Danzig") will be issued in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.

Part II "Fall Weiss" is attached herewith. The signature of the Führer will be appended later.

The Führer has added the following Directives to "Fall Weiss":

1) Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can be carried out at any time from 1.9.39 onwards

2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise time-table for "Fall Weiss" and to arrange by conferences the synchronised timings between the 3 branches of the Armed Forces

3) The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and the details for the time-table must be submitted to the OKW by 1.5.39.

The Chief of the High Command of the
Armed Forces

(signed) KEITEL

Distribution:-

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RdL u Ob.d L	=	1 (" " 3.)
OKW (L)	=	2 (" " 4 u. 5)
Total		5

H1146 - 0043

Top Secret.
Officer Only

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW Nr. 37/39 Top Secret Officer Only. WFA/LI

Berlin, 11 April 1939

5 Copies
2nd Copy

Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed Forces, 1939/40.

I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these for the conduct of war.

Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be prepared for the following eventualities:

I) Safeguarding of the frontiers of the German Reich and protection against surprise air attacks. (see Annexe I)

II) "Fall Weiss" (see Annexe II)

III) The Annexation of Danzig (see Annexe III)

Annexe IV contains regulations for the exercise of military authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike development.

(signed) Adolf Hitler.

Distribution:

OKH	=	1 (Copy No. 1)
OKM	=	1 (" " 2)
RdL u.Ob.d.L	=	1 (" " 3)
OKW (WFA/L)	=	2 (" " 4)u. 5)

H1146 - 0044

(C-120/C)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-120
Continued

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ANNEX I to OKW L Ia No. 37/39

I.

Safeguarding the Frontiers of the German Reich and Protection Against Surprise Air Raids.

(Translation Omitted)

- -

Enclosure to OKW No. 37/39 Top Secret WFA/L I, dated 11 April 43; Annex I

Top Secret
By Officer Only

Special Order for "Frontier Defence" (Grenzsicherung)

(Translation Omitted)

H1146 - 0045

ANNEX II to OKW No. 37/39 Top Secret L I

Top Secret

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II

"Fall Weiss"

The present attitude of Poland requires, beyond the plan "Frontier-defense East", the effecting of military preparations to exclude if necessary any threat from this direction forever.

1) Political Requirements and Aims.

German relations with Poland continue to be based on the principle of avoiding any quarrels. Should Poland, however, change her policy towards Germany, based up to now on the same principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement might become necessary, notwithstanding the pact in effect with Poland.

The aim then will be to destroy Polish military strength, and create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed a part of the Reich-territory at the outbreak of the conflict, at the latest.

The political leadership considers it its task in this case to isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to Poland only.

The development of increasing internal crises in France and the resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situation in the not too distant future.

Intervention by Russia so far as she would be able to do this cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because this would imply Poland's destruction by Bolshevism.

The attitude of the Baltic States will be determined wholly by German military exigencies.

On the German side, Hungary can not be considered a certain ally. Italy's attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis.

2) Military Conclusions.

The great objectives in the building up of the German Armed Forces will continue to be determined by the antagonism of the "Western Democracies". "Fall Weiss" constitutes only a precautionary complement to these preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any way, however, as the necessary prerequisite for a military settlement with the Western opponents.

The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting the war with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes.

The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea coast, as well as the air over them.

H1146 - 0046

Against the Baltic States - Lithuania in particular,- security measures are to be carried out for the event of a Polish march through this country.

3) Tasks of the Armed Forces.

The task of the Armed Forces is to destroy the Polish Armed Forces. For this reason a surprise attack is to be striven for and prepared. The camoflaged or open general mobilisation will not be ordered earlier than the day before the attack at the latest possible moment.

The forces provided for the "Western frontier defense" (aanex I "Frontier defense") must not be employed for any other purpose for the moment.

All other frontiers are to be kept under observation - the Lithuanian is to be covered.

4) Tasks of the Branches of the Armed Forces.

a) Army

The operational objective in the East is to destroy the Polish army.

For this purpose the German Armed Forces, on the southern flank, may enter Slovak territory. In the North, communication between Pomerania and East Prussia must be established quickly.

The preparations for the opening of operations are to be made in such a way, that even without waiting for the planned assembly of mobilized units, positions can be taken up immediately by the first available troops. A camoflaged assembly for these units just before the day of attack may be provided. I reserve for myself the decision in this matter.

Whether the forces provided for the "Western frontier defense" will be deployed there completely, or will be partly available for some other employment, - will depend upon the political situation.

b) Navy

The tasks of the Navy in the Baltic sea are as follows:

1) Destruction or elimination of the Polish Navy.
2) Blockade of all sea-ways to the Polish Naval bases, especially Gdynia. The neutral shipping in Polish harbours and in Danzig is to be given at the beginning of the invasion of Poland, a time limit for sailing. After its expiration, the Navy will be free to set up blockade measures.
   The disadvantages for the naval warfare produced by this time limit must be accepted.
3) Suppression of the Polish maritime trade.
4) Securing of the sea-route Reich - East Prussia.
5) Protection of German sea-communications to Sweden and Baltic States.
6) Reconnaissance and protection, as far as possible in an inconspicuous manner, against an intervention by the Soviet Navy from the Gulf of Finland.

Suitable naval froces are to be provided for defense of the coast and coastal zone of the North Sea.

In the southern part of the North Sea and in the Skagerrak measures are to be taken for precautionary protection against a surprise intervention of the Western powers. These measures are to be restricted to the absolute

H1146 - 0047

minimum. Their inconspicuousness must be assured. It is of decisive importance to avoid here any sort of action which might make the political attitude of the Western Powers more unfriendly.

c) Air Force

The whole Air Force except, for necessary forces left in the West, is to be sued for a surprise attack against Poland. Besides destruction of the Polish Air Force in the shortest time possible, - the tasks of the German Air Force are principally as follows:

1) Interference with the Polish mobilisation and prevention of planned Polish strategic concentrations.
2) Tactical support of the Army, especially support of the spear-heads starting immediately after the crossing of the frontier.

A possible transfer of flying-units to East Prussia, before beginning of operations, must not endanger surprise.

The moment of the first flight over the frontier is to be timed in coordination with the Army's operations.

Attacks against the harbour of Gdynia may be undertaken only after expiration of the time limit for sailing for the neutral ships. (See number 4 b)

Strong points of air-defense are to be set up above Stettin, Berlin and the Upper-Silesian industrial district including Maehrisch Ostrau (Moravská Ostravá) and Bruenn (Brno).

H1146 - 0048

(C-120/E)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-120
Continued

Typed by Officer

Top Secret. Officer Only

High Command of the Armed Forces.
WFA. Nr 67/39 Top Secret Officer Only. L (I)

Berlin, 24th June 1939

5 Copies
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Subject: - "Fall Weiss"

The Army High Command is herewith directed to prepare all measures necessary for capturing intact the bridges over the lower Vistula. On the completion of preparations, the Army High Command will briefly report to the Armed Forces High Command.

Besides, the Army and Navy High Commands will again examine whether the element of surprise in sudden attacks against the bridge at Dirschau will be impaired by preceding actions of the Navy in the Danzig Bay. In view of the importance of the bridge, it should be stated if the consent of the Army High Command to the intended measures of the Navy (mining before Y-time) is upheld.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces

(signed) KEITEL 24.6

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(C-120/F)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-120
Continued

Enclosure to OKW No. 37/39 Top Secret WFA/L I of 11 April 1939 (Annex II)

Top Secret

Special Orders for

"Fall Weiss"

Senior Officer only
Officer only

1) Legal Basis

We must start with the fact that the "State of Defense" or the "State of War" in the meaning of the R. V. Gesetz (Reich Defense Law) of 4 September 1938, will not be declared.

All actions and requests are to be based on peace-time legislation. The Provisions of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, apply appropriately. The right to issue supplements is reserved.

2) Mobilization

Directives concerning the extent of preliminary measures for execution of "Fall Weiss", especially where they entail the induction of supplementary personnel or the procuring of supplementary materiel, will be issued later by the OKW.

If, for the Armed Forces, or parts of them, a mobilisation without public proclamation (X-case) is ordered, it will not apply automatically to the civilian sphere including the armaments industry. However, the OKW will order such measures, with locally limited application, as are required for the mobilization of the Armed Forces or parts of them and for the maintenance of the ability of government agencies and of enterprises to function.

If for the armed forces as a whole the general mobilisation by public promulgation is ordered, then this mobilisation will quite automatically and indissolubly apply to the civil sphere, including the armaments industry. However, the mobilisation by public promulgation is not to be counted upon, if the military operations are restricted to "Fall Weiss".

3) Zone of operations and executive power..

For "Fall Weiss" the Eastern Zone of Operations (Op. Gebiet Ost) will be put into effect by the OKW. If the "Frontier Defense West" is involved, too, the Western Zone of Operations (Op. Gebiet West), provided for this contingency, will also be put into effect.

After the crossing of the frontier the operation zone will be extended forward, corresponding to the areas occupied by the troops.

In the "Army Operation Zone" the Commander-in-Chief of the Army will by special order receive the authorization to exercize executive power, with the right to delegate this authorization, completely or partly, to army commanders.

4) V.G.A.D. or V.G.A.D. (K) and Frontier Guards.

Orders for the formation "Reinforced frontier control service" - V.G.A.D., or V.G.A.D. (K) and the "Frontier Guard" will be issued by the O.K.W. if necessary.

H1146 -0050

5) Powers for the Reichsminister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force in questions of aerial defense.

Authorizations given for the mobilization (X-) case to the Reich Minister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Airforce according to the order OKW. Nr. 2230/38 g.K. WFA/L II of the 27 Sept. 38, Part. III, may be conferred upon him by an order of the Supreme Commander, already in the period of tension.

6) Clearing the frontier zones.

Clearing and evacuation measures will not be executed in the East. O.K.H. will make preparations for a receiving organization for refugees of German descent from Poland.

7) Evacuation and Rehousing of Population for Protection against Air-Attacks.

Insofar as the evacuation and rehousing of the population, as well as other measures for protection against air-attacks (clearing of school-buildings, public buildings, hospitals etc), come under consideration for the Mobilization (X) Case, these measures are to be prepared and the dates fixed by the Reichsminister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Airforce in cooperation with the military and civil authorities concerned. Execution of such plans in the period of tension depends upon the approval of O.K.W.

8) Organization of command.

According to situation, the following will be put under complete or partial command of:

a) The Commander-in-Chief of the Army:
The Air-force units provided for "Fall Weiss";
The SS Military Units (SS-Verfuegungstruppe) according to the order O.K.W. No. 1730/38 g.K. WFA/L II of 28 August 1938.
From the police at first those units provided for by the mobilization plan. The elements of the German Labor Service (RAD) provided according to Special Annex 7 to the mobilization plan for the Army.

b) The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy:
The Naval Air Force units;
The RAD-units provided for by the mobilization plan.

c) The Reichsminister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Airforce:
The RAD.-units enumerated in Special Annex 3 of the Air Force Mobilization plan.
The army units provided for airborne operations according to request of the Commander-in-Chief of the Airforce.

9) Supervision and prevention of communications on the land-and sea-frontiers and prevention of railroad-, air- and sea traffic.

The necessary measures will be prepared by the O.K.W. in cooperation with the Services in such a way that they can be put into operation completely or partly for "Fall Weiss" as well as on other frontiers (including the sea coast), according to the situation. Detailed provisions will follow.

10) Signal Communications.

(Translation Omitted)

11) Supply.

According to order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army the troops may be supplied from occupied territory. In this regard the critical

H1146 - 0051

situation of the German minority should be given due consideration. Requisitioning in occupied territory may be carried out in accordance with the Hague Land War Convention; insofar as contributions must be demanded from people of German descent, they must be paid for in German currency.
The rate of exchange for every kind of contribution will be announced in due time by the O.K.W.

12) Allowances (pay, rations, billeting, clothing, medicalcure)

(Translation Omitted)

13) Accounting of additional expenses which may arise.

Additional expenses resulting from "Fall Weiss" are to be charged finally under expenditure, to the (Special Budget) Account VIII E 230 (Budget of OKW) set up especially for this purpose.

initialled
(illegible!)

H1146 - 0052

Annex III to OKW. Nr. 37/39 Top Secret WFA/L I

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III
Annexation of Danzig

A surprise annexation of the Free State of Danzig may come into consideration, independently of "Fall Weiss", in order to exploit a favourable political situation.

The preparations are to be carried out on the following basis: The "Organisation of command in East-Prussia in case of warlike complications" (see Annex IV) will be put into effect, in regard to fig. 3.

The occupation will be carried out by the Army from East-Prussia.

The Navy will support the action of the Army by intervention from the sea, according to the detailed order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The naval forces involved are to be instructed to cooperate with the Army.

The extent to which the units of the Air Force can take part in the action of occupation is to be decided by the Reichsminister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

Details on cooperation are to be settled among the Services directly.

- -

Enclsoure to OKW No. 37/39 Top Secret
WFA/L I, dated 11 April 39, Annex III

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Special Orders for

"Annexation of Danzig"

(Translation Omitted)

H1146 - 0053

Annex IV to OKW/L Ia No. 37/39 Top Secret

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By officer only

IV

Provisions for the Exercise of Command
in East Prussia in Case of Warlike Complications

(Translation omitted)

H1146 - 0054

Annex V to OKW L Ia No. 37/39 Top Secret

5 copies
2nd copy

V

Boundaries of the Zone of Operations of the Army

(Translation omitted)

H1146 - 0055

(C-120/J)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-120
Continued

Berlin, 10 May 1939

High Command of the Armed Forces
No. 1050/39 Top Secret WFA/L II c.

TOP SECRET

200 copies
Copy No. 45

Subject: Exercise of Military Powers in Area of Operations of the Army.

(Translation omitted)

H1146 - 0056

(C-120/K)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-120
Continued

Top Secret
Officer Only

The Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 10th May 1939

Nr. 48/39 Top Secret WFA/L (I)

7 copies
2nd copy

Subject: Directive for the uniform preparation of War by the Armed Forces, 1939/40 (OKW.Nr.37/39 g.K.Chefs. WFA/L(I) of 11.4.39.)

Herewith, as Part VI of the "Directive", instructions for the economic war and the protection of our own economy are issued.

The Commanders-in-Chief of the Services will report to the Armed Forces High Command on the measures taken in consequence of these instructions by 1st August 1939.

(signed) Adolf Hitler.

Distribution: -

O.K.H.	=	1 (Pruef Nr. 1)
O.K.M.	=	1 (" " 2)
R.d.L.u.Ob.d.L.	=	1 (" " 3)
O.K.W. (W Stb)	=	1 (" " 4)
O.K.W. (Ausl/Abr)	=	1 (" " 5)
O.K.W. (L)	=	2 (" " 6 u. 7)

H1146 - 0057

Annex VI to
OKW No. 37/39 Top Secret WFA/L Ia

Top Secret
By Officer Only

VI

Directives for the War Against the Enemy Economy (Economic Warfare) and Measures for the Protection of our own Economy.

I. Introduction

1) The most important instruments of the attack against the enemy economy are the Navy and Air Force. Their measures will be supplemented by the sabotage warfare (OKW (Abwehr)). It may become a mission of the Army to widen our German living space by the occupation of enemy territories of special importance to our own economy.

The preparation of economic warfare measures is a responsibility of the GBW (Plenipotentiary for the Economy).

The OKW (WFA in coordination with the W Staff) will insure that uniform objectives are set for all measures against the enemy economy. The same applies for measures for the protection of our own economy.

2) In Section II and III of these Directives, outlines are issued for the economic warfare and protective measures for the contingencies (Faelle) "Frontier Defence" and "Weiss". From them the preparations to be effected by the Services and the GBW will be derived.

* * * * *

III. Directive for "Fall Weiss".

1) The objective is to capture the Polish economic installations as intact as possible. They may be attacked only in case of immediate military necessity.

2) The quick occupation of the industrial districts of Polish-Upper-Silesia and Cieszyn (Teschen) is important for the war economy.

3) All sea-borne imports to Poland have to be prevented by the Navy. For this purpose the form of the trade warfare (Handelskrieg) against Polish imports is to be laid down in cooperation with the Foreign Office in accordance with the political situation. Of special importance here is the treatment of neutral flags and of goods which are possibly destined for Poland by way of neutral ports.

4) For the protection of the German economy, the measures for the case "Frontier Defence" apply where appropriate.

- - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-120

[illegible] November 1945

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document C-120.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 126
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

C 126

EXTRACT FROM OPERATION ORDERS 1 FOR THE CAPITAL SHIP "SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN"

Kiel, August 21st,,1939.

. . . . I Position

(a) Political

"Fall Weiss" means that the Polish Army shall be utterly broken and annihilated by surprise, in order to create a state of affairs in the East which meets the defence of the country.

The Free State of Danzig will be declared to be Reich territory on the outbreak of hostilities at the latest. Security measures will be taken in the Baltic and Kattegat against the intervention of foreign states. .....

Draft signed ALBRECHT
pp Chief of Staff for
Naval Group Command
East.
Fein.

C 126

EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO OKW (L) BY VON BRAUCHITSCH

Berlin, July 3rd, 1939.

The Supreme Command of the Army cannot agree to the measures which the Navy are intending to take before Y-hour - insofar as these could become known to the enemy - and requests that steps be taken to ensure that no measures of any kind which may prejudice a surprise attack be carried out by other sections of the Armed Fordes before the time when the army crosses the frontier. The crossings of the frontier by the army takes place at dawn on Y-day. . . . .

C 126

EXTRACTS FROM MEMO OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE NAVY

Berlin, May 16th, 1939.

II. Directions of the Fuehrer

2. Conclusions in the military field :-

The major aims in building up the German Army continue to be determined by the hostility of the Western democracies. "Fall Weiss" constitutes merely a completion, by way of precaution, of preparations, and should on no account be regarded as the forerunner of a settlement with our opponents in the West by force of arms.

H1146 - 0058

The isolation of Poland will be maintained the more readily even after the outbreak of war, if we succeed in opening the war with heavy blows struck by surprise and followed up by rapid successes.

8. (a) ... It can be expected that Y-hour will be a time in the early hours of the morning, two hours before it grows light (three hours before sunrise).
This time of day is required by the Navy to carry out the measures she has to take, and is recognized by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

(b) With a view to maintaining, on a large scale, the routine of peace-time training, and to avoiding a premature exposure of the measures it is intended to take, a warning (preparation) period of 48 hours may be expected . . . .

V. Date fixed for completion of preparations

According to the instructions of the Fuehrer, "Fall Weiss" should be so worked on that it can be carried out at any time from 1 September 1939. onwards . . . .

C 126

RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSION WITH THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES/LII ON TIMETABLES FOR PREPARATORY MEASURES

Undated

1. The preparatory measures determined upon in timetable form will be submitted to the Fuehrer for approval.
Each section of the Armed Forces can, at its own discretion, proceed with and carry out these measures, when approved, from the time fixed onwards.

2. The measures proposed by the Navy, including exercise in the transmission of orders and intelligence for Group Command East, present no difficulties, since they can be disguised as practice measures.

3. The following should be laid down uniformly for all sections of the Armed Forces :-

Y - 5 24-hour duty for the Senior Staffs, (Army, Group and "Wehrkreis" H.Qs.)

Y - 3 Sections of the Armed Forces may further extend 24-hour duty.

Y - 4 Switch over to "Martha" network.

Y - 2 Switch over, in the operation area, to the jamming networks of the two other sections of the Armed Forces.

An earlier time for putting the Martha network into operation is desired by the Navy as well as being requested by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Armed Forces Communications) so that the Post Office can deal with it in stages.

Y - 6 Disguised stopping of leave, no recalls, especially not from abroad.

Y - 2 Naval air units to come under the tactical control of the C.-in-C. of the Navy.

4. It is intended to switch over to the defence network from 3 August 1939."
. . . .

No signature

H1146 - 0059

C 126

EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO THE FLEET, F.O. (U/B) & B.d.P.

Berlin, August 2nd, 1939.

Attached are Operational Directions for the employment of U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out "Fall Weiss" remaining unchanged. F.O. (U/B) is handing in his Operation Orders to Slk. by 12 August (Ink note - a decision on the sailings of U-Boats for the Atlantic will probably be made at the middle of August).

These directions must, if the Operations are not carried out, be destroyed by the 1 September 1939 at the latest . . . .

(Initialled) F.A.
Slk.
1/Slk.

C 126

Berlin 22.6.1939.

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Re : Preparations for "Fall Weiss".

. . . .

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander a "preliminary time-table" for "Fall Weiss", based on the particulars so far available from the Navy, Army and Air Force. Details concerning the days preceding the attack and the start of the attack were not included in this time-table.

The Fuehrer and the Supreme Commander is, in the main, in agreement with the intentions of the Navy, Army and Air Force and made the following comments on individual points :-

1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up reserves on a larger scale than usual for the manoeuvres scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments, employers or other private persons who make enquiries should be told that men are being called up for the autumn manoeuvres and for the exercise units it is intended to form for those manoeuvres.

It is requested that directions to this effect to issued to subordinate establishments.

2. For reasons of security the clearing of hospitals in the area of the frontier which the Supreme Command of the Army proposed should take place from the middle of July, must not be carried out.

3. It shoud be ascertained whether it appears to be expedient to transfer the S.S. Artillery Regiment to East Prussia and use it there for the purpose intended, in view of the fact that this regiment had only been formed a short time previously, or whether it seems more profitable to use an Army Artillery Regiment in place of an S.S. Artillery Regiment.

The result of the investigation should be communicated to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

H1146 - 0060

4. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander will decide at the beginning of August whether the training ships of the Navy will put out according to plan.

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

Keitel.

C 126

SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES
OKW/WFA No. 170/39gk Chefs. L.I.

Berlin, 31 August 1939

MOST SECRET

8 Copies
2nd Copy

Known to Ob.d.M.

S.O. only (Stamp)
Access only through an officer.

Direction No. 1 for the Conduct of the War.

1. Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by peaceful means of a situation on the Eastern Frontier which is intolerable for Germany are exhausted, I have determined on a solution by force.

2. The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance with the preparations made for "Fall Weiss", with the alterations which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that it has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions.

Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged.

Date of attack - 1 September 1939
Time of attack - 04:45 (Inserted in red pencil)

This time also applies to the operation at Gdynia, Bay of Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge.

3. In the West it is important that the responsibility for the opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England and France. At first purely local action should be taken against insignificant frontier violations.

and Denmark (red pencil note) The neutrality assured by us to Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland should be scrupulously observed.

The German land frontier in the West is not to be crossed at any point without my express consent.

According to this Atlantic U-boats must remain in their waiting positions for the time being. (pencil note) The same applies to warlike actions at sea or any which may be so interpreted.

Defensive measures on the part of the Luftwaffe should at first be confined exclusively to the warding off of enemy air attacks on the frontier of the Reich. In doing so the frontier of the neutral states should be observed as long as possible when dealing with single aircraft and smaller units. Defensive operations should only be permitted over this neutral territory when, where French and English attacking squadrons are operating over neutral states against German territory in considerable force, air defence in the West is no longer assured.

H1146 - 0061

It is of special importance that the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces should be informed with the least possible delay of any violation of the neutrality of their States on the part of our opponents in the West.

4. If England and France open hostilities against Germany, the task of those sections of the Armed Forces which are operating in the West is to uphold, while conserving their strength as far as possible, those conditions necessary for the successful conclusion of the operations against Poland. Within the scope of this duty, damage should be done to enemy forces and their economic sources of supply as far as resources allow. In any case I reserve to myself the order to commence attack operations.

Warfare against Merchant Shipping (Green Pencil)

(See Directions to Groups, ships and U-Boats) (red pencil note).

The Army is holding the West wall and is making preparations to prevent its being turned - the Western Powers violating Belgian or Dutch territory in doing so. If French forces move into Luxembourg, the frontier bridges may be blown up.

(Undecipherable note in green pencil)

In its warfare on merchant shipping the Navy is concentrating on England. To intensify the effect of this, a declaration of danger zones is to be expected.
The Supreme Command of the Navy announces in which areas of sea and within what limits danger zones are considered expedient. The wording of a public declaration should be prepared in conjunction with the Foreign Office and should be submitted to me for approval through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

The Baltic should be secured against penetration by the enemy. The C.-C. of the Navy decides whether the approaches to the Baltic should be mined for this purpose.

Address to . . (undecipherable) General Warning! (Red pencil note)

The primary task of the Luftwaffe is to prevent the French and English Air Force operating against the German Army and German "Lebensraum".
In waging war against England preparations should be made for the use of the Luftwaffe in causing damage to sea transport, the armament industry and troop transports to France. Full use should be made of favorable opportunities to make an effective attack on massed English naval units, especially on battleships and aircraft carriers. The decision regarding attacks on London rests with me.

Attacks on the English motherland should be prepared, bearing in mind that whatever happens, inadequate success with part forces is to be avoided.

(sgd) A. Hitler

. . . (undecipherable)

Warning?
(Note in red pencil)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C126

16 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, PFC, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document C 126.

ERNST M. COHN
PFC, 33925738.

H1146 - 0062

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-139
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC.24-7/C-139

Top Secret.
S.O.

The Reich Minister of Defence
Nr. 1400/35 g.Kdos.L.Chef.

Berlin, 2nd May 1935

(Note in
2nd copy (Blue pencil "By hand only")

To: Chief of Army High Command
Chief of Navy High Command
Reich Minister for Air

For the operation, suggested in the last Staff Talks of the Armed Forces, I lay down the Code name "Schulung" ("Training").

The supreme direction of operation "Schulung" rests with the Reich Minister of Defence as this is a joint undertaking of the three Services.

Preparations for the operation will begin forthwith according to the following directives:

I. General.

1.) The operation must, on issue of the code word "Carry Out Schulung", be executed by a surprise blow at lightning speed.

Strictest secrecy is necessary in the preparations and only the very smallest number of officers should be informed and employed in the drafting of reports, drawings etc., and these officers only in person.

2.) There is no time for mobilisation of the Forces taking part. These will be employed in their peace-time strength and with their peace-time equipment.

3.) The preparation for the operation will be made without regard to the present inadequate state of our armaments. Every improvement of the state of our armaments will make possible a greater measure of preparedness and thus result in better prospects of success.

II. In particular, I request suggestions about the following points:

1.) High Command of the Army:

a) How many divisions ready for action and what other suitable troops, including all motorised troops, can be made available for the operation?

Basis of the calculations:

Restriction to pure defence - if necessary delaying resistance - in the West.

Reinforcement of the necessarily inadequate forces there by the East Prussian divisions which will be transported there immediately by rail or sea.

b) Concentration area or areas and time taken by concentration.

c) Plans for the carrying out of the operation.

2.) High Command of the Navy.

Safe transport of the East-Prussian troops by sea if transport by land is not possible.

3.) Air-Force.

a) Support for the attack carried out under "Schulung" by the army.
b) Examination of the possibilities of further assistance to the defence in the West.

(signed) v.Blomberg

H1146 - 0063

SEC.24-7/C-139.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C-139, SEC.24-7

5 November 1945

I, VIRGINIA VON SCHON, (CIV), 046318, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-139, SEC.24-7.

VIRGINIA VON SCHON
046318.

H1146 - 0064

H1146 - 0065

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-140
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

(SEC-24.7/C-140)

To A I op 23/35. (in pencil)

Appendix to "The Reich-Minister for Defence No. 7/33 secret Reich Ministry of Defence.

Berlin, 25.10.1935.
Secret 114.

Directive
for the Armed Forces
in case of Sanctions.

Weisung
fur die Wehrmacht
im Falle von Sanktionen.

1.) The further development of the international situation created by Germany's giving notice of leaving the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, can lead to the application of sanction measures against Germany.

It is not known which States will take steps towards sanctions. As long as the Council of the League of Nations does not decide upon joint action, France should first of all be considered. But France can induce Poland, Belgium and Czechoslovakia also to apply sanctions.

2.) The sanctions of the opponents can be of various natures.

The Armed Forces will be immediately and directly affected by such measures as entail a violation of German Territory, particularly therefore, if the enemy's forces break into, fly over or shell German land areas. The same applies at sea to the 3-miles zone (pencil margin-note - mine-laying) also in case of enemy measures against German naval forc in case of the capture or sinking of German merchant ships, in case of the blockade of the German coast as well as in case of attack on German coastal fortifications or places.

First of all an occupation of German territory is to be reckoned with.

3.) The Government of the Reich is determined to reply to all enemy actions as described under figure 2, with a local armed resistance, without regard to the chances of military success. (for restrictions see figure 5. a) to c)). (Pencil margin note: Resistance).

This resistance will be made only by the Army, Navy and Air Force and the other forces, which have been expressly described as components of and which are under orders of the Armed Forces. These other forces must comply with the conditions of Article 1.) of the Appendix to the Treaty regarding the laws and usages of land warfare of 18.10.1907.

4.) In order to carry out armed resistance, the following emergency, and defensive measures of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, are visualized:

a). Systematic formation of the A-Army (A-Heeres). The whole Provincial and/or Emergency Police Force of the states (Länder) is, as a fighting body, at the disposal of the Chief of the Army High Command and under his orders. Defence-District-Command I (Wehrkr.Kdo.I) has at its disposal the East Prussian Provincial Police Force.

H1146 - 0066

b). Systematic formation of the V-Navy(V-Marine) and its further reinforcement as material and personnel possibilities permit.

c). Systematic formation of the A-Air Force (A-Luftwaffe) including the passive air defence of the Reich.

The air-forces planned for co-operation with the Army and the Navy, as soon as ready, will be placed under the orders of the Commander in Chief of the Army or Navy.

The field passive air defence troops (Feldluftschutz--truppen) planned for the Army will be available at first for the passive air defence of the Reich. I reserve for myself the time of placing them under the orders of the Chief of the Army Command.

5.) The following tasks of the armed resistance to be offered are to be envisaged first.

a). on land :

The ensuring of the positioning of the A-Army against France-Belgium, against Poland and Czechoslovakia together with the Frontier Guards (the reinforced Frontier Guard - Survey Service included) and the Provincial and/or Emergency Police Force. In the West the line Roer-Rhine and the Black Forest, in the East of the Reich the position Hotzenplotz-Oder-Nischlitz-Obra and Pomerania must be held as long as possible. In the struggle against Czechoslovakia ground may be given only yard by yard. As far as East Prussia is concerned the present regulations remain in force.

A concentration of forces of the Army in the demilitarised zone or their entry into the same requires my consent.

b). At sea:

Protection of commerce in the North and Baltic seas. Securing of communication with East Prussia.

Defence against enemy attacks launched from the sea and from the air against the German Coast.

I reserve for myself the approval of all enterprises which have not the character of armed resistance (pencil note: see para 2) such as attacks against Gdingen, mining operations which exceed local or tactical purposes, as well as of counter-measures against an enemy blockade (marginal note in pencil; as long as the blockade has nothing to do with para.2 or 3) and the opening of warfare against merchant and naval shipping.

c). in the Air:

Defence of the air over Berlin and over the industrial part of central Germany, with Berlin as the centre of gravity.

H1146 - 0067

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-140.
(cont'd)

The employment of Bombers remains reserved.

I reserve for myself the approval of declaration of restricted areas for civil aviation.

signed. Blomberg.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-140.

I, KENNETH DUKE, Major, R.A.,109907, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-140.

KENNETH DUKE,
Major.,R.A.
109907.

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. C-140
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(Extra Copy)
(In pencil)

Only by Officer, to be passed by hand.

The Reich Minister for Defence
No. 7/33 g. Kdos. RW. Min.

Berlin, 25th October 1933

(Stamp) Secret. S.O.

To: Head of Army High Command
Head of Navy High Command
Reich Minister for Air

1) The enclosed directive gives the basis for preparations of the Armed Forces in the case of sanctions being applied against Germany.

2) I request the Heads of the Army and Navy High Commands and the Reich Minister for Air to carry out the preparations in accordance with the following instructions:

(a) Strictest secrecy. It is of the utmost importance that no fact becomes known to the outside world from which preparation for resistance of sanctions can be inferred or which are incompatible with Germany's existing obligations regarding the demilitarised zone in the sphere of foreign policy. If necessary, the preparations must take second place to this necessity.

Measures in the process of execution, which are designed to strengthen our system of defence in the more distant future, are not affected by the attached directives.

(b) The circle of persons taking part in the preparatory studies will be restricted, for the time being, to the Reich Ministry for Defence and Reich Ministry for Air. Insofar as the Head of the Army High Command wishes to contact the Reich Minister of the Interior with regard to the Mobilised Police (Bereitschaftspolizei), this ruling should also be observed.

(c) I forbid all preparations of a practical nature until further notice.

3) I request early reports by the Heads of the Army and Navy High Commands and the Reich Minister for Air on the measures intended as to blockading, demolitions and evacuation. Reports will also be submitted to me on intentions regarding actual measures of armament. I will subsequently decide as to the participation of the National Defence Board (Landesverteidigungsrat) in the further preparations.

I intend to call a meeting of individual agencies (Aussenstellen) of the Army and the Navy for a discussion of the most important questions in the Reich Ministry for Defence by the end of next week.

(signed) v. Blomberg.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf. O-133 55 67 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-140.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
O-133 55 67

H1146 - 0068

H1146 - 0069

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-159
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC24-9/C-159

(Reader's initials in green pencil).

(Red pencil note- To be submitted to the C-in-C of the Navy)

The War Minister and C-in-C of the Armed Forces

Berlin W35, 2.3.36.
Tirpitzufer 72-76
Telephone: Bl
Kurfuerst 8191

W A No. 380/36 Most Secret L I
S.O. only

Written by an officer

To:
The C-in-C of the Army
The C-in-C of the Navy
The Air Minister and C-in-C of the Air Force

Supreme Command of the Navy
Reg. No. AI Op 14/36

1. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has made the following decision:

By reason of the Franco-Russian alliance, the obligations accepted by Germany in the Locarno Treaty, as far as they apply to articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles wich refer to the demilitarised zone, are to be regarded as obsolete.

2. Sections of the Army and Air Force will therefore be transferred simultaneonsly in a surprise move to garrisons of the demilitarised zone. In this connection I issue the following orders:

3.

a) Re-forming his divisional staffs, the C-in-C of the Army is to move forward sections consisting mainly of the VI, IX and V Army Corps into the demilitarised zone in such a way that they will be transferred to permanent garrisons onthe Rhine and East of it. Apart from that, one Infantry Batallion shall be transferred to Aachen, one to Trier and one to Saarbruecken.

The Regional Police Inspectorates West, South West, and South will come entirely under the orders of the C-in-C of the Army for the purpose of incorporating them into the army.

b) The Reich Air Minister and C-in-C of the Air Force will transfer one fighter squadron each to the area around Cologne and Coblenz, and sections of the AAA into or near such towns on the Lower and Middle Rhine where the most important Rhine bridges are.

4. The movements are to be prepared and synchronised in such a way by the C-in-C of the Army and the C-in-C of the Air Force that the first Staffel, including the batallions assigned to Aachen, Trier and Saarbruecken, and the AAA guns arrive in the Rhine Valley at 1200 hours on Z-day and the first fighter squadrons

H1146 - 0070

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-159
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

land at the same time.

A second Staffal, comprising all the remaining sections of the Army assigned to the demilitarised zone will follow within 24 hours. Orders for Z-day will be given at the appropriate time.

5. Marching orders for the troops which are to be transferred, are to be given as late as possible. Every precaution must be taken to shorten the period between the commencement of practical preparations for the actual move and the entry into the demilitarised zone.

The C-in-C of the Army will see to it that the responsible departments of the general and interior administration, of the Police Force, of the municipalities, and of the Party are not informed before 0800 hours on Z-Day about the billetting of Army and Air Force men in their area.

6. To preserve the peaceful character of the operation, military security or advance measures are not to be taken without my express orders.

On Z-Day, from 0800 hours until further notice, however it must be ensured that the command posts of the three services can commence work day and night at short notice. Persons on leave are not to be recalled.

7. If the other powers who have signed the Locarno Treaty reply to the transfer of German troops into the demilitarised zone with military preparations, I reserve the right to decide on any military counter-measures.

In the event of enemy frontier violations with offensive intent, action must be taken in accordance with instructions for taking up position and battle orders.

8. I request:

a) timely information on instructions given in accordance with 3a and 3b.

b) to be informed continuously on the progress of the transfer of garrisons, starting on Z-Day at 1300 hours (W A Abteilung L).

Counter espionage is being given special instructions.

c) That suggestions be made to me as soon as possible, as to what advance measures should be put into operation during the the first critical stages, in case military preparations by neighbouring states become evident.

signed Blomberg.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO C-159

I, Pfc Ernst M. Cohn 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-159.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc.
33925738

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-174
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces
WFA/Abt. L. Nr 22070/40 G. Kdos. Chefs.

Berlin, 1.3.1940

9 Copies
3rd. Copy.

Most Secret *

TOP SECRET
By Officer only

Directive for "Fall Weseruebung" **

1.) The development of the Situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces ("Fall Weseruebung"). This operation should prevent British enroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic, further it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain. The part which the Navy and the Air Force will have to play, within the limits of their capabilities, is to protect the operation against the interference of British naval and air striking forces.

In view of our military and political power in comparison with that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the "Fall Weseruebung" will be kept as small as possible. The numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise execution. On principle we will do our utmost to make the operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the Governments at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and the Air Force, will provide the necessary emphasis. If in spite of this resistance should be met with, all military means will be used to crush it.

2.) I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the operation against Denmark and Norway the Commanding General of the XXI Army Corps, General d. I. * ** v. Falkenhorst (Commander of "Group XXI").

In questions of the conduct of operations the above named is directly under my orders. The Staff is to be completed from all the three branches of the Armed Forces.

The force which will be selected for the purpose of "Fall Weseruebung" will be under separate command. They will not be allocated for other operational theatres.

The part of the Air Force detailed for the purpose of the "Weseruebung" will be tactically under the orders of Group XXI. After the completion of their task they revert to the command of Ob.d.L. ****

The employment of the forces which are under direct Naval and Air Force command will take place in agreement with the Commander of Group XXI.

The administration and supply of the forces posted to Group XXI will be ensured by the branches of the Armed Forces themselves according to the demands of the Commander.

Translator's Notes:

* Initialled by Fricke
** Code name for Invasion of Norway and Denmark
*** der Infanterie-of the Infantry
**** Commander in Chief of the Air Force

H1146 - 0071

H1146 - 0072

3.) The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway must take place simultaneously. I emphasise that the operations must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy seizes the iniative against Norway, we must be able to apply immediately our own counter-measures.

It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and of readiness, drafting and embarkation of the troops, must be made with this factor in mind.

In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with fictitious objectives. The troops may be acquainted with the actual objectives only after putting to sea.

4.) Occupation of Denmark ("Weseruebung Süd").

Added to this, having secured the most important places, the Group will break through as quickly as possible from Fuenen to Skagen and to the east coast. In Seeland bases will be captured early on. These will serve as starting points for later occupation. The Navy will provide forces for the securing of the connection Nyborg - Korsör and for swift capture of the Kleine - Belt - Bridge as well as for landing of troops should the necessity arise. She will also prepare the defence of the coast.

The Air-Force will provide squadrons of which the primary object will be demonstrations and dropping of leaflets. Full use of the existing Danish ground defences and air defence must be ensured.

5.) Occupation of Norway ("Weseruebung Nord")

The task of the Group XXI: Capture by surprise of the most important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations.

The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the transport by sea of the landing troops as well as the transport of the forces which will have to be brought to Oslo in a later stage of the operation. She will escort supplies and reserves on the way over by sea.

Preparations must be made for speedy completion of coastal defence in Norway.

The Air Force, after the occupation has been completed, will ensure air defence and will make use of Norwegian bases for air welfare against Britain.

6.) Group XXI will make regular reports to the OKW concerning the state of preparations and will submit a chronological summary of the progress of preparations. The shortest necessary space of time between the issue of the order for "Weseruebung" and its execution must be reported.

Intended Battle Headquarters will be reported.

Code names: Wesertag - the day of the operation.

Weserzeit - "H" hour.

(Signed) A. Hitler.

H1146 - 0073

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-174 (Cont'd)

Distribution:

O.C. Group XXI	Copy No. 1.
C.in C. Army	" " 2.
C.in C. Navy	" " 3.
C.in C. Air Force	" " 4.

Supreme Command Armed Forces

Head W.F.A. *	" " 5.
L. Section	" Nos. 6 - 9

* Wehrmachtsführungsamt - operational H.Q. Armed Forces.

- - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-174

27 November 1945.

I, D. E. SHERRIFF, Second Officer, WRNS, 36482, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-174.

D. E. SHERRIFF,
Second Officer, WRNS,
36482.

P. 4

Liaison Staff of Supreme Headquarters C.P. 25 November 1941
Armament Procurement Office (WiRüAmt)
with the Reich Marshall.
Nr. 260/ 41 g.

Ref: Order of the Chief, WiRüAmt, Supreme Headquarters, date
29 July 1941.

Re: War Economy Notes concluded 30 November 1941

To the:

Chief of the WiRüAmt

General Thomas

B e r l i n
==========

The conceptions occasionally mentioned during the reporting period are comprised in the notes of the conference on 8 November 1941. Compare Reich Marshall of greater Germany report for the V.J.P. Nr. 19 203/ 6 g.v. of the 20th November 1941. The Reich Marshall has not been in the supreme headquarters EAST since that time so that no lectures have been given.

In order to preserve presentation with respect to the existing reports, the general principles of economic policy in the newly-occupied Eastern territories "based on the EAST conference" in Berlin of the 8th of November 1941 are stated in the following:

"I. For the duration of the war the requirements of the war economy will be the all dominant factor of any economic measures in the newly-occupied Eastern territories.

II. Seen from a long range point of view the newly-occupied Eastern areas will be exploited economically from the point o view of colonial administration and by colonial methods.

Exceptions will be made only for those parts of the East land which are to be Germanized by order of the Führer, but even they are subject to the principle expressed in paragraph I.

III. The main emphasis of all economic work rests with the production of food and raw materials.

The highest possible production surplus for the supply of the Reich and of other European countries is to be attained by cheap production based on the maintenance of the low living standard of the native population. Besides covering thereby the European needs for food supplies and raw materials as far as possible, this measure is intended to create a source of income for the Reich which will make it

P. 5

possible to liquidate in a few decades, with utmost consideration for the German taxpayer, an essential part of the debts incurred in the financing of the war.

H1146 - 0074

IV. Manufacturing in the occupied Eastern territories will be considered only if absolutely necessary:

a) to decrease the volume of transportation, (i.e. manufacturing processes up to steel or aluminum blocks),

b) to take care of urgent repair needs inside the country,

c) to take advantage of all facilities in the armament sector during war-time.

It remains to be decided to what extent a resumption of the production of trucks and tractors can be considered during the war (in view of the overburdened European industrial capacity).

V. The development of a considerable consumer goods and finished products industry in the occupied Eastern territories is not permitted. It is rather the task of European and especially German industry to process the raw materials and semi-finished products produced in the occupied Eastern areas and to take care of the most urgent requirements for industrial consumer goods, and production means of these Eastern areas which are to be exploited like a colony. The larger the number of products of daily needs we send to Russia, the greater will be the quantity of raw materials we can extract, the greater will the difference in values become, and the earlier will our war debts be liquidated.

VI. To supply the population with high-valued consumer goods is out of the question. On the contrary, all tendencies to raise the general standard of living are to be suppressed right from the start with the most drastic measures. The question as to which kinds and quantities of consumer goods and production means are to be delivered to the newly-occupied Eastern areas is to be settled in conjunction with the Economi Office of the Reich commissars.

The Eastland (Ostland), too, may, at the beginning, be furnished only very limited quantities of consumer goods. Th
P. 6 long range order for the Germanization of the Eastland must no be allowed to lead to a general rise of the living standards o all the nationalities living there. Only the Germans living there, or to be settled there, and the elements to be Germanized may receive preferential treatment.

VII. The Russian price and wage scales are to be kept as low a possible. Any interference with the price and wage policy which is to be established exclusively to benefit the interest of the Reich is to be punished mercilessly. The Eastland, to is subject to the principle that surpluses, specifically the agricultural ones, have to reach the Reich at the lowest possible prices".

(Signed) NAGL

H1146 - 0075

P. 12 Liaison of the OKW/WiRüAmt with the Reich Marshall

C.P., 18 September 1941

31/41

TOP SECRET

Re: Economic Notes for the Reporting Period of 15 August to 16 September 1941.

In that period discussions pertaining to war and general economy took place only on the 15th and 16th of September. Nothing of basically new importance came out of the discussions so that no notes could be taken about it.

.....

para 3 The following persons participated in the conference of 16 September which had been preceded by a short meeting on the 15th of September:

The Reich Marshall
Secretary of State Backe (4-Year Plan)
General of the Luftwaffe Gosrau (Administrative Office, Ob d L)
Lt. General von Seidel (Quartermaster General Ob d L)
Lt. General Osterkamp (Army Administrative Office)
Lt. General Wondersleben (Army Administrative Office)
Colonel Büntsch (Quartermaster General, OKH)
Ministerialdirektor Riecke (Economic Staff EAST, 4-Year Plan and Reich Minister, EAST)
Major General Nagl (Liaison Office, OKW/WiRüAmt)
Ministerialrat Dr. Görnnert (Reich Marshall)
Captain on the General Staff of the Luftwaffe von Brauchitsch (Reich Marshall)

P. 13 At this conference which was concerned with the better exploitation of the occupied territories for the German food economy, the Reich Marshall called attention to the following:

It seems that the Wehrmacht demands too much, especially preserved food from home. With the exception of tobacco goods, chocolate, dried vegetables, etc., all food supplies for the troops, used or utilized in the Eastern territories, have to b furnished by the occupied territories themselves. If that cannot be accomplished, perhaps on account of insufficient organization or out of sympathy for the native population, or because of transport difficulties or indolence, or because the use of preserved foods is simpler, then those reasons must be done away with. On no account do I permit an increased supply from the Reich, which - especially with regard to meat supply - would lead to a decreas of rations for the German civilian population. On no account do I give my permission for that.

The morale at home would suffer from that or become shaky The home front has to take enough already (bombings, mounting losses, slow successes in the East, and in addition, the fact that this war is a second one within a generation). This would furnish an excellent weapon for enemy propaganda. It already employs these days the method of instructing the populations of the occupied countries to cry for food time and tir again, to hide stores, to keep from delivering food supplies, etc., so that every place - and not the least at home - food difficulties and bad feelings associated with the sinking of morale, arise.

H1146 - 0076

It is clear that a graduated scale of food allocations is needed.

First in line are the combat troops, then the remainder of troops in enemy territory, and then those troops stationed at home. The rates are adjusted accordingly. The supply of the German non-military population follows and only then comes the population of the occupied territories.

In the occupied territories on principle only those people are to be supplied with an adequate amount of food who work for us. Even if one wanted to feed all the other inhabitants, one could not do it in the newly-occupied Eastern
P. 14 areas. It is, therefore, wrong to funnel off food supplies for this purpose, if it is done at the expense of the army and necessitates increased supplies from home.

.....

(Signed) NAGEL (Reich Marshal

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. EC 3

4 December 1945.

I, BERT STEIN, civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of extracts from Document EC 3.

Certified by:

SIDNEY B. JACOBY BERT STEIN

H1146 - 0077

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC 126
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Economic Staff East,
Agricultural Group.

23 May 1941.

Economic Policy Directives for Economic Organization, East, Agricultural Group

P. 1 Prior to World War I, Russia was the country with the largest surplus of agricultural products in the world. Situated in the zone of extensive cultivation and extensive cattle production, Russia produced a yearly average during the years 1909-1913 for the world market of: approximately 11 million tons of grain, about 1/3 of the total amount of grain in world markets; 228,000 tons of oil seeds; 660,000 tons of oil cake; 266,000 tons of sugar; 68,000 tons of butter; and 218,000 tons = 5 billion eggs. Today, Russia exports only very small percentages thereof, i.e. annual grain export averaging approximately from 1 to not more than 2 million. At the same time, the territory cultivated in Russia, however, according to their statistics, has increased considerably. For example:-

For	From 1913	To 1938
Grain	94,4 Mill. ha	102,4 Mill. ha
Potatoes	3,1 " "	7,4 " "
Sugar beet	0,6 " "	1,2 " "
Sun flowers	1,0 " "	3,1 " " (1928/32 even 4,2 Mill.)
Linseed	0,4 " "	0,4 Mill. ha
Soya	-	0,2 " "
Fodder	2,0 " "	9,1 " "
Flax	1,0 " "	1,9 " "
Cotton	0,7 " "	2,1 " "
Hemp	0,6 " "	0,9 " " (1928/32)

Accordingly, the crops have increased according to the Russian statistics.

	1909/13	1937	1938
Grain	70,0 Mill. t.	120,3 Mill. t.	95,0 Mill. t.
thereof			1940: 112,0)
Wheat	20,6	46,9	
Rye	18,9	29,2	
Oats	13,4	21,9	
Barley	9,0	10,6	
Maize	1,3	4,8 (1933)	
Potatoes	20,2	65,6	
Sugar beet	9,9	21,9	
Flax	0,5	0,6	0,6
Cotton	0,23	0,82	0,84
Hemp	0,33	0,37	

P. 2 para 1 The explanation for these figures is to be seen in the following:

i. The total population has increased from 140 million in 1914 to 170 and a half million in 1939. In particular, the city population has increased from approximately 10% to approximately 30% of the total population.

H1146-0078

ii. The number of pigs has increased from 14.2 million in 1913 to 30.6 million in 1938, and with it the requirement for fodder.

iii. The number of sheep and goats has increased from 74 million in 1913 to 102.5 million in 1938.

para 7 ..... It can be assumed that the present crops are not greater than in the pre-World War I period, despite an expansion of the cultivated areas.....

P. 3 para 2 The grain surplus of Russia is decisively determined not by the size of the crop but by the level of domestic consumption. Even a small decrease of 30 kgms. per person of the population (220 kgms. instead of 250 kgms.) and a decrease of the ration for horses of 25% will create an export surplus equalling almost the amount prevailing in peace-time.

This fact is the key upon which our actions and our economic policy must be based.

For:-

a.) Doubtless, war activities will decrease production in the beginning and possibly - depending upon the amount of destruction - for many years. An increase in production will require years.

b.) Since Germany and Europe, respectively, requires surplus under all circumstances, the consumption must be decreased correspondingly. The examples given above show the extent to which the amount of surplus can be increased by a limitation of production.

c.) Such a decrease of consumption, contrary to the territories so far occupied, is feasible here because the principal food surplus area is clearly supported from the principal deficit area. Contrary to territory under the General Gouvernement, the Protectorate, France and Belgium, here no mixture of deficit and surplus areas exists such as would prevent a seizure due to black market or direct contacts between producer and consumer.

The surplus territories are situated in the black soil district (that is, in the south & south-east) and in the Caucasus. The deficit areas are principally located in the forest zone of the north.

P. 4 para 1 Therefore, an isolation of the black soil areas must in any case place greater or lesser surpluses in these regions at our disposal. The consequences will be cessation of supplies to the entire forest zone, including the essential industrial centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg.....

P. 5 para 1 This means:

1.) All industry in the deficit area, particularly the manufacturing industries in the Moscow and Petersburg regions as well as the Ural industrial region, will be abandoned. It may be assumed that these regions today absorb an annual 5-10 million tons from the food production zone.

2.) The Trans-Caucasian oil district will have to be excepted, although it is a deficit area. This source of oil, cotton, manganese, copper, silk and tea must continue to be supplied with food in any case, for special political and economic reasons.

H1146-0079

3.) No further exceptions with a view to preserving one or the other industrial region or industrial enterprise must be permitted.

4.) Industry can only be preserved insofar as it is located in the surplus region. This applies, apart from the above-mentioned oilfield regions in the Caucasus, particularly to the heavy industries in the Donets district (Ukraine). Only the future will show to what extent it will prove possible to maintain in full those industries, and in particular the Ukrainian manufacturing industries, after the withdrawal of the food surpluses required by Germany.

The following consequences result from this situation, which has received the approval of the highest authorities, since it is in accord with the political tendencies (preservation of the 'small' Russians, preservation of the Caucasus, of the Baltic provinces, of White Russia to the prejudice of the Great Russians):

I. For the forest belt

a.) Production in the forest belt (the food-deficit area will become "naturalized", similar to the events during the World War and the Communistic tendencies of the war, etc., viz: Agriculture in that territory will begin to become more 'home production'. The result will be that the planting of products destined for the market such as, in particular, flax and hemp, will be discontinued, and the area used therefor will be taken over for products for the producer (grain, potatoes, etc.) Moreover, discontinuance of fodder for that area will lead to the collapse of the dairy production and of pig-producing in that territory.

P. 6

b.) Germany is not interested in the maintenance of the productive power of those territories, except for supplying the troops stationed there. The population, as in th old days, will utilize arable land for growing its own food. It is useless to expect grain or other surpluses to be produced. Only after many years can those extensive regions be intensified to an extent that they might produce genuine surpluses. The population of these areas, in particular the urban population, will have to face most serious distress from famine. It will be necessary to divert the population into the Siberian spaces. Since rail transport is out of the question, this too, will be an extremely difficult problem.

c.) In this situation, Germany will only draw substantial advantages by quick, non-recurrent seizure, i.e. it will be vitally necessary to make the entire flax harvest available for German needs, not only the fibers but also the oleaginous seed.

It will also be necessary to utilize for German purposes the livestock which has no fodder base of its own i.e. it will be necessary to seize livestock holdings immediately, and to make them available to the troops not only for the moment, but in the long run, and also for exportation to Germany. Since fodder supplies will be cut off, pig and cattle holdings in these areas will of necessity drastically decline in the near future. If the are not seized by the Germans at an early date, they will be slaughtered by the population for its own use, without Germany getting anything out of it.....

H1146 - 0080

p. 7
para 2
middle
of
page

..... It has been demanded by the Führer that the reduction in the meat ration should be made good by the fall. This can only be achieved by the most drastic seizures of Russian live-stock holdings, particularly in areas which are in a favorable transport situation in relation to Germany.....

para 3

In respect of flax cultivation, too, the German economy will be interested in these territories. On the other hand, if at all possible, it must be attempted to treat these territories leniently, for political reasons: the conflict between White Russians and Lithuanians on one hand against Great Russians on the other. Only the future will show to what extent this is possible.

3. The problem of fisheries

The fisheries in the North constitute a special problem. Germany's aim must be to seize the approximately 100 steam
p. 8 fishing vessels in Murmansk, Kola, etc., in order to utilize them for German benefit in fishing operations based on Norway
End of para ..... Thus, there is no question of a development of Russian fisheries, but what is needed is conquest of the Russian fishing fleet.

para 2

A destruction of the Russian manufacturing industries in the forest zone is also an indispensable necessity for Germany's more remote peace-time future. Even in Tsarist Russia, the high prices of consumer goods were a device, in addition to taxes, for increasing the grain surpluses of the producing zone. Peasants in this zone were compelled to sell all their produce, except for a subsistence minimum, in order to pay their taxes and buy the consumer goods which they needed. In future, Southern Russia must turn its face to-
p. 9 wards Europe. Its food surpluses, however, will only be paid for if it purchases its industrial consumer goods from Germany or Europe. Russian competition from the forest zone must therefore be abolished. It follows from all that has been said that the German administration in these territories may well attempt to mitigate the consequences of the famine which undoubtedly will take place, and to accelerate the return to primitive agricultural conditions. An attempt might be made to intensify cultivation in these areas by expanding the acreage under potatoes or other important food crops giving a high yield. However, these measures will not avert famine. Many tens of millions of people in this area will become redundant and will either die or have to emigrate to Siberia. Any attempt to save the population there from death by starvation by importing surpluses from the black soil zone would be at the expense of supplies to Europe. It would reduce Germany's striking power in the war, and would undermine Germany's and Europe's power to resist the blockade. This must be clearly and absolutely understood. The manufacturing industries in Belgium and France are much more important for Germany and the German war effort than those in Russia. It is therefore much more essential to safeguard food supplies to these countries through surpluses from the East than to make an ambitious attempt to preserve Russian industry in the food-consuming zone. One must always bear in mind that the Great Russian people, whether under Tsarism or Bolshevism, is always an irreconcilable enemy not only of Germany, but also of Europe. From this it also follows that there can be no question of introducing marketing regulations or food rationing in these territories. Rationing would establish a claim against the German administration on the part of the population, and such a claim must be rejected beforehand.

H1146 - 0081

.....

para 3

. For the rest, it can be pointed out that even given the best intentions on the part of the German administration to supply the forest zone with the surpluses of the South, such supplies would fail on account of transport conditions alone. The Russian rail network is weak in itself, and will be taxed to capacity by the tasks of supplying the Army and the necessity of exports to Europe.

II. For the black soil belt

p. 10 para 2 middle of para

..... 2.) The battle for increased production, and the seizure of surpluses, presupposes a retention of large-scale farming units (collective and Soviet farms)..... In view of the Russians' mentality an increase in production is only possible by decree from above..... A splitting-up into several millions of individual peasant holdings would make any German influence on production completely illusory. Every attempt to liquidate the large-scale units must therefore be fought with the most drastic means.....

p. 12

I. Supplies for the Army

Germany's food situation in the third year of war demands it imperatively that the Wehrmacht, in all its provisioning, must not live off Greater German territory or that of incorporated or friendly areas from which this territory receives imports. This minimum aim, the provisioning of the Wehrmacht from enemy territory in the third year, and if necessary in later years, must be attained at any price. This means that one-third of the Wehrmacht must be fully provisioned by French deliveries to the army of occupation. The remaining two-thirds (and even slightly more in view of the present size of the Wehrmacht) must without exception be provisioned from the Eastern space. This leads to the following particulars:-

1.) Bread Cereals. The requirements of the Wehrmacht as to bread cereals amount annually to about 1 and a half million tons. France supplies 470,000 tons yearly in accordance with the Hague Convention for Land Warfare and the Armistice Treaty. France will have to continue to make such shipments also in the third year. The East will, in future, have to make available under all circumstances about 1 million tons. In furnishing bread cereals to the Wehrmacht, consideration must also be given to the problem of the supply of foodstuffs and beer.

2.) Oats. The requirements of the army amount to about 1.8 million tons. France and the other occupied territories in the West ship approximately 600,000 tons. Accordingly, 1.2 to 1.5 million tons would be the quota for the East.

3.) Meats. The requirements of the Wehrmacht amount to about 600,000 tons annually. France, with Holland and Denmark, delivered up to now 200,000 tons and will, in the third year of the war, ship 125,000 tons at the most. Accordingly, there remain about 475,000 tons of meats which the Eastern territories will have to supply, or figured in the exchange value of grain, 3,400,000 tons of grain.

4.) Fats. The requirements of the army amount annually to about 100,000 tons. France has been up to now unable to supply fats and will in the future also be unable to do so. The entire 100,000 tons will have to be shipped by the Eastern territories.

H1146-0082

5.) Besides, the Eastern territories will have to supply the proportionate requirements of the Wehrmacht as to hay and straw respectively; furthermore, they will have to furnish the requirements as to fruit, vegetables, canned fish, sugar, prepared foodstuffs and legumes.

From this it follows that about 1 million tons of bread cereals, 1.2 million tons of fodder cereals, 2.4 million tons of grain for meat production, or a total of from 4 and a half million to 5 million tons of grain will have to be supplied from the Eastern territories for the requirements of the army, in addition to the shipments of hay, straw, fats, eggs, etc. It is to be noted that hereby the transport situation for exports to Germany from the East and for supplies from Germany will be considerably relieved.

P. 13 These quantities have by all means to be furnished for the army in the Eastern territories. They will be increased by those amounts by which the French quota might possibly be reduced.

It cannot be anticipated today what troop transfers will take place during the third year of war (possibly also demobilization of a considerable number of soldiers). Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that a part of the army, such as for instance, the 'Flak' (anti-aircraft batteries), the personnel in training, especially the youngest training age class, etc. will also in the future be permanently stationed in Germany. For all these reasons, the estimated size of the Wehrmacht in the East may be considerably reduced during the third year of war, which would lead to an increase in the number of consumers in Germany herself. Also, in this case, the quantities made available for the estimated 2/3 of the entire Wehrmacht will have to be supplied under any circumstances from the Eastern territories. Obviously, the transport situation will hereby be considerably burdened.

II. Supplies for the German civilian population

1.) Only after meeting those requirements of the army which, under any circumstances, will have to be made available from the Eastern territories, can shipments to Germany to cover civilian needs begin. In this matter, any dissipation of energy on side issues must, under any circumstances, be abstained from. First and foremost is the transport to Germany of oil seeds - particularly of sunflower seeds, but also of flax seed, cotton seed, soya beans - in order to increase the stocks of fats. For, from the fat stocks in the third year of war there will be a lack of about 150,000 tons of oil which Japan and Manchukuo up to now shipped through Russia. Furthermore, the remaining oil seed reserves that are still on hand will be used up in the third year of the war economy. For these reasons, it will be necessary to procure from the East from 400,000 to 500,000 tons of oil which must be considered equivalent to about 1 and a half million tons of oil seeds. This transport problem must under all circumstances be solved, and in doing so the fact that in the Eastern territories the oil seeds are being pressed to oil will not lead to an alleviation of the situation for the reason that greater Germany can likewise not do without the resulting oil cake. It will be a question of expediency as to whether oil seeds or oil and oil cake should be shipped. The final result must be the delivery of about 400,000 tons of oil and 1 million tons of oil cake.

H1146-0083

2.) Only after the transport of these oil seeds is accomplished, may an export of grain be effected, which of course, is extremely desirable, because greater Germany must at an increasing rate supply the occupied territories and must also
P. 14 herself replenish her reserves after the bad harvest in 1940 and after this year's harvest which, at best, must be expected to be an average one. In any case, the grain surpluses of the newly-annexed border territories and also of regions situated favorably in respect of transportation, must be exported to Germany in order to obtain soon the quantities which the Russians anyway would have supplied voluntarily. In any case, however, if transportation is not possible, all grain surpluses that exist in the Eastern territories above the quota for army requirements, must be secured so that these stocks can be transferred to Germany during the coming year.

3.) As the shortening of rations in Germany has already now shown, the weakest point in the German food situation is the meat supply. The relief resulting from the fact that 2/3 of the army is procuring its meat from the Eastern territories, is not sufficient to make good in the fall the cut that was made in meat rations, because Germany's fodder supply situation makes it absolutely necessary to reduce further the stocks of pigs. Therefore, it will be necessary to place quantities of meat, also, from the Eastern territories at the disposal of the Reich.

While, however, the supply to the army must come from all territories in the East (according to the troop contingents stationed in the individual territories), and while the export of oil seeds and grain will for the most part originate in the black soil zone, the procurement of meat for German purposes, even for the purposes of the current requirements of the Wehrmacht, must take place from the forest belt and, in that zone, especially from the White Russian region and the central industrial areas in the vicinity of Moscow.

One has to be entirely clear regarding the following situation:

The stocks of cattle in the whole of Russia amount to about 63 million compared with 32 million in greater Germany, the stocks of pigs amount to 30 million compared with 24 million in Germany at the present time. The cattle stocks are more concentrated in the natural pasture-lands; these are the regions north of Moscow, excluding the Baltic provinces, up to Siberia and the Steppe regions in the south-east. The pork larders are situated in the north-west wooded regions as far as Moscow. These territories in the future will, in any case, have to reduce their stocks of cattle very considerably, especially their pig inventories, on account of the interruption in grain deliveries from the black soil zone. In such a situation, the danger exists that if our authorities do not seize the stocks of cattle immediately, in order to supply the army on the one hand and the homeland on the other, the livestock might be slaughtered within a very short time for the purposes of the local population and would therefore no longer be available for German purposes.

H1146-0084

. 15 What matters, therefore, is not only to prepare making available stocks of cattle for 1 year for 2/3 of the Wehrmacht and to ship to the Baltic Sea ports livestock, especially from the north-west and the central regions, in order to utilize it for German civilian requirements by way of the border slaughter house in the North of Germany, but the decisive point is to assure, as far as possible, meat stocks for the future as well. The problem of preserving meat therefore will be of utmost importance, especially in the northern regions. Everything in tin-plate that is obtainable or can be made in Russia must, therefore, be withdrawn from all other canning purposes and serve in the manufacture of canned meat, which can be stored over a longer period of time only in tin-plate cans. Possible exceptions to this rule, perhaps in the case of canned fish, will only be ordered later as far as it should be necessary. Another important point is to use as well all other methods of preserving food (pickling, freezing and smoking of food). It is necessary for this important purpose to make use of all meat packing houses that are located in these regions. The importance and urgency of this task will have to be pointed out again and again. The interruption in the fodder supply will make it impossible to get hold of the cattle later on.....

. 16 iddle of rge ..... IV. Collection: The solution of these problems requires, apart from the maintenance of production in the surplus area, a smooth functioning of collection. For this reason alone the collective farming structure must not be touched, since collection is the easier the bigger each individual farming unit. In conducting collection in the reconstruction areas, i.e. in the surplus-producing districts, the food supplies of the producing peasants and farm laborers will have to be considered, in order to insure maintenance and increase of production in future years. Such considerations will not always be possible, or necessary, in the food-consuming areas of the forest zone, except for the special treatment to be accorded the Baltic and, if possible, the White Russian territories. Apart from collecting provisions and supplies for the Wehrmacht, the important thing in the food-consuming areas will be to seize the largest possible portion of the oil seed harvest and to collect the largest possible quantities of grain in order to insure export to Germany. The seizure of livestock which will be needed has already been discussed. In order to obtain barter goods for the peasants in the surplus producing zone, sugar crops will be seized without exception. The same goes for tobacco, alcohol, hides, leather, and fiber crops for the manufacture of textiles, as well as for industrial consumer goods, such as coal, kerosene, etc.....

. 18 ern l In conclusion, the principles must be pointed out once more: under the Bolshevik system Russia has, purely out of power motives, withdrawn from Europe and thus upset the European equilibrium based on division of labor. Our task is to re-integrate Russia with the European division of labor, and it involves, of necessity, the destruction of the existing economic equilibrium within the Soviet Union. Thus, it is not important, under any circumstances, to preserve what has existed, but what matters is a deliberate turning away from the existing situation and introducing Russian food resources into the European framework. This will inevitably result in an extinction of industry as well as of a large part of the people in what so far have been the food-deficit areas.

It is impossible to state an alternative in sufficiently hard and severe terms.....

H1146 - 0085

P. 19
para 2

..... Our problem is not to replace intensive food production in Europe through the incorporation of new space in the East, but to replace imports from overseas by imports from the East. The task is two-fold:-

1.) We must use the Eastern spaces for overcoming the food shortage during and after the war. This means that we must not be afraid of drawing upon the capital substance of the East. Such an intervention is much more acceptable from the European standpoint than drawing upon the capital substance of Europe's agriculture.....

para 4

2.) For the future new order the food-producing areas in the East must be turned into a permanent and substantial complementary source of food for Europe, through intensified cultivation and resulting higher yields.

The first-named task must be accomplished at any price, even through the most ruthless cutting down of Russian domestic consumption, which will require discrimination between the consuming and producing zones.

The second task, however, presupposes adequate feeding of the working people, since no production increase is possible without adequate feeding of the men who have to accomplish it.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. EC 126

30 November 1945.

I, ARTHUR ALLEN, civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of extracts from document EC 126.

Certified by:

ARTHUR ALLEN

SIDNEY B. JACOBY

H1146 - 0086

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-305
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(in pencil): Wi Rü Dept 383/40 Most Secret

Berlin 12 February 1940

V.P.2999 Top Secret

20 copies
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Most Secret

Meeting under the chairmanship of Minister President General Fieldmarshal Goering on questions concerning the East.

The following, among others, were present:

Reich Minister Graf Schwerin von Krosigk,
General Governor Reich Minister Frank,
Reichstatthalters Forster and Greiser,
Lord Lieutenants Koch and Wagner,
Reichsfuehrer - SS Himmler,
State Secretaries Koerner, Neumann,
Landfried, Backe,
Dr.Syrup, Kleinmann,
Alpers,
The Head of the Main Trust office East,
Dr.h.c. Winkler.

By way of introduction, the General Fieldmarshal explained that the strengthening of the war potential of the Reich must be the chief aim of all measures to be taken in the East. Therefore it is necessary, that the conditions be stabilized as soon as possible, even if this means that the type and methods of administration will be different in the new Eastern Gaus from those in the General Government. From this it is obvious that, with the possible exception of the Beskiden Gau no part will be finally included within the German frontiers.

If all measures must serve the chief pupose of strengthening the economic power, we must refrain, within the area, from the attempt of Germany, to bring it up to the standard of the Old Reich (Altreich) immediately. The process assimilation in the new Eastern Gaus will, therefore, be much slower than was possible in Austria and in the Sudeten Gau in times of peace. It will be the task of the Reich to carry out the reconstruction of the East with all its power after the end of the war.

With this chief purpose in view, the following principles for individual problems are to be observed:

P.2 1. Agriculture:

The task consists of obtaining the greatest possible agricultural production from the new Eastern Gaus disregarding questions of ownership. The Minister of Food and Agriculture has the sole responsibility for this, regardless of when, where and how they will later be settled. Transfer of property can be considered only for the Baltic Germans and for the Wolhynien Germans. .....

H1146 - 0087

2. Trade economy:

In the Reich Gaus, all essential industrial concerns of importance to the war, are to be reinstated. The examination of the raw material stove-houses is to continue; no great results will, however, be achieved by this. It is possible that the investigation of raw materials will have better success in the General Government. The main thing here is the petrolium which must be exploited and transported into the Reich regardless of how the payment for it is to be arranged. The mining of iron ore also must be pressed forward.

.....

P.3. 4. Special questions concerning the Government General:

..... The General Government will have to receive the jews who are orderen to emigrate from Germany and the new Eastern Gaus. However, it must not occur again that transporttrains are sent into the General Government without notification of the General Governor in the regular way and at the right time.

II.

The following reported on the situation in the Eastern Territories:

1. Lord Lieutenant Gauleiter:

..... There have been no evacuations. The jews are employed on road construction and are needed for this purpose for a time. The Poles are employed in agriculture and in factories. Should the prisoners of war, employed in agriculture in East Prussia, be removed, as intended, into the interior of the Reich, East Prussia will need 115 - 120,000 Polish farm workers.

2. Reichsstatthalter Gauleiter Forster:

The population of the Danzig/West Prussia Gau (newly acquired territories) is 1,5 million, of whom 240,000 are Germans, 850,000 well-established Poles and 300,000 immigrant Poles, jews and asocials (1800 jews). 87,000 persons have been evacuated, 40,000 of these from Gotenhafen. From there, also the unmerous shirkers, who are now looked after by welfare, will have to be deported to the General Government. Therefore, an evacuation of 20,000 further persons can be counted on for the current year .....

3. Reichsstatthalter Gauleiter Greiser:

The Gau has approx, 4 ½ million inhabitants, of whom 400,000 are Germans and 400,000 jews. So far, 87,000persons have been evacuated. Among these are no workers, except those who were politically tainted; agricultural workers have not been deported. .....

P.6 4. Lord Lieutenant Gauleiter Wagner:

Agriculture is in good shape. Industry could increase its output by 30 to 50 % if it were possible to eliminate the transportation difficulties. No evacuations have taken place so far. However, for the future the deportation of 100 - 120,000 jews and 100,000 unreliable Polish immigrants is being considered .....

H1146 - 0088

H1146 - 0089

III.

P.7 The Reich Commissar for the consolidation of the German race, Reichsfuehrer-SS Himmler, reports that 40,000, Reich Germans had to be accommodated in Gotenhafen, and that room had to be made for 70,000 Baltic Germans and 130,000 Wolhynien Germans. Probably not more than 300,000 persons have been evacuated so far (the Polish population being 8 Mill.)

On the other hand it will probably be necessary to transfer into the Eastern Gaus 30,000 Germans from the Lublin area East of the Weichsel which is to be reserved for jews.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT EC-305

November 25, 1945

I CLARE BOULTER, P.O.,W.R.N.S. 59549 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document EC-305.

CLARE BOULTER
P.O., W.R.N.S.
59549.

Exhibit USA 579
Filed Jan. 8, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC 408
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Div. of National Defense
(Abt. Landesverteidigung)

Secret Command Matter 30.12.1936

Initialed G. 31/10 4 copies
3rd. copy.

Report Memorandum

on the Four Year Plan and preparation of the war economy.

The Führer and Reich Chancellor has conferred powers in regard to mobilization preparations in the economic field that need further definition.
Powers were granted:

1. The Reich Minister of War and Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht, by decision of the Reich Government on 4.4.33, to act as competent representative of the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor in matters concerning Reich defense.
   As stated in the Cabinet decree, he is responsible for the execution of the measures determined upon by the RVR and issues the directives for it to the Reich Ministries and other offices, which are then responsible for the further steps necessary.
   This grant of authority definitely takes into account the superior position, in time of war, of the R.K.B., which is emphasized by the delegation of the executive power (cf. RVC).
2. The Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy, through the Reich Defense Law and the Reich Government's resolution of 21.5.35.
   The G.B. (Generalbevollmachtigte), according to this, is to commence his work in peacetime and direct the economic preparations for the eventuality of war.
   To this end, the economic departments (Ressorts) were uniformly placed under his authority in matters concerning the R.V.
3. Minister President Generaloberst Göring, as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, by authority of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, granted 18.10.36.
   As regards the war economy, Min. Pres. Gen. Oberst Goring sees it as his task "within 4 years to put the entire economy in a state of readiness for war." (Cf. letter Göring - Schacht St.M.R.V. 516 g.Rs. of 18.12.36.)
   Minister President Gen. Oberst Göring was also given far-reaching powers to issue directives to all the highest offices (Obersten Dienststellen) of the State and the Party.

The mere comparison of these tasks has shown (see correspondence Min. Pres. Gen. Oberst Göring - Minister Schacht as G.B. for War Economy) that this situation is untenable.

A fruitless correspondence will be carried on among the offices of the three persons empowered to accomplish the same tasks, without leading to unified cooperation in attaining the goal.

It is recommended, therefore:

That the Fuehrer be asked to limit the authorized powers on the following basis:

H1146 - 0090

1.) Reich Minister of War.
during war: executive power, in order to secure uniformity in the conduct of the war by order of the Fuehrer.
in peacetime;

a.) Power to issue directives to all highest Reich agencies for the uniformity of all preparations, insofar as demands must be adjusted and the decisions concerned do not warrant the attention of the Fuehrer.

b.) Unlimited command and control right in the armament concerns and in their utilization as well. (sowie deren Bestimmung).

2.) Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy.
during war: Centralized direction of war economy, excluding armament industry.
in peacetime: Unified preparation of the war economy as heretofore.

3.) Commissioner for the Four Year Plan.
during war: suspended (aufgehoben).
in peacetime: Safeguarding the independent basis of the life and economy of the German people. To the extent that this task entrenches upon the sphere of the Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy (G.B. für die Kriegswirtschaft), joint action should be taken (im Einvernehmen handeln). In case of divergent purposes, the decision will be made by the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor after consultation with the Reich Minister of War.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT EC 408

19 November 1945

I, Grace E. McConnaughey, Civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. EC 408.

Grace E. McConnaughey

H1146-0091

H1146-0092

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. EC 410
OFFICE OF THE US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Volume 37-a, Appendix 10, Copy of Goering's directive of 19 October 1939.

In this directive issued to all Ministries and all officials of the Four-Year Plan, Goering repeats his instructions for the economic administration of the occupied territories previously outlined by him of October 18th, as follows:

The task for the economic treatment of the various administrative regions is different according to whether a country is involved which will be incorporated politically into the German Reich or whether we deal with the Government General which, in all probability, will not be made a part of Germany.

In the first mentioned territories the reconstruction and expansion of the economy, the safe-guarding of all their productive facilities and supplies must be aimed at, as well as a complete incorporation into the Greater German economic system at the earlies possible time.

On the other hand, there must be removed from the territories of the Government General all raw materials, scrap materials, machines, etc. which are of use for the German war economy. Industrial enterprises which are not absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the bare existence of the population must be exported to Germany, unless such exportation would take an unreasonable period of time so that it is more practical to exploit those enterprises by giving them German orders to be executed at their present location.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF
DOCUMENT NO. EC 410

I, Walter J. Derenberg, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. EC 410.

signed WALTER J. DERENBERG.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC 472
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Reich Marshall of the
Greater German Reich

2000 copies

For Official Use Only

Directives
for the Operation of the Economy in
the Newly-Occupied Eastern Territories

(Green Folder)

Part I (2nd edition)
Functions and Organization
of the Economy

Berlin, July 1941.

P. 5
para 7

THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

A. In General

For the uniform direction of the economic administration in the area of operations and in the areas of the future political administration, the Reich Marshall has created the

"Economic Executive Staff, East"

which is responsible directly to him and which, in the absence of the Reich Marshall, is directed by State Secretary Körner. The Chief of the "Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamts", General of the Infantry Thomas, in his capacity as a member of the Economic Executive Staff, East, acts as a representative of the military interests during the preparation and execution of the military operations.

The orders of the Reich Marshall cover all economic fields, including nutrition and agriculture. They are to be executed by the subordinate economic offices (infra under B).

The orders of the "Economic Executive Staff, East" are transmitted for execution by the Chief Wi Rü Amt to the

"Economic Staff, East"

which is proceeding into the occupied territory and which, during operations, is located in the immediate vicinity of the OKH/Gen Qu (High Command of the Army; Headquarters).

P. 6

B. Economic Organization in the Area of Operations

.....

para 10

IV. The particulars of the organization of the economic offices.

1. Economic Staff, East

The Economic Staff, East, as the advance command office of the Economic Executive Staff, East, is located in the immediate vicinity of the OKH/Gen Qu (High Command of the Army; Headquarters). It has the
P. 7
function of representing, at the OKH/Gen Qu, the commands directed to it

H1146-0093

by the Reich Marshall via the Economic Executive Staff, East and the Chief Wi Rü Amt; and it has the function of securing their execution through the channels stated supra under B III.

The Economic Staff, East is sub-divided into:

Chief of the Economic Staff, together with the group of leaders (function: questions of leadership; in addition, assignment of work).

Group Ia (functions: nutrition and agriculture, the economy of all agricultural products, provision of supplies for the army, in co-operation with the army groups concerned).

Group W (functions: industrial economy, including raw materials and public utilities, forestry, finance and banking, enemy property, trade and commodity transactions. The special staff of the Plenipotentiary for Motor Transportation is a member of Group W.

Group M. (functions: needs of the army, military economy, transportation of economic goods).

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT EC

10 December 1945.

I, SIDNEY B. JACOBY, civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of extracts from document EC

SIDNEY B. JACOBY

H1146-0094

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P. 7 function of representing, at the OKH/Gen Qu, the commands directed to it

H1146 - 0095

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Group M. (functions: needs of the army, military economy, transportation of economic goods).

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT EC

10 December 1945.

I, SIDNEY B. JACOBY, civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of extracts from document EC

SIDNEY B. JACOBY

H1146 - 0096

TR

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-3
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF
COUNSEL

Contents of Hitler's Talk to the Supreme Commander and Commanding Generals, Obersalzberg, 22-8-39

Decision to attack Poland in the spring. Originally it was feared that due to political combinations, England, Russia, France and Poland had to be fought against simultaneously. Even this risk would have had to be borne. Goering has stated that the Four Year Plan had failed and that we were at the end if we were not victorious in the coming year.

Since Autumn, 1938, and since, I have found out that Japan does not go with us without conditions, and that Mussolini is menaced by the weak-headed king and the treacherous scoundrel of a Crown Prince. I have decided to go with Stalin. On the whole, there are only three great statesmen in the world: Stalin, myself and Mussolini. Mussolini, the weakest, has not been able to break either the power of the crown or of the church. Stalin and I are the only ones that see only the future. So I shall shake hands with Stalin within a few weeks on the common German-Russian border and undertake with him a new distribution of the world.

Our strength is in our quickness and our brutality. Ghengis Khan had millions of women and children killed by his own will and with a gay heart. History sees only in him a great state builder. What weak Western European civilization thinks about me does not matter. I have given the order and will have every one shot, who utters even one word of criticism that the aim of the war is not to attain certain lines, but consists in the physical destruction of the opponent. Thus for the time being I have sent to the East only my "Death's Head Units" with the order to kill without pity or mercy all men, women and children of Polish race or language. Only in such a way will we win the vital space that we need. Who still talks nowadays of the extermination of the Armenians?

Colonel General (Generaloberst) von BRAUCHITSCH has promised me to bring the war against Poland to a conclusion within a few weeks. If he would have told me that it would take me two years or even one year only, I would not have issued the order to march and would have temporarily entered into an alliance with England instead of Russia. For we cannot conduct a long war. In any case, a new situation has now been created. I have witnessed the miserable worms Daladier and Chamberlain in Munich. They will be too cowardly to attack. They will not go any further than blockade. Against it we have our autarchy and the Russian raw materials. Poland will be depopulated and colonized with Germans. My pact with Poland was only meant to stall for time. And besides, gentlemen, in Russia will happen just what I have practised with Poland. After Stalin's death (he is seriously ill), we shall crush the Soviet Union.

The small countries do not frighten me. After Kemal's death, Turkey will be ruled by morons and half-idiots. Carol of Rumania is a thoroughly corrupted slave of his sexual desires. The King of Belgium and the Northern kings are weak puppets, depending on the good digestion of their over-fed and tired peoples.

H1146 -0097

We must take into account the defection of Japan. I have left to Japan a whole year's time to decide. The Emperor is the companion piece of the late Czars. Weak, cowardly, irresolute, may he fall before a revolution. My association with Japan was never popular. We will furthermore cause unrest in the Far East and Arabia. Let us think of ourselves as masters and consider these people at best as lacquered half-monkeys, who need to feel the knout.

The occasion is favorable now as it has never been. I have only one fear and that is that Chamberlain or such another dirty swine comes to me with propositions or a change of mind. He will be thrown downstairs. And even if I must personally kick him in the belly before the eyes of all the photographers.

No, for this it is too late. The invasion and the extermination of Poland begins on Saturday morning. I will have a few companies in Polish uniform attack in Upper Silesia or in the Protectorate. Whether the world believes it doesn't mean a damn to me. The world believes only in success.

Glory and honor are beckoning to you, gentlemen, as they never did for centuries. Be hard. Be without mercy. Act quicker and more brutally than the others. The citizens of Western Europe must quiver in horror. That is the most human warfare for it scares them off.

The new warfare corresponds to the new border status. A wall from Reval, Lublin, Kaschau to the Danube Estuary. The Russians get the rest. Ribbentrop has received instructions to make any offer and to accept any demand. In the West, I reserve the right to ascertain the line strategically best. Here, there will be something to do with Holland, Belgium, French Lorraine as protectorate areas.

And now, on to the enemy!... In Warsaw, we will celebrate our meeting again...

****

The speech was listened to enthusiastically. Goering jumped on the table. Bloodthirsty thanks and bloody promises. He danced around like a savage. The few (!) doubtful ones remained silent.

****

During the meal, Hitler stated that he must operate this year, as he would not be living long. His successor would not be able to do so; furthermore, the situation would be desperate in two years at the latest.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

18 November 1945

I, CHARLES E. BIDWELL, Staff Sergeant, 13146954, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document L-3.

CHARLES E. BIDWELL,
S/Sgt., 13146954.

H1146 - 0098

TRANSLTION OF DOCUMENT L79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Secret
To be translmitted by officer only

Minutes
of a Conference on 23 May 39

Place: The Fuehrer's Study, New Reich Chancellery.

Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.

Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-Admiral Raeder,

Col.-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Adml. Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont, Lt.- Col. (G.S.) Schmundt, Capt. Engel (Army), lieut-Comd. Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).

Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.

The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:

1) Analysis of the situation.
2) Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from the situation.
3) Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.
4) Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from these consequences.

Secrecy is the first essential for success.

The Fuehrer's observations are given in systematised form below.

Our present situation must be considered from two points of view:

I) The actual development of events between 1933 and 1939;
2) The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.

In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously.

Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.

Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.

This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany's demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as "Encroachments". The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force.

H1146 - 0099

A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible whithout invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.

Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 of 20 years' time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.

We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.

The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.

After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:

The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.

The demarkation of frontiers is of military importance.

The Pole is no "supplementary enemy". Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.

Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all, It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thoroughgoing German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.

There is no other possibility for Europe.

Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Remember - blockade.

If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record harvests we shall be able to rely even less in time of war than in peace.

The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labour.

The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.

Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.

It is questionalbe whether miltary success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland.

H1146-0100

The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.

There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision:

To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.

We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.

Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Poweres (France and England).

If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France,

Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland - beginning with an attack on Poland - will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and then settle Poland at the same time.

The isolation of Poland is a matter of skilful politics.

Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan's own interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.

Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in Press comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become closer.

If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and death struggle.

What will this struggle be like?

England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood will be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin will determine the duration of our resistance.

The Dutch and Belgium air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications, in order finally to force them into cooperation.

H1146-0101

Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to pressure.

Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.

The war with England and France will be a life-and death s struggle.

The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80 million human beings.

Question: Short or long war?

Every country's armed forces or government must aim at a short war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of 10-15 years, duration.

History has always shown that the people have believed that wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar weaknesses.

England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world power.

England is the driving force against Germany.
(Literally: England: is the motor driving against Germany). Her strength lies in the following:

1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance and gifted as organisers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure and bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher.

2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. Extended by the acquisition of allies, This power is not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with consequental financial credit.

3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a courageous air force.

England's weakness:

If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of World War. It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet, landings had to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible.

The moment England's food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate. The import of food and fuel depends on the fleet's protection.

H1146-0102

H1146-0103

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is destroyed, immediate capitulation will be the result.

There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to rely entirely on the element of surprise.

Experience has show that surprise may be nullified by:-

I) Betrayal from the wider circle of military experts.

2) Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise.

3) Human incompetence

4) Weather conditions.

The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. Beyond that time the tension cannot be endured for long. It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.

This must be regarded as a most unfavourable basis of action.

I) An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final decisive blow right at the start. Considerations of right and wrong, or treaties, do not enter into the matter. This will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account of Poland.

2) In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for England are eliminated.

The army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured.

England can then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines can extend the range of the blockade.

Consequences:

England will not be able to fight on the Continent;
Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines;
Time will not be on England's side;
Germany will not bleed to death on land.

Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative:-

I. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have been different.

2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an Air Force, It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defensive counter-measures.

3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.

4. Once the army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, has taken the most important positions, industrial production will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army's battles and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.

The Army must therefore be capable of taking these positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.

Study to this end is of the utmost importance.

The aim will always be to force England to her knees.

A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.

This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be true of the latter for instance, as long as the English Fleet had no available counter-measures; it will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.

Where straight forward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise and by masterly handling.

<u>This is the plan of attack.</u>

The plan demands:-

I. A correct estimate of weapons and their effectiveness:- e.g. (a) Battleship or aircraft carrier; which is the more effective? Individually or considered as a whole? The aircraft carrier is the better protection for a convoy.

(b) Is air attack more important on a factory than on a battleship? Where are bottle-necks in production located?

2. Immediate preparedness on the part of the Army. The Army must move straight from its peace stations to overrun neighbouring states. (Literally: Neighbouring states must be overrun direct from barracks).

3. A study of the enemy's weak points.

These studies must not be left to the General Staffs. Secrecy would no longer be guaranteed.

The Fuehrer has therefore decided to order the formation of a small planning staff at OKW. It will keep the Fuehrer informed and report to him.

The planning staff is responsible for the planning of operations on the highest level, and of the technical preparations and organization necessarily required by the decision taken.

The purpose of certain regulations concerns no-one outside the staff.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L 79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

However great are the increases in the armaments of our adversaries, they must ,at some time, come to the end of their recources, and ours will be greater. French recruiting - I20,000 men in each age class.

We shall not be forced into a war, but we shall not be able to avoid one.

Secrecy is the decisive requirement for success. Our object must be kept secret even from Italy or Japan. The break-through through the Maginot line is still a possibility for Italy, and must be studied. The Fuehrer considers that such a break-through is possible.

The close combination of the services, for the study of the problem in its entity, is important.

The object:

I. Study of the problem in its entity.
2. Study of the procedure.
3. Study of the necessary requirements.
4. Study of the necessary training.

The staff must include men with great imaginative power and the best technical knowledge, as well as officers of sober and sceptical judgement.

Working principles:

I, No-one must be admitted who is not concerned.
2. No-one may know more than it is necessary for him to know.

3. When must the person concerned know, at latest? No-one may know of a matter earlier than is necessary for him to know of it.

At the request of Field Marshal Goering, the Fuehrer decrees that:

a) The various services shall decide what construction is to be undertaken.
b) There shall be no alterations in the shipbuilding programs.
c) The armaments programs are to be considered with regards to I943 or I944.

Certified correct record
(Sgd) Schmundt, Lt Col.

I8 Nov. I945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT L 79

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 338I2I69, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document L 79.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5 338I2I69

DOCUMENT NO. L-83

City of Washington)
) ss:
District of Columbia)

Gerhart H. Seger being first duly sworn deposes and says:

1. I was born in Leipzig, Germany, in 1896 and lived there until my induction into the German Army in 1915. I was successively attached to the Cavalry, Infantry and Air Force, and concluded my military service as a pilot in the German Air Force. I experienced a considerable amount of combat flying duty, was shot down over France in August 1918. I received several decorations, one of which was the highest medal awarded by the Austrian government. Following my demobilization from the Army I attended Leipzig University where I received a degree in journalism in March 1920. Thereafter I became editor of a newspaper in Berlin in the period 1920-1923. After that I held a position with the German Peace Society until 1928, edited a paper in Dessau during the period 1928-1933, and was elected to the Reichstag in 1930.

2. During the period after World War I up until my commitment to the Leipzig jail and Oranienburg concentration camp in the spring of 1933 following the Nazis' accession to power in January of that year, my business and political affiliations exposed me to the full impact of the Nazi theories and practice of violent regimentation and terroristic tactics. My conflicts with the Nazis by virtue of my identification with the peace movement, and as a duly elected member of the Reichstag representing a political faith (Social Democratic Party) hostile to National Socialism, clearly demonstrated that, even in the period prior to 1933, the Nazis considered crimes and terrorism a necessary and desirable weapon in overcoming democratic opposition. The knowledge acquired as a result of these personal experiences during the period eventuating in successful culmination of the Nazis' efforts to seize power led me to a realization of some of the fundamental purposes and objectives which that group sought to accomplish by the systematic adoption of these tactics. The lapse of time attested the validity of that realization. While rarely openly articulated during the period embraced by my personal knowledge, the overt actions and studied practices of the Nazis could be directed to only one goal; namely, the perfection of rigid control over Germany as a preliminary step to dominance in Europe, and, possibly, eventual world hegemony. At that time the basic pattern was in process of formulation. The following aspects of that pattern were evidenced by the actions of the Nazis which came within the scope of my personal experience:

(a) Destruction of political resistance to the Nazi ideology by terrorizing, confining, and destroying democratic opposition elements.

(b) Division of German citizenry on a racial basis and discrimination against those who were adjudged not to be of German blood.

(c) Unlawful appropriation, spoliation, and forced sale of property for the personal enrichment of Nazis and for the purpose of establishing, solidifying, and maintaining internal control in Nazi hands.

H1146-0106

(d) Destruction of racial minorities and political opponents through systematic underfeeding, deprivation of a livelihood, clothing, shelter, food and medical care; deportation of forced labor; work under inhumane conditions.

While the attainment of power was a necessary condition to the full flowering of the Nazi criminal and terroristic methodology, the outcroppings of such a policy were visible in the years preceding 1933. Specific overt acts, within the scope of my personal knowledge, which evidence the Nazis' belief at that time that the use of force, regimentation, and terrorism was necessary to the accomplishment of their purposes, are included in this statement.

3. In 1923 my interest in the German peace movement induced me to accept the position of Secretary General of the Deutsche Friedenagesellschaft which was the leading organization within Germany advocating compliance with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles on the part of Germany. At that time the important policy issue before the German public was whether Germany should conscientiously fulfill its obligations under the Treaty of Versailles with a view to obtaining its gradual revision in a peaceful manner or whether there should be a concerted, albeit clandestine, effort to sabotage the Treaty. The Peace Society with which I became affiliated advocated adherence on the part of Germany to the Treaty of Versailles and a policy of reconciliation with former allies. Espousal of these principles enabled this organization to make a substantial contribution to the cause of peace. Its president, Dr. Ludwig Quidde, the Historian of Munich University, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1925. In its opposition to clandestine militarism the tenets of this organization were diametrically opposed to the principles and practices of the National Socialist Party. The latter party and sympathetic militaristic interests evolved the theory of the "unreality of defeat" and that "our armies were not beaten" as a basis for the doctrine that since the conclusion of the war a shame and disgrace had befallen Germany which could only be rectified by a great sacrifice, eventually, a war. Thus, the ideological predicate was laid for a vehement militarism on the part of these groups.

4. The antagonism of the followers of Hitler to my organization was dramatically demonstrated on numerous occasions when meetings of the Peace Society were broken up and terrorized by shock-troops and SA units. A number of examples are given below:

(a) One such occasion relates to a meeting in Essen in May 1923. At that time France had occupied the Ruhr Basin as a result of Germany's default on her Treaty obligations. While the German government had instructed the population of that territory to refrain from any acts of violence, the Nazi Party organized groups of saboteurs to create unrest and stimulate violence. The best known leader of the saboteurs was a soldier of fortune by the name of Leo Schlageter who subsequently was sentenced to death by a French military court and executed. In its program of supporting the government the German Peace Society arranged for a number of meetings in that territory to impress upon the population the necessity for an attitude of understandings. I was scheduled as the principal speaker at one of these meetings which was held in Essen during the month of May, 1923, attended by an audience of several thousands of persons. Before the meeting got underway an organized Nazi group strong-armed their way to the platform with the announced purpose of attacking me, but were prevented from reaching the stage by local police. However, they

H1146-0107

assaulted a number of participants of that meeting and succeeded in creating such a disturbance that the meeting had to be adjourned.

(b) Another such occurrence took place in the spring of 1925, at Siegen, Westphalia, where a meeting was scheduled to take place at the municipal auditorium. Shortly before the meeting a large group of the SA gained entrance to the building and occupied the front part of the auditorium. The presiding officer of the meeting was to be the chairman of the local branch of the German Peace Society who was a war veteran having lost both of his legs. While I was accompanying him slowly from the railroad depot toward the municipal auditorium we were overtaken by storm troopers who were discussing their plans to prevent this meeting from being carried out. We also heard that both the chairman of the meeting and I, as the speaker, were to be beaten up and forced out of town. Nevertheless, we proceeded to the auditorium and I began my address which was constantly interrupted by cat calls and insulting remarks. Finally the Nazis arose as a group and tried to storm the stage. However, they were prevented from doing so by Prussian State Police who had appeared in sufficient numbers to thwart the attempt. This rowdyism necessitated premature adjournment of the meeting by the Chief of Police. The chairman of the meeting was escorted to his house by the police and a guard accompanied me to the railroad depot.

(c) On one occasion during the period of my association with the German Peace Society I wrote and caused to be published a pamphlet or monograph on the subject of the "Black Reichswehr." This was a commentary on the methods pursued by the Reichswehr in seeking to evade the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Shortly after this document was distributed the Nazi press, including Hitler's own newspaper, "Voelkischer Beobachter," demanded my indictment for treason. Prior to the publication of this pamphlet the Pact of the Locarno had been signed and the allied forces withdrew their Army of Occupation, thus leaving to Germany the fulfillment of the Versailles Treaty without formal Allied supervision. The violent criticism to which this document was subjected evidenced the open hostility of the Nazis to any program contemplating the revision of the Treaty of Versailles by peaceful or legal methods.

(d) The foregoing represent examples of the tactics and attitude of the Nazis with reference to the German Peace Society. It, of course, exemplified their attitude toward any person or organization which stood for adherence to the Treaty of Versailles and the restraint of German militarism. It is not necessary for me to relate further specific examples of the terroristic methods to which I was exposed during the period of my connection with this Society. The foregoing instances were repeated many times. These events made it apparent that the Peace Society would thereafter be ineffective in combatting the militaristic trend which had the silent support of the Reichswehr and the open espousal of the Nazis as well as the Conservative-Nationalist Party led by Dr. Hugenberg. Therefore, I left my position with the German Peace Society and returned to my journalistic profession. I became the editor of a daily social democratic newspaper, the "Volksblatt", published in Dessau, Anhalt.

5. The former Dukedom of Anhalt was part of the Reichstag Constituency No. 10, Magdeburg-Anhalt. I was selected

H1146-0108

by the Social Democratic Party of the Constituency as one of its candidates for membership in the Reichstag, and ran for election which took place on the 14th of September 1930. I was elected at that time. This was the first election in which the Nazis made substantial gains, having increased their number of representatives in the Reichstag from 13 to 107. During the campaign Nazi terrorism was prevalent in those Constituencies in which they were desirous of making a showing or where they thought they had a chance of winning. In this election Himmler was one of my competitors; also General von Seeckt, who, although not a candidate of the Nazi Party, had earned the support of the Nazis by virtue of his militaristic views. These leaders received sufficient votes for election under the system of proportional representation. Himmler's candidacy made the result of the election in this district a question of party prestige. One of the means employed by the Nazis to insure a particular success in that district was to bring in prominent outside speakers of their Party together with an imposing detachment of storm troopers. They not only followed this strategy in meetings arranged for their own speakers where storm troopers prevented anyone connected with the opposition from taking the floor, but they also sent speakers into meetings of other political parties accompanied by many storm troopers, often physically taking over the meeting. One particular meeting which the Nazis tried to take over physically was held during that campaign in the city of Raguhn in Anhalt. The meeting was called by the Social Democratic Party and I was the principal speaker. The Nazis brought with them, as speaker, the leading SA officer and Gauleiter of the Province of Silesia, Edmund Heines. As soon as Heines was given the floor to reply to my address, the storm troopers advanced toward the stage and made preparations to take the meeting over. The State Police of Anhalt, however, was represented in sufficient strength to forestall that audacious attempt.

6. Another meeting during that campaign took place in the City of Aschersleben where the Nazis brought in as their speaker Roland Freisler who later became the Minister of Justice in the Nazi government of Prussia. Freisler brought with him such a large detachment of storm troopers, some of whom were armed with pistols and clubs, that they succeeded in forcibly excluding everybody not in sympathy with their views, and thus concluded as their own meeting the one which had been called by the Social Democratic Party.

7. As in the case of terroristic tactics manifested in connection with meetings of the Peace Society, the foregoing incidents are representative of the systematic practices of the Nazis with reference to their political opponents. These violent tactics, repeated many times, are thus demonstrated to have constituted an integral aspect of their political creed. Always the first endeavor of this method was to transmute political dispute into physical combat, and thus to rely on superior fighting technique and brutality as a method of achieving success in the public forum.

8. Even in the actual deliberations of the Reichstag the Nazis resorted to the same ruthless procedures. Here again they sought to destroy parliamentary government and attain their ends by a display of aggression and the use of oppressive methods. Illustrative of their actions within the halls of the Reichstag are the following:

(a) On the 14th of September 1930, 107 Nazi members of the Reichstag were elected out of a total membership of

H1146-0109

524. This group of 107 Nazi members conducted themselves like a storm troop unit. Whenever representatives of the government or the democratic parties spoke the Nazi members marched out in a body in studied contempt of the speaker, or entered in a body to interrupt the speaker, thus making it physically impossible for the Reichstag President to maintain order.

(b) According to the rules of the Reichstag a limited speaking time was accorded to each speaker depending upon his place in the debate. The speaker of the house was charged with maintaining that schedule. It was one of the favorite tactics of the Nazis to disrupt the schedule by a noisy demonstration whenever one of their own speakers ran overtime and was cut off by the Reichstag President. On such occasions, the Nazis created such a bedlam that the President could not make himself heard. Similarly, in the case of speakers of opposition parties, the Nazi members constantly interrupted, often resorting to lengthy and spurious parliamentary manouvers, with the result that the schedule of the session was thrown out of gear.

(c) The tactics of disturbance of parliamentary proceedings employed by the Nazis finally culminated in physical attacks upon members of the house as well as visitors. At one time in 1932 a visitor, Helmuth Klotz, who came to call on a democratic member of the house was physically attacked by the Nazis. Klotz had been a well-known submarine commander in the German Navy in World War I and, as an ardent supporter of the republic, had publicly opposed a policy of secretly rearming Germany thus incurring the wrath of the Nazi Party. He was attacked in a corridor of the Reichstag Building by Heines and other Nazi members of the house, and, when democratic members of the house came to his rescue, the Nazis called more of their members to press the assault until the Reichstag President found it necessary to call the police to restore order.

(d) The Nazi members who were the greatest offenders in disrupting the proceedings and in employing oppressive tactics were Joseph Goebbels, Robert Ley, Alfred Rosenberg, Erich Koch, Edmund Heines, Hans Frank, Fritz Terboven and others whose names I do not recall.

(e) That the Nazis had already conceived the device of the concentration camp as a means of suppressing and regimenting opposition elements was forcefully brought to my attention during the course of a conversation which I had with Dr. Wilhelm Frick in December 1932. Frick at that time was Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag of which I was a member. When I gave an emphatic answer to Frick concerning the particular matter discussed, he replied, "Don't worry, when we are in power we shall put all of you guys into concentration camps." When the Nazis came into power Frick was appointed Reichsminister of Interior and promptly carried out his threat in collaboration with Goering, as Chief of the Prussian State Police, and Himmler.

(f) Early in July 1932 the Reichstag was dissolved and elections scheduled for the 31st of July. Again the Nazis manifested their contempt for democratic processes by the increased use of force during the course of the campaign. Interruption of meetings, heckling and beating of democratic speakers, and general terroristic practices were resorted to in full measure during that campaign. I was again re-elected to the Reichstag at the conclusion of the

H1146-0110

campaign. It was far more difficult at that time to obtain adequate protection from the Prussian State Police for the reason that the Papen-Putsch of 20 July 1932 resulted in the declaration of martial law in Prussia. The Reichwehr, under the command of General Gerd von Rundstedt, did little to maintain order at political meetings.

(g) After Hitler was appointed Chancellor on 30 January 1933 the Reichstag was again dissolved and an election scheduled for the 5th of March. Nazi methods of terror reached a peak in this campaign. During the period immediately preceding the scheduled election date I was campaigning in my home district where the Nazis had taken a dominant part in the election. On the 2nd of March between the hours of 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. my wife and I were awakened by a disturbance in the street. Five storm troopers appeared in front of the apartment house calling my name. My wife stepped out of our bedroom onto the balcony to ascertain the cause of the disturbance. As she did so one of the storm troopers fired a revolver and the shot went over her head into the ceiling of our bedroom. The next day I took my wife and daughter to the home of my mother in the city of Leipzig intending to stay there until the Reichstag reconvened. On Sunday, March 12, while my wife was taking our child out for a walk the door bell at my mother's apartment rang. Three local policemen and four SA men appeared at the door and requested me to identify myself which I did. Thereupon, they took me in an automobile to a police jail in the City of Leipzig where I was kept in solitary confinement for two days. On March 14 I was transferred to the county jail of Dessau where I was again kept in solitary confinement for three months. During the period of my incarceration in these prisons I was given relative freedom in the use of my time and was, in general, treated properly. From time to time I was interrogated by Dessau police officers in a manner indicating that they would like to establish that I was connected in some way with the Reichstag fire. This was an obvious "red-herring" which the police, on orders of the Gestapo, resorted to for the purpose of suggesting some justification, however tenuous, for my continued detention. The transparent absurdity of this tactic finally induced the police to abandon it.

9. During my imprisonment I made every attempt within my power to bring about my release or, at least, to have charges filed in the desperate hope that they might be the subject of a judicial hearing. Among other things, I wrote a letter to the President of the German Supreme Court, Dr. Erwin Bumke, pointing out that my arrest constituted an infringement of my parliamentary immunity, as a member of the Reichstag Foreign Affairs Committee, which continued in effect until the New Reichstag convened. Also, in oral and written communications to various officials, I insisted on the protection afforded to citizens of Germany under the Weimar Constitution. My lawyer demanded that charges against me be filed or otherwise made known to me. These efforts were wholly ineffective. Charges were never filed nor did I receive a single coherent statement from any Nazi or police official, high or low, which informed me of the legal or, indeed, the political basis for my incarceration. Evidently, my only sin was my refusal to subscribe to the principles and methods of the Nazi Party. That refusal was reflected in my public and parliamentary statements and in my writings. Such disagreement was consistently peaceful and never implemented by physical aggression or by my association with any group which

H1146-0111

sponsored the use of physical force. However, under the regime which came into power on 30 January 1933, more disagreement involved, inexorably, jeopardy of the heretic's life.

10. On 14 June 1933 I was transferred to the concentration camp at Oranienburg. I remained in Oranienburg until the 4th of December 1933 when I escaped from that institution and was fortunate enough to get across the German-Czechoslovakian border. My experiences in that camp have heretofore been documented in my book entitled, "A Nation Terrorized" which was published by the Reilly & Lee Company, Chicago, in 1935.

Signed: Gerhart H. Seger

Subscribed and sworn to before

me this the 21st day of July 1945.

SIGNED: EDWARD L. DAVIS
Notary Public.

H1146-0112

H1146-0113

COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. L-151
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

No. 1267 Paris, November 23, 1937.

Subject: Visit of Ambassador Bullitt to Warsaw.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDER SECRETARY.

The Honorable,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that, in accordance with my telegram No. 1557 of November 4, 2 P.M., to the Department and the Department's telegram No. 563 of November 4, 3 P.M., to me, I left Paris, to visit Ambassador Biddle, on Saturday evening, November 13th at 6:15 P.M., arriving in Warsaw at 4:32 P.M., on November 14th. I left Warsaw at 10:20 P.M., November 17th, arriving in Berlin at 8:00 A.M., November 18th. I departed from Berlin on November 19th at 9:30 P.M., arriving in Paris at 9:55 A.M., on Saturday, November 20th.

In the course of this trip I talked with a number of statesmen and diplomats, and it has occurred to me that the Department of State might be interested in having more than a formal report of the dates of my journey. I append, therefore, memoranda recording portions of conversations with the following: 1. The
1/ Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Colonel Joseph Beck, Marshal
2/ Smigly-Rydz, and other members of the Polish Government; 2. The
3/ Japanese Ambassador in Warsaw, Shuichi Sakoh; 3. The Italian
4/ Ambassador in Berlin, Bernardo Attolico; 4. Baron Konstantin
5/ von Neurath; 5. Doctor Hjalmar Schacht; 6. General Hermann
6/ Goering.

Respectfully yours,

William C. Bullitt.

List of Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and Colonel Beck, Marshal Smigly-Rydz, and other members of the Polish Government.
2. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and the Japanese Ambassador in Warsaw.
3. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and the Italian Ambassador in Berlin.
4. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and Baron Konstantin von Neurath.
5. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and Doctor Hjalmar Schacht.
6. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and General Hermann Goering.

WCB:CO/lhh

H1146-0114

COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. L-151

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 1267 of
November 23, 1937, from the Embassy at Paris.

MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR BULLITT AND DOCTOR HJALMAR SCHACHT.

I had a conversation with Doctor Hjalmar Schacht which was not altogether without interest. Schacht began by saying that he regretted greatly that nothing had come of his two visits to Paris in the course of which he had attempted to establish the basis for a Franco-German rapprochement. He said that he had found Blum extremely reasonable with regard to the colonial question. He then went on to speak of the absolute necessity for doing something to produce peace in Europe before the outbreak of war toward which the Continent was drifting. He prefaced his remarks by saying that he himself today was "completely without influence on that man," meaning Hitler. He seemed to regard himself as politically dead and to have small respect for "that man." He said that the one way he could see to peace was through direct negotiations between France and Germany. He did not believe that the conversations which Halifax was about to have with Hitler would lead to any considerable results. Hitler was furious with the British because he had made his one great gesture of political generosity toward the British and the British had not responded by any similar gesture. He had offered to limit the German fleet and the British had quietly pocketed this concession and had then made none of the corresponding gestures toward Germany that Hitler had anticipated.

Schacht said that in his opinion the best way to begin to deal with Hitler was not through political discussions but through economic discussions. Hitler was not in the least interested in economic matters. He regarded money as "filth." It was, therefore, possible to enter into negotiations with him in the economic domain without arousing his emotional antipathies and begun to lead him into arrangements in the political and military fields in which he was intensely interested.

Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment, he was not vitally concerned about the Polish corridor and in his (Schacht's) opinion, it might be possible to maintain the Corridor provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany.

COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. L-151

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 1267 of
November 23, 1937, from the Embassy at Paris.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR BULLITT AND GENERAL HERMANN GOERING

I said to General Goering as soon as I met him that I should be extremely glad to have his ideas on the prospects of peace and war in Europe and that I wished he would begin by telling me what he thought of Germany's relations with France.

Goering said that there was no direct conflict whatsoever today between Germany and France. Germany had given up entirely and forever the idea of regaining Alsace-Lorraine. Germany had learned through long experience that the people of Alsace and Lorraine would inevitably be against whichever of the two countries happened to have the sovereignty over Alsace-Lorraine at the moment and would be permanently a source of discord within the country to which they were attached. Germany did not desire to have any half-loyal citizens and, therefore, had not the slightest desire for a return of Alsace-Lorraine to the German Reich.

In addition, the economic systems of France and Germany were completely complementary. It should be possible to develop to a much greater extent the exchange of all sorts of products between France and Germany.

Furthermore, the French had contributed so much to the culture of Germany and the Germans had contributed so much to the culture of France that as two civilized peoples who lived side by side they had a deep underlying esteem for each other. Furthermore, the French and the Germans respected each other as brave soldiers and courageous peoples who were ready to die for their respective countries. In addition, the French Government had indicated that it was prepared insofar as it was concerned, to return the German colonies which had been transferred to France by the Treaty of Versailles. There was, unfortunately, the proviso that France would only take this action if Great Britain were prepared to make a similar concession.

There was, therefore, no cause of discord whatsoever in the direct relations between France and Germany to prevent the closest sort of friendship between the two countries. So far as Germany was concerned, he could say with authority that Germany today was prepared to conclude at once an offensive and defensive alliance with France.

The sole source of friction between Germany and France was the refusal of France to permit Germany to achieve certain vital national necessities. If France, instead of accepting a collaboration with Germany, should continue to follow a policy of building up alliances in Eastern Europe to prevent Germany from the achievement of her legitimate aims it was obvious that there would be conflict between France and Germany.

I asked Goering what aims especially he had in mind. He replied, "We are determined to join to the German Reich all Germans who are contiguous to the Reich and are divided from the great body of the German race merely by the artificial barriers imposed by the Treaty of Versailles."

H1146-0115

I asked Goering if he meant that Germany was absolutely determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this was an absolute determination of the German Government. The German Government at the present time was not pressing this matter because of certain momentary political considerations, especially in their relations with Italy; but Germany would tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the consolidation of Austria in the German Reich. He then added a statement which went further than any I have heard on this subject. He said, "There are schemes being pushed now for a union of Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia either with or without a Hapsburg at the head of the unit. Such a solution is absolutely inacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of such an agreement would be an immediate casus belli." (Goering used the Latin expression casus belli. It is not a translation from the German, in which our conversation was carried on.)

I asked Goering if the German Government was as decided in its views with regard to the Germans in Bohemia as it was with regard to Austria. He replied that there could be only one final solution of this question. The Sudeten Germans must enter the German Reich as all other Germans who lived contiguous to the Reich.

I asked if the German Government might not be content if the Czech Government should accord to the Germans of Bohemia a large measure of local autonomy while keeping them under Czech sovereignty. Goering replied that such a concession on the part of the Czechoslovak Government would lead to a temporary appeasement of the situation; but the autonomy would have to be real autonomy and such a solution would not be a final solution. There could be no final solution but the inclusion of these Germans within the Reich.

I asked Goering how he viewed the case of the Germans in other portions of Europe; notably the Germans of Transylvania. He replied that these racial groups were cut off from the main body of the German people and could not, therefore, be joined to it. All that Germany would insist upon would be that they should be treated as equals with equal rights and be permitted to retain their cultural life. The situation of the Germans in Transylvania was extremely unsatisfactory. On the other hand, the Yugoslavs had treated the Germans within their borders with such conspicuous intelligence and fairness that the leaders of the Germans of Yugoslavia had informed him recently that they had no real grievances and that they would resist to the utmost any arrangements in Europe which might envisage their return to Hungary.

Goering then added that the only other two considerable German racial groups which would lie outside the borders of the German Reich, after the Germans of Austria and Bohemia had been included, would be the Germans of the South Tyrol who were now in the hands of Italy and the Germans in Poland. He did not feel that there was a sufficient number of Germans in Italy to warrant a major war for their attachment to the Reich. Similarly the Germans of Poland would have to stay where they were because there were a considerable number of Poles in Germany and all that either Poland or Germany could expect would be that these minorities should be treated on each side of the border with the greatest human consideration.

H1146-0116

Goering went on to say that the idea that Germany had any ambitions to annex the Ukraine was pure nonsense. I suggested that one of the reasons it was nonsense was that it would involve first the conquest of Poland and then the conquest of the whole of Central Europe before it could become realizable.

Goering replied that this was so and that in addition Germany had no desire to have territory in Europe except territory inhabited by Germans.

I thanked Goering for giving me such a clear expression of Germany's intentions with regard to the Continent and asked him if he would pass on to the colonial field.

Goering said that Germany's demands in the colonial field were well known. They were for a return of the German colonies which had been taken away from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. Germany had no right to demand anything but these colonies. On the other hand, Germany had no desire to be stiff-necked about this matter. If England should not wish to return German East Africa or German Southwest Africa, for military and other reasons, Germany would make no objection if England could make an arrangement, financial or otherwise, with Portugal and Belgium for the giving to Germany of Portuguese and Belgian colonies in West Africa which would compensate Germany for the loss of her East African possessions. It was idle to say that Germany could not get raw materials of great value from African colonies; for example, the Cameroons. It was entirely true that today the Cameroons had been very little developed and were producing very little, but with German intelligence and energy applied to them, they could be made to produce materials of the greatest value to Germany. The same was true of many other areas in Africa which today were undeveloped or under-developed. The essential problem for Germany was to feed and maintain her people at a decent standard of living. It was entirely clear that with the increase of population in Germany the soil now in the hands of Germany would be insufficient to maintain this increasing German population. Before the war, when barriers to international trade had been low, it had been possible for Germany to maintain herself by her great international trade. Today barriers were so high that this would soon become impossible He hoped that there might be a reduction of such barriers and that Germany could find increasing markets for her products but she could not feel safe unless she had a colonial domain which would give her access to her own raw materials.

Goering then went on to say that he deplored greatly the present state of trade relations between Germany and the United States. The trade between the two countries was ceasing to be of any importance which was contrary to all reason. Indeed, Germany was almost isolated from the United States. There were certain countries with which Germany had good relations; and certain countries with which Germany had bad relations; but with the United States, Germany had no relations at all. He then asked me why I believed there was such hostility to Germany in the United States.

I replied that there were many sources of this hostility. All Americans were devoted to the ideal of democracy. There had been a democratic government in Germany, or at least the semblance of a democratic government, which had been destroyed and replaced by Nazi dictatorship. Any governing group which destroyed democracy to replace it by dictatorship would always be unpopular in the United States. Furthermore, the German Government had at the same time attacked with the utmost violence the Jews, the Catholic

H1146-0117

Church and the Protestant Church. The reaction in America among Protestants, Catholics and Jews had, therefore, been natural, immediate, and intense.

Goering then protested, saying that he was informed that people in the United States believed that the National Socialist Government was attempting to set up a heathen church in Germany. I replied that this was so. He said that it was true that within the Nazi Government there was a small group of people who desired to see a return to the Norse gods, but he could assure me that this movement was completely without importance and did not include more than one percent of the Nazi Party. So far as he, himself, was concerned, he was a Protestant and still attended church services. He had been to church recently on the occasion of the confirmation of his nephew. He thought that the violence of the reaction in the United States probably was due to the Jews. I replied that in some measure it was due to the Jews as was only natural, but that it was not only the Jews but all Americans who were shocked and horrified by the treatment of the Jews in Germany and that the attacks on the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church and on democracy and human freedom were factors of equal importance.

I then added that there was an additional element which was playing a certain role at the moment. It appeared that the Nazi Government was engaged in forming Nazi organizations in the United States. Neither the Government nor the people of the United States could tolerate the formation on their soil of any national group or other group directed by any foreign country. We could not permit Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini or any other dictator to organize groups of agents in the United States. If we should do so, we would soon cease to be a nation and become a mere battleground for the conflicting ambitions of foreign dictators.

Goering said that he considered this entirely reasonable and understandable and if he were an American would certainly not tolerate the slightest interference by any foreign agency in the life of the United States. The German Government had forbidden any German citizen to participate in any way in the formation of such groups. He believed that I would find that such groups were formed by American citizens of German origin. I replied that I felt quite certain that such groups would not be formed without the approval and desire of the German Government. Goering then said: "It is true that certain persons in our Government here believe that we should attempt to organize the Germans, especially of the Middle West, because they feel that if if Germany should again become involved in war with France and England, there would come a moment when the United States might again consider entering such a war against Germany and they believe that such groups of organized Germans in the United States might throw their influence decisively against a declaration of war and might prevent the United States entering such a conflict.

I then said that I could merely remind him of two things: The first, that the organization of German groups in the United States during the late war had aroused hostility throughout the entire country against Germany. The second, a conversation which had taken place during the World War between our Ambassador to Germany, Mr. James Gerard and Zimmerman, who was Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Reich at that time. Zimmerman had stated to Gerard that the United States could not enter the war because there were five million Germans in the United States who would prevent by force, if necessary, any such action. Mr. Gerard had replied that if there were five million

H1146-0118

Germans in the United States who would prevent by force, if necessary, any such action, there were five million and one lamp posts. Goering did not seem to get the point with absolute clarity. I, therefore, added, "and you will understand that, if, as you have said, there are six million Germans in the United States today, who could be organized to influence the action of the United States Government, there are a great many more than six million tree limbs on which to hang them."

Goering seemed to find this remark entirely reasonable and in a more friendly and intimate tone asked, "What then can we do to improve our relations with the United States?" I replied that he had an excellent ambassador in Washington at the moment who could doubtless inform him better than I could on this subject.

I then asked Goering for his views with regard to the Far East. He said that he believed the Japanese would win the war and succeed in imposing on China precisely what they should desire to impose. I asked Goering if he knew precisely what that was. He said that he believed that the Japanese aim was to organize the Northern Provinces of China thoroughly as a base from which to attack the Soviet Union, since it was obvious that Japan would be compelled to attack the Soviet Union owing to the geographic position of Vladivostok. The Japanese desired to have Central and South China in relative chaos and impotence until they had finished with the Soviet Union.

At this point, Goering asked me why the United States had begun to build battleships for the Soviet Union. I replied that I had no information to the effect that the American Government was building battleships for the Soviet Union and I considered such a report highly improbable. Goering said that his information indeed was rather vague on this point.

I asked him what his views were with regard to the Soviet Union at the present time. He said that in his opinion the Red Army on the European frontier had ceased to be a serious fighting force if indeed it had ever been one. He said that the reports of the prowess of Soviet aviation in Spain were extraordinarily misleading. German officers in Spain had analyzed in detail the debris of all Soviet planes that had been shot down behind Franco's lines. They had discovered that every Soviet plane which had flown with conspicuous success in Spain had been of American manufacture. I asked him if he meant manufactured in Russia on American models. He replied in the negative, and said that the Russians had actually sent to Spain not planes manufactured in Russia on American models but planesevery part of which had been manufactured in America. That explained the excellent performance of those particular planes. All his information was to the effect that planes actually manufactured in Russia copying American models were of such inferior workmanship that they could not compare with planes actually built in America. Furthermore, this wastrue with regard to all Soviet industrial products. They might turn out five thousand tractors in a year but it was extremely improbable that a single one of those tractors would be running two years after it had been put in use. Furthermore, the service of supply of the Russian Army today was in as lamentablecondition as it had been in the time of the Czar. In the time of the Czarthe Russian Armies at the front were frequently without food or munitions. The service of supply then had been controlled largely by Jews. It was still controll largely by Jews and, if the Soviet Union should attempt to make war on the European frontier, he would expect a complete

H1146-0119

collapse of the Soviet Armies because of bad organization. He did not think that today there was the faintest change of the Soviet Union attempting any offensive operations on the European frontier.

Goering said that he believed the Soviet Army in the Far East was better organized than the Soviet Army on the European frontier; but he felt confident that in spite of the increasing weakness of Japan, the Soviet Union would not dare to intervene in the Sino-Japanese conflict. He then said that the Japanese Army had shown itself to be considerably weaker than expected and that the Chinese, with totally inadequate weapons, had made a very fine defense due in part, he felt, to the presence of German staff officers with the Chinese armies.

Goering then said that he was surprised to learn that the United States was building battleships which could not possibly pass through the Panama Canal. I replied that I believed his statement was entirely erroneous. He said that he could not admit this; that his information was positive. The newest American battleships could not possibly go through the Panama Canal. I told him that we would have to disagree on this point. He then said that no matter whether we could put our new battleships through the Canal or not, we could do nothing in the Far East to interfere in any way with Japan.

I was indiscreet enough to remark that the combined American and British fleets might be powerful enough to do something although neither Great Britain nor the United States had any desire for conflict with Japan. Goering replied, "You know that the British Fleet can not operate anywhere at the present time. It is completely pinned down by ourselves in the North Sea and by the Italians in the Mediterranean."

Goering then said that he hoped I realized there was an intense desire on the part of the German Government to develop better relations with the United States and on this note, pleasantly, our conversation ended.

H1146-0120

H1146-0121

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-221
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Fuehrer's Headquarters, 16.7.1941
Bo/Fu

Top SECRET
(Pencil note) 17.VII 41

M e m o r a n d u m for the record.

By order of the Fuehrer he held today at 15 hours in his quarters a conference attended by Reichsleiter Rosenberg, Reich Minister Lammers, Field Marshal Keitel, the Reich Marshal and myself. The conference began at 15 hours and, including a break for coffee, lasted until about 20 hours.

By way of introduction the Fuehrer pointed out, he desired first of all to make some fundemental statements. Several measures had to be taken without delay; this was confirmed, among other events, by an assertion made in an impudent Vichy newspaper that the war against the Soviet Union was a war waged by Europe, and that, therefore, it had to be conducted for the benefit of Europe as a whole. Obviously the Vichy paper meant to say by these hints that it ought not to be the Germans alone who benefitted from this war, but that all European states ought to profit by it.

Now it was essential that we did not publicise our aims before the world; also there was no need for that, but the main thing was that we ourselves knew what we wanted. By no means should we render our rask more difficult by making superfluous declarations. Such declarations were superfluous because we could do everything wherever we had the power, and what was beyond our power we would not be able to do anyway.

(Original Page 2)

What we told the world about the motives for our measures ought to be conditioned, therefore, by tactical reasons. We ought to act here in exactly the same way as we did in the bases of Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. In these cases too we did not publish our aims, and it was only sensible to continue in the same way.

Therefore we shall emphasize again that we were forced to occupy, administer, and secure a certain area; it was in the interest of the inhabitants that we provided order, food, traffic etc., hence our measures. Nobody shall be able to recognize that it initiates a final settlement. This need not prevent our taking all necessary measures - shooting, desettling, etc. - and we shall take them.

But we do not want to make any people into enemies prematurely and unnecessarily. Therefore we shall act as though we wanted to exercise a mandate only. At the same time we must know clearly that we shall never leave those countries.
Our conduct therefore ought to be:

1.) To do nothing which might obstruct the final settlement, but to prepare for it only in secret;

2.) To emphasize that we are liberators.

In particular:

The Crimea has to be evacuated by all foreigners and to be settled by Germans only.
In the same way the former Austrian part of Galicia will become Reich territory.

H1146-0122

Our present relations with Roumania are good, but nobody knows what they will be at any future time. This we have to consider, and we have to draw our frontiers accordingly. One ought not to be dependent on the good will of other people; we have to plan our relations with Roumania in accordance with this principle.

Original page 3

On principle we have now to face the task of cutting up the giant cake according to our needs, in order to be able:

first, to dominate it,
second, to administer it, and
third, to exploit it.

The Russians have now ordered partisan warfare behind our front. This partisan war again has some advantage for us; it enables us to eradicate everyone who opposes us.

Principles:

Never again must it be possible to create a military power west of the Urals, even if we have to wage war for a hundred years in order to attain this goal. Every successor of the Fuehrer should know : security for the Reich exists only if there are no foreign military forces west of the Urals; it is Germany who undertakes the protection of this area against all possible dangers. Our iron principle is and has to remain:
We must never permit anybody but the Germans to carry arms!

This is especially important; even when it seems easier at first to enlist the armed support of foreign subjugated nations, it is wrong to do so. In the end this will prove to be to our disadvantage unconditionally and unavoidably. Only the German may carry arms, not the Slav, not the Czech, not the Cossack nor the Ukrainian!

On no account should we apply a wavering policy such as was done in Alsace before 1918. What distinguishes the Englishman is that he pursues constantly one line and one aim. In this respect surely we have to learn from the Englishman. Therefore we ought never to base our actions on single contemporary personalities: here again the conduct of the British in India towards the Indian princes etc. ought to be an example: it is always the soldier who has to consolidate the regime.

Original page 4

We have to create a Garden of Eden in the newly occupied eastern territories; they are vitally important to us; as compared with them colonies play only an entirely subordinate part.

Even if we divide up certain areas at once, we shall always proceed in the role of protectors of the Right and of the people. The terms which are necessary at this time should be selected in accordance with this principle: we shall not speak of new Reich territory only, but of the task which became necessary because of the war.

In particular:

In the Baltic territory the country up to the Duna now will have to be administered in agreement with Field Marshal Keitel. Reichsleiter Rosenberg emphasizes that in his opinion a different treatment of the population is desirable in every district ("Kommissariat"). In the Ukraine we should start with a cultural administration, there we ought to awake the historical consciousness of the Ukrainians, establish a university at Kiev, and the like.

H1146-0123

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-221
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(CONT'd)

The Reich Marshal makes the counterstatement that we had to think first of securing our food situation, everything else could come later.
(Incidental question: Is there still anything like an educated class in the Ukraine, or are upper class Ukrainians rather to be found only as emigrants outside present day Russia?)

Rosenberg continues, there were certain independent movements in the Ukraine which deserved furtherance.

Original page 5

The Reich Marshal asks the Fuehrer to indicate what areas had been promised to other states.

The Fuehrer replies, Antonescu desired Bessarabia and Odessa with a strip (of land) leading west-northwest from Odessa.

Upon objections made by the Reich Marshal and Rosenberg, the Fuehrer replies that the new frontiers desired by Antonescu contained little outside the old Roumanian frontiers.

The Fuehrer states furthermore that nothing definite had been promised to the Hungarians, Turks and Slovaks.

Then the Fuehrer submits for consideration whether the former Austrian part of Galicia ought to be added at once to the government; upon objections having been voiced the Fuehrer decides that this part shall not be added to the government but should only be subordinated likewise to Reichminister Frank (Lwow).

The Reich Marshal thinks it was right to incorporate into East Prussia several parts of the Baltic country, e.g. the Forest of Bialystok.

The Fuehrer emphasizes that the entire Baltic country will have to be incorporated into Germany.

At the same time the Crimea, including a considerable hinterland (situated north of the Crimea) should become Reich territory; the hinterland should be as large as possible.

Rosenberg objects to this because of the Ukrainians living there.
(Incidental question: It occurred to me several times that Rosenberg has a soft spot for the Ukrainians; thus he desires to aggrandize the former Ukraine to a considerable extent.)

The Fuehrer emphasizes furthermore that the Volga Colony too will have to become Reich territory, also the district around Baku; the latter will have to become a German concession (Military colony).

Original page 6

The Finns wanted East Carelia, but the Kola Peninsula will be taken by Germany because of the large nickel mines there.

The annexation of Finland as a federated state should be prepared with caution. The area around Leningrad is wanted by the Finns; the Fuehrer will raze Leningrad to the ground and then hand it over to the Finns.

H1146-0124

There ensues a rather long discussion as to the qualifications of Gau Leader (Gauleiter) L o h s e, who has been proposed by Rosenberg as Governor of the Baltic Country. Rosenberg reiterates that having approached Lohse already he would be in a difficult situation in case Lohse were not appointed; for the western part of the Baltic Country K u b e was to be appointed, but subordinated to Lohse; for the Ukraine Rosenberg proposes S a u c k e l.

The Reich Marshal, however, emphasized the most important points of view on which we ought to base these appointments:
Securing of food supplies, and as far as necessary, of trade; securing of communications, etc.
The Reich Marshal emphasizes, either Koch should be appointed for the Baltic country because he knew this country very well, or Koch should receive the Ukraine because Koch was the person with the greatest initiative and with the best education.

The Fuehrer asked whether K u b e could not be appointed as commissioner for the district of Moscow; Rosenberg and the Reich Marshal both think that Kube was too old for this position .

Upon further representations Rosenberg replied he was afraid that Koch might soon refuse to obey his (Rosenberg's) instructions; by the way, Koch had predicted such conduct on his part.

Original page 7

The Reich Marshal replied it was indeed not desirable that Rosenberg guide every step of the appointees, rather these people had the duty of working quite independently.

For the Caucasus area Rosenberg proposed his Chief of Staff S c h i c k e d a n z; he reiterated that Schickedanz certainly would fulfil his task very well, a statement which is doubted by the Reich Marshal.

Rosenberg then stated Lutze had proposed to him to appoint several SA Leaders, namely S c h e p p m a n n for Kiev, - M a n t h e y - Dr. B e n n e c k e -, L i t z m a n n for Estonia, and Burgomaster Dr. D r e x l e r for Latvia. The Fuehrer has no objections to the use of SA Leaders.

Rosenberg then states he had received a letter from Ribbentrop who desired the participation of the Foreign Office; but he (Rosenberg) asked the Fuehrer to determine that the internal formation of the newly acquired areas was no concern of the Foreign Office. The Fuehrer agrees with this conception. Until further notice it will be sufficient for the Foreign Office to appoint a liaison officer to Reichsleiter Rosenberg.

The Fuehrer emphasizes that the Ukraine would undoubtedly be the most important district for the next three years. Therefore it would be best to appoint K o c h there; if S a u c k e l were to be used, then it would be better to appoint him for the Baltic country.

Original page 8

Rosenberg continues, he intended to appoint S c h n e e r, S e l z n e r and M a n d e r b a c h as Commissioners for the Moscow area. The Fuehrer desires that Holz be used too, and that the former Gauleiter F r a u e n f e l d should be placed in charge of administering the Crimea

H1146-0125

Rosenberg states he intended to use also Captain von Petersdorff, owing to his special merits; general consternation, general rejection. The Fuehrer and the Reich Marshal both emphasize there was no doubt that von Petersdorf was insane.

Rosenberg states furthermore that the appointment of the Burgomaster of Stuttgart, S t r o e l i n has been proposed to him. There were no objections.

Since K u b e is considered too old for the Moscow District by both the Reich Marshal and Rosenberg, K a s c h e is to take over this district.

(Memo for Party Comrade Klopfer:
Please ask Dr. Meyer <u>at once</u> for the files concerning the plans for the future organization and the intended appointments.)

The Reich Marshal emphasizes he intended to appoint Gauleiter T e r b o v e n for the exploitation of the Kola Peninsula; the Fuehrer agrees.

The Fuehrer emphasizes that L o h s e , provided he thinks himself equal to this task, should take over the Baltic country K a s c h e Moskow, K o c h the Ukriane, F r a u e n f e l d the Crimea, T e r b o v e n Kola, and S c h i c k e d a n z the Caucasus.

<u>Original page 9</u>

Reichsleiter Rosenberg then broached the question of securing the administration of the Eastern areas.

The Fuehrer tells the Reich Marshal and the Field Marshal he had always urged that Police Regiments should be provided with armored cars; this has proved to be quite necessary for police operations within the newly occupied eastern territories, because a Police Regiment equipped with the appropriate number of armored cars of course could perform many services. Otherwise though, the Fuehrer pointed out the protection was very slight. However, the Reich Marshal was going to transfer all his training fields to the new territories, and if necessary even Junkers 52 could throw bombs in case of riots. Naturally this giant area would have to be pacified as quickly as possible; the best solution was to shoot anybody who looked sideways.

Field Marshal Keitel emphasizes the inhabitants themselves ought to be made responsible for their things because it was of course impossible to put a sentry in front of every shed or railway station. The inhabitants had to understand that anybody who did not perform their duties properly would be shot, and that they would be held responsible for each offense.

Upon a question of Reichsleiter Rosenberg the Fuehrer replied newspapers also - e. g. for the Ukraine would have to be reestablished, in order to obtain means of influencing the inhabitants.

<u>After the interval</u> the Fuehrer emphasized we had to understand that the Europe of today was nothing but a geographical term; in reality Asia extended up to our previous frontiers.

H1146-0126

Original page 10

Reichsleiter Rosenberg then described the organizational arrangement he intended to establish; he did not intend to appoint a Permanent Deputy of the Reich Commissioner ahead of time, but always the most efficient of the General Commissioners would be called upon to deputize for the Reich Commissioner.

Rosenberg will set up four departments in the office of the Reich Commissioner: first for the general administration,
second for politics,
third for economics,
fourth for engineering and architecture.

(Incidental remark: The Fuehrer emphasizes that activities on the part of the churches are out of the question. Papen had sent him through the Foreign Office a long memorandum in which it was asserted now was the right moment to reintroduce the churches; but this was completely out of the question.)

The Reich Marshal will detail to the Rosenberg Office Assistant Secretaries (Ministerialdirektoren) S c h l o t t e r e r and R i e c k e .

Reichsleiter Rosenberg applies for appropriate premises to house his administration; he applies for the premises of the Commercial Mission of the Soviet Union in Lietzenberger Street; the Foreign Office, though, were of the opinion that these premises were extraterritorial. The Fuehrer replies that this was nonsense; Reich Minister Lammers was charged to inform the Foreign Office they were to hand over these premises to Rosenberg at once and without any negotiations.

Rosenberg then proposes to detail a liaison officer to the Fuehrer; his adjutant K o e p p e n was to be appointed; the Fuehrer agrees and adds that Koeppen would become the opposite number to Hewel.

Original page "10" (should be "11")

Reich Minister Dr. Lammers reads the drafts prepared by him (see enclosure).

A longer discussion takes place concerning the jurisdiction of Reich SS Fuehrer; obviously at the same time the participants have in mind the jurisdiction of the Reich Marshal.

The Fuehrer, the Reich Marshal and others reiterate that Himmler was to have no greater jurisdiction than he had in Germany proper; but this (much) was absolutely necessary.

The Fuehrer repeats emphatically this quarrel would soon subside in practice; he recalls the excellent collaboration between Army and Air Force at the front.

In conclusion it is decided to call the Baltic country "Ostland".

Enclosures

H1146-0127

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO L-221

23 November 1945

I, WALTER ROTHSCHILD, 1st Lieutenant, ASN-0886354, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document L-221.

WALTER ROTHSCHILD
1st Lt. ASN
0886354

H1146-0128

Exhibit USA 589
Filed Jan. 8, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 069-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY

The Deputy of the Fuehrer
Staff Director

Munich 33, January 17, 1939
Brown House

S E C R E T

Regulation No 1/39 g

Subject: Jews

After a report of General Field Marshal Goering the Fuehrer has made some basic decisions regarding the Jewish question. The decisions are brought to your attention in the enclosure. Strict compliance with these directives is requested.

signed: M BORMANN

1 inclosure
Distribution: III b

Official:

signed

Office Rosenberg
Rec'd Nr 5827 Jan 19, 39
filed Feb 2
Submitted to RL Jan 19
Urban Jan 20
Schickedanz Feb 13

H1146-0129

COPY

Minister President General Field Marshal Goering
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan

Berlin, Dec 28, 1938

SECRET

Pursuant to my report the Fuehrer has made the following decisions on the Jewish question.

A.

I. Housing of Jews

1. a) Protective regulations for tenants will not be generally reveked in the case of Jews. It is desirable, however, to proceed in individual cases in such a way that Jews will live together in one house, as much as feasible under rental conditions.

b) For this reason the arianization of real estate will be the last step of the total arianization, that means that at present real estate is only to be arianized in individual cases where there are compelling reasons. An immediate concern is the arianization of plants and business enterprises, farm property, forests, etc.

2. The use of sleepers and dining cars is to be prohibited for Jews. Apart from that no separate Jew-compartements must be arranged for. Neither should any bans be pronounced regarding the use of railways, streetcars, subways, buses and ships.

3. The ban for Jews is to be pronounced only for certain public establishments etc. This includes such hotels and restaurants which are mainly visited by Party members (for instance: Hotel Kaiserhof, Berlin; Hotel Vierjahreszeiten Munich; Hotel Deutscher Hof, Nuernberg, Hotel Drei Mohren, Augsburg, etc.) The ban can further be pronounced for swimming pools, certain public squares, resort towns, etc. Mineral baths may, in individual cases and if prescribed by a doctor, be used by Jews, but only in a manner not causing offense.

II. Pensions are not to be denied to Jews who have been civil servants and who have been pensioned. It is to be investigated, however, whether those Jews can manage on a smaller pension.

III. Jewish social care is not to be arianized or to be abolished, so that Jews will not become a public burden but can be cared for by Jewish institutions.

IV. Jewish patents are property values and therefore to be arianized too. (A similar procedure was used during the World War by America and other states pertaining to German citizons.)

B.

Mixed Marriages:

I. 1. with children (half-Aryans 1 class)

a) If the father is German and the mother Jewish the family is permitted to remain in their present apartment. No ban for Jews regarding housing is to be pronounced against these families.

The property of the Jewish mother may be transferred in such cases to the German husband respectively the half-Aryan children.

b) If the father is Jewish and the mother German these families are neither to be housed in Jewish quarters for the time being. This because the children (half-Aryan 1st class) are not to be exposed

H1146-0130

to the Jewish agitation as they will have to serve later in the labor service and the armed forces.

The property may for the time being be transferred partly or entirely to the children.

2. without children

a) If the husband is German and the wife Jewish par. 1 a) holds true accordingly.

b) If the husband is Jewish and the wife German these childless couples are to be treated as pure Jews.

Property values of the husband cannot be transferred to the wife. Both can be lodged in Jewish houses or quarters. Especially in the case of emigration both spouses are to be treated like Jews as soon as the augmented emigration has been set into nation.

II. If the German wife diverces the Jewish husband she returns to the German blood-kinship. All disadvantages for her are dropped in this case.

signed: GOERING

Authenticated copy:

signed: JAHN

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 069-PS

November 23, 1945

I FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt.Inf., 01335567 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 069-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
01335567.

H1146-0131

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 141-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

In conveying the measures taken until now, for the securing of Jewish art property by the Chief of the Military administration Paris and the special service staff Rosenberg (The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 2 f 28.14.W.Z.Nr 3812/40 g), the art objects brought to the Louvre will be disposed of in the following way:

1) Those art objects about which the Fuehrer has reserved for himself the decision as to their use,

2) Those art objects which serve to the completion of the Reichs Marshal's collection,

3) Those art objects and library stocks the use of which seem useful to the establishing of the higher institutes of learning and which come within the jurisdiction of Reichsleiter Rosenberg,

4) Those art objects that are suited to be sent to German museums,

of all these art objects. a systematic inventory will be made by the special purpose staff Rosenberg; they will then be packed and shipped to Germany with the assistance of the Luftwaffe.

5) Those art objects that are suited to be given to French museums or which might be of use for the German-French art trade, will be auctioned off at a date yet to be fixed; the profit of this auction will be given to the French State for the benefit of those bereaved by the war.

6) The further securing of Jewish art property in France willbe continued by the special purpose staff Rosenberg in the same way as heretofore in cooperation with the Chief of the military administration Paris.

Paris, 5 November 1940

I will submit this proposal to the Fuehrer. These instructions are in effect until he has reached a decision.

signed: GOERING

Certified true copy:
Berlin 15 Dec 1943
(Dr Zeiss)
Chief of special purpose staff

Rosenberg's special purpose staff seal

VERIFICATION OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 141-PS

I, Fred Niebergall, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document 141-PS, made under my supervision by Wolfgang E. Thormann, M/Sgt, 387/9424.

Fred Niebergall
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

H1146-0132

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 343-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF COUNSEL

Field Marshall Milch

Berlin,-W 8, 31 Aug. 1942
Leipzigerstrasse 7

Dear Mr. Himmler !

I thank you very much for your letter of the 25 Aug. I have read with great interest the reports of Dr. Rascher and Dr. Romberg. I am informed about the current experiments. I shall ask the two gentlemen to give a lecture combined with the showing of motion pictures to my men in the near future.

Hoping that it will be possible for me to see you at the occassion of my next visit to Headquarters I remain with best regards and

Heil Hitler !

/s/ yours

E. M i l c h.

Mr. Reichsfuehrer SS and

Chief of the German Police Himmler

B e r l i n SW 11.

H1146-0133

SECRET

Field Marshal Milch

Berlin W 8, 2o May 1942
Leipzigerstrasse 7

Dear Wolffy !

In reference to your telegramm of 12 May our sanitary inspector reports to me that the altitude experiments carried out by the SS and Air Force at Dachau have been finished. Any continuation of these experiments seems essentially unreasonable. However the carrying out of experiments of some other kind, in regard to perils at high seas, would be important. These have been prepared in immediate agreement with the proper offices;Major (M.C.) Weltz will be charged with the execution and Capt (M.C.) Rascher will be made available until further orders in addition to his duties within the Medical Corps of the Air Corps. A change of these measures does not appear necessary, and an enlargement of the task is not considerred pressing at this time.

The low-pressure chamber would not be needed for these low-temperatur experiments. Is it urgently needed at another place and therefore can no longer remain in Dachau.

I convey the special thanks from the supreme commander of the Air Corps to the SS for their extensive cooperation.

I remain with best wishes for you in good comradship and with

Heil Hitler !

Always yours

s/s E. M i l c h

Mr. SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff
Berlin SW 11.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 343-PS

I, Fred Niebergall, 2nd Lt.Inf. O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document Nr. 343-PS.

Fred Niebergall
2nd Lt.Inf.
O-1335567

H1146-0134

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 375-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

General Staff of the 5th Section
(German Air Force)
(Genstb. 5. Abteilung)
No. 28/38. TOP SECRET (G-2)
For Commanders only (CHEF-SACHE)

Berlin, 25 August 1938

THROUGH OFFICER COURIER ONLY

TOP SECRET

Subject: Extended Case Green (GRUEN - code for Czechoslovakia)
Estimate of the Situation with Special Consideration of the Enemy.

A) Initial Political Situation:

1) The basic assumption is that France will declare war during the Case Green.

It is presumed that France will only decide upon war if active military assistance by Great Britain is definitely assured.

2) The Soviet Union will probably side immediately with the Western Powers.

3) It is not expected for the moment that other states will intervene against Germany.

The Dutch-Belgian area assumes in this connection much more importance for the prevention of the war in Western Europe than during the World War. This mainly as an advanced base for the air war.

4) The United States of America will immediately support the fight of the Western Powers with strong ideological and economic means.

5) Italy, Nationalistic-Spain, Hungary and Japan are regarded as benevolent neutrals.

B) Initial Military Situation:

1) The French-Czechoslovakian treaty provides for military assistance only in the case of an unprovoked attack. At least an agreement of the French and British views as to the legal aspect has to be achieved. If only for political reasons we have to consider the 2nd day as the earliest possible day of war on a European scale. In case of a 24 hour ultimatum it would be the 3rd day.

2) It is further assumed that the actual commencement of hostilities will only take place after the French armed forces have been tactically deployed. That means within the fourth to eighteenth day. This to

a) use the deployment as a means of political pressure,
b) and to be able to deploy the troops undisturbed.

3) The war aim of the Entente Powers is to be considered as the overcoming of Germany through attacking its war economy. With other words through a long war.

4) The following are possible methods of operation for the French army:

a) to man and hold the Maginot-line,
b) to march into Belgium and the Netherlands at the beginning of the war with the aim of occupying the Ruhr-territory.

All suppositions support the first alternative.

5) The French Air Force will probably attack both economic and German Air Force targets as well as military and communication objectives. Thus no concentrated effect will be achieved at any one place.

6) The French Navy will probably cooperate through operations with the British sea power to supplement the North Sea blockade. The aim will be the maintenance of naval predominance in the Atlantic and the Western Mediterranean.

7) The British Air Force is assumed to be committed from English bases against the Rhine-Westphalia industrial area and the North Sea ports. Sooner or later the Belgium-Dutch neutrality will be violated.

A camouflaged aircraft reporting network in Belgium and the Netherlands has to be taken into account from the first day of the war. No transfer to France on the part of the British Air Force need be expected at the beginning of the war. Equally it is held to be out of the question for any large parts of the British armed forces to be transferred to France.

8) Provision seems to have been made for the use of North French ground organizations during the course of the war at least by part of the attacking British Air Forces.

The existence of a relatively large number of civilian airfields in Belgium and the Netherlands seem to indicate the intention of moving advanced elements of the air defences of London (light fighters and reconnaissance aircraft) into this area after a while.

9) Thanks to the expected neutrality of Poland, the active participation of Soviet Russia will be largely restricted to the prosecution of the war in the Baltic.

Furthermore, air attacks against East Prussia and the Baltic coast are to be anticipated and occasional raids on Berlin are regarded as possible.

10) The basic assumption in respect to our own prosecution of the war is that two war plane air forces will be available in the West at the beginning of hostilities. There will be five war plane air forces in all after three to four weeks. The aim will be to bring about a decision by the defeat of the Western powers.

C) Task of the German Air Force:

The German Air Force has at present not all the forces necessary to seek a decision by attacking the enemy's war economy with the aid of the navy. The prime responsibility of the German Air Force in the present situation must be to help the armed forces immobilized opposite a fortified front to achieve operational freedom.

D) Enemy War Plane Forces:

1) The French Air Force will have on the 1st October some 640 war planes in the front line units on French home territory of which not more than 120 to 150 attain a modern standard of performance. Available reserves total about 320 obsolete war planes.

There are another 150 obsolete war planes in North Africa for use in colonial war or against Southern Italy.

H1146-0135

H1146-0136

It is assumed that the French home war plane units will be deployed for the most part in the known areas of Eastern France at the beginning of the war. They will be employed against various targets (air force targets, industrial and communications targets, military installations, Army targets) in the operational area as well as in depth according to the capabilities of their personnel and equipments.

Any transfer of more than insignificant forces to Czechoslovakia is regarded as outside the range of practical possibilities, as is the concentrated commitment of large formations against the armies fighting in Czechoslovakia.

2) The British war plane force will consist of some 850 war planes on October 1st of which 300 to 350 can be regarded as modern. The majority of the front line aircraft as well as some 200 to 300 reserve aircraft can be described as only conditionally serviceable in the face of modern defences.

Due to their inadequate range the present British war plane formations are not in a position to carry on a vigorous air war from their home bases only without violating sovereign Dutch or Belgian territory.

Even if Dutch and Belgian neutrality is ignored only the modern war planes need be taken into account as a serious threat to the Ruhr.

A transfer of British Air Forces to Northern France is to be expected at the eatliest, after several weeks of war.

If the French Army Command decides to march through Belgium and the Netherlands the immediate influx of British fighters into this area becomes probable.

Heavy attacks against the North Sea ports by carrier based aircraft need not be reckoned with:

a) because the equipment and training of these aircraft is designed to fit them for specific naval tasks;
b) because aircraft carriers, due to their vulnerability, will be committed in the North Sea only for very pressing reasons, which do not exist in this instance.

On the other hand occasional attacks by coastal aircraft forces against targets on the North Sea coast are feasible and probable.

D) Enemy Aircraft Industries:

1) The first aircraft put into mass production as a result of the expansion of French military aircraft industry during the years 1934 to 1938 are at present rolling off the assembly lines. At the moment the aero-engine factories are lagging behind with deliveries.

In August 1938 forty single-engined and thirty twin-engined military aircraft were delivered to the French Air Forces. It must be assumed that these figures will be increased during the coming months to 100 aircraft a month, 50 single-engined and 50 twin-engined.

H1146-0137

A further moderate increase in production is possible and to be expected from spring 1939 on.

2) In Great Britain existing plants have been extended since 1936 with the aid of State funds and the effect on the armament situation will begin to make itself felt increasingly from 1939 on. If the present plans will be observed the program will be completely carried out by 1941.

Present production (August 1938) is estimated at some 200 aircraft of all types (Commercial and military aircraft) a month. It must be noted that the import of training aircraft and long-range reconniassance aircraft from the United States and Canada is intended.

3) North American aircraft industry (United States and Canada) is at the moment fully occupied. No notable expansion has yet taken place but is possible. A possible expansion would have no pratical effects in 1939.

250 aircraft of all types (commercial and military) a month for the home and foreign market may be stated as the present prodocution rate. Appreciably more aircraft engines are manufactured.

F) Position with regard to preparation of target data:

1) It is proposed to supply units on or before 5th October with the following target data for France:

a) Air Force (airfields, air parks and equipment depots, airforce fueldumps). About 90% of existing installations are included.

b) Fuel Supply.
100% of the refineries are included and 60% of the total storage capacity (including the above-mentioned Air Force fuel dumps).

c) Ammunition Supply.
An estimated 70% to 80% of the total productive capacity of explosive and gunpowder factories and 17 large supply dumps (main ammunition depots and ammunition depots, Army and Air Force) are included.

d) Power Supply.
All the large power plants are included.

e) Key Industries.
In particular the Paris aero-engine industry has been included.

f) Targets in the Paris area.

Further target data, particularly for essential industrial targets, are accumulating currently.

In addition, command authorities will receive maps of the tactical situation and of target groups on or before the above-mentioned date.

2) Basic target maps of British ground organization (airfields) are approximately 90% ready. They have been passed on to Air Force Group 2 for printing and for the adding of sectional excerpts of maps. They have been ordered to be ready by 15 September.

H1146-0138

As far as essential industrial targets are concerned, work has been carried out on the food and crude oil supply systems and docks in the London and Hull areas (basic target maps, sector maps, partially covered also by aerial and ground panoramas).

These will be reproduced after the ground organization targets have been printed. They cannot be expected to be ready before 20 October.

Tactical maps and target maps of London and Hull will be issued to the command authorities prior to the end of September.

3) The basic target maps of the Air Force objectives for Belgium and the Netherlands are ready for printing. Reproduction and distribution (including sector maps) will probably be possible only during October.

4) In general it must be emphasized that contrary to Czechoslovakia there are relatively very few aerial photographs of Western European targets available.

G) Recommandations for our own Prosecution of the Air War.

1) A negative answer must be given to the question as to whether it is appropriate to postpone the massed commitment of our striking power until the spring. The balance of force would probably have altered by that time to our disadvantage due to further progress of French and British aircraft industry and imports from North America.

2) From a climatological point of view the autumn offers our forces greater prospect of success than the enemy, due to our relatively good training in instrument flying.

3) As our forces must be regarded as small, even if we accept the figure of 5 air forces as a basis, the task can only be fulfilled by concentrated blows directed against the enemy's weakest points.

For this purpose choice of targets must be made with the greatest care and must be restricted to the decisive points.

4) As long as only 2 air forces are available prosecution of the war on the basis of gaining time is advisable. This is seen in attacks against the enemy air forces in the airfields where they are deployed in Eastern France, with a view to prevent complete aerial predominance by the enemy.

Attacks on Paris should only be carried out as a reprisal, especially as the air defences in and around Paris are strong. Such attacks must however be possible at all times.

Direct cooperation with the Army is only considered desirable if the enemy deploys or advances in such strength as to endanger the Western German fortifications by a break through or outglanking.

Support for the Army will be supplied in this case by attacks:

a) against transports, troop concentrations and movements,
b) against enemy war planes, should these cooperate with his armed forces in great numbers.

Should there be danger of a penetration of the Western fortifications, a further measure would be to concentrate fighter forces scattered in the West on the decisive ground front.

H1146-0139

Attacks against objectives in the British Isles are to be regarded as unjustifiable in view of the small numbers of our combat forces.

Should the enemy remain on the defensive in the ground war and withdraw with his war plane forces to the West there will be no urgent reason for us to commit our own forces. In this case it would seem better to save our forces until reinforcements arrive.

5) As soon as strong forces are freed for the prosecution of the war in the West, operations in the air must be directed without delay at reaching a decision.

It would seem possible to achieve this end by attacking:

a) fuel refineries and dumps;
b) gunpowder and high explosive factories, main ammunition depots and ammunition depots;
c) the most important parks handling imports which are also centers for the transfer and reshipment of fuel and ammunition.

Thus the enemy's fuel and ammunition supply system for his ground and air forces would be paralyzed or at least curtailed to an intolerable degree.

Assuming that the individual groups of targets are one after the other successively attacked until eliminated it would appear that by the use of 5 air forces a sufficient measure of success could be achieved to enable the Army to break through the enemy's fortified front.

No large-scale operations against targets in the British Isles could be carried out in addition to this task.

Everything should however be prepared to make reprisal attacks against London possible at any time.

Considering the strength of the air defences in and around London success in such attacks is only likely if strong forces are committed.

In addition occasional harassing attacks against targets in South and Southeast England may be worthy of consideration, particularly if the weather enforces a lull in France. A secondary aim of such attacks would be to pin down strong defence forces in Great Britain.

6) Should still stronger war plane forces - at least 3 air forces - be available after the French targets had been successfully attacked, they might be committed to advantage in attacks against the food supply of Great Britain, notably of London. It must however be emphasized that it is only regarded as possible to achieve decisive successes if considerably stronger forces are committed and if the western ports are also subjected to air attacks.

:) Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command, Army and Navy:

1) The use of the Condor Legion against the refineries in Bordeaux and possible against those in Marseilles would valuably supplement our attacks of the French fuel supply system.

H1146-0140

2) The ammunition situation has to be rendered precarious for the enemy as soon as possible. Therefore the armed forces should accompany the air attacks against the ammunition supplies with synchronized offensive thrusts. Special attention should be directed towards the ammunition supplies stored in the Maginot line itself and accessible to air attack.

3) The Navy should hamper imports through the French Atlantic ports to as great an extent as is compatible with its other tasks and the forces available. Especially for some 2-3 months at the beginning of the attack against the fuel supply of France.

4) Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the conditions under which an occupation of this area could be carried out and how long it would take. In this case it would be necessary to reassess the commitment against Great Britain.

signed: For: WOLTER

1 inclosure

Distribution:
Chief of German Air Force Operations Staff
General Staff/5th Section (Draft)
1. copy with 1 inclosure
2. copy with 1 inclosure

- - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. 375-PS

4 November 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf,O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 375-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

Major(General Staff)

SECRET

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 376-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Freiherr von Falkenstein

FUHRER's H.Q.

(Addressed to an unspecified General and marked "Chefsache")

29/10/40

In order to supplement today's telephone conversation of 10.00 AM. I take the liberty of submitting to you a brief resume of the military questions current here for your personal information before I go on leave. Major Queisner, my deputy, is informed of the questions touched on here and can supply further information if necessary.

The exception is Gibraltar, General Warlimont having requested that all inquiries be made to him, as this territory is regarded as a particularly ticklish business.

1). At the moment no intervention in Greece is intended. Nor for the moment is anything to be undertaken with regard to Crete.

2). The question of beginning preparations in Libya in conjunction with Italy is to be examined in the light of a report by General Ritter von Thoma which will be received during the next few days.

In the light of this report a proposal is to be submitted to the Führer by Field Marshall Keitel with regard to strength required, date of offensive, etc. Field Marshall Keitel and Marshal Badoglio will then meet in mid-November and will settle details. Large-scale preparations should not be expected before then.

The Quartermaster-General (Colonel Langemeyer) has been informed by us of the necessity for timely disposal of special war material, equipment and clothing.

3). No orders respecting "Fall Ost' (Case East) have been given and no orders are to be expected at the moment.

At the moment the Russian action against Rumania is dismissed as a trifling matter.

Transports to Rumania are proceeding according to plan as ordered by the Führer and are not to be speeded up.

4). No activity should be expected at present on the part of Spain. The conversation between the Führer and Franco therefore covered only economic collaboration and long-term developments.

The Gibraltar affair should not however be lost to mind though it will have to be treated with extreme care.

The Army will shortly send a small reconnaissance staff (Erkundungsstab) to Spain where it willcooperate with Admiral Canaris: this has been authorised by the Führer. The G.F will request permission to participate on its own account.

There will be further orders from the Armed Forces Supreme Command; the details requested in teleprinter message 00 926/40 are required for this purpose.

5). The Führer is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the prosecution of war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here. Essential conditions are at the present:-

H1146-0141

H1146-0142

SECRET

a). No other operational commitment,
b). Portuguese neutrality,
c). Support of France and Spain.

A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF.

Major Queisner will fetch the documents for himself from Ic Kurfürst (C. in C. GAF Rear Hq.). I would like to ask Colonel Schmidt to arrange that he be supplied with the information he desires.

6). C. in C. Armed Forces Norway has expressed fears that as a result of the Order: Armed Forces Supreme Command, Armed Forces Operations Staff/Abteilung L. No. 35 331/40 top secret and Chefsache dated 22/10/40 greater activity on the part of the British will develop against Norway, and has requested naval and air force reinforcements. The question of moving Stuka Staffeln was touched upon. I expressed my opinion that Stuka units had at present to prepare for other tasks, but would however request that the matter be further examined.

7). General von Bötticher has made repeated reference, especially in his telegram 2314 dated 26/10, to the fact that in his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I pointed out that the matter was a specificially GAF one, but have taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own merits.

(Sgnd) Falkenstein.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 376-PS

24 August 1945

I, Fred Neibergall, 2nd Lt., Inf., 0-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the attached is a true and correct translation of Document No. 376-PS

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt., Inf.
0-1335567

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 386-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NOTES on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei
on 5 Nov 37 from 1615-2030 hours

Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. BLOMBERG
The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von FRITSCH
The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. H.C. RAEDER
The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst GOERING
The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Freiherr v. NEURATH
Oberst HOSZBACH

The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today's conference was of such high importance, that its further detailed discussion would probably take place in Cabinet sessions. However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided NOT to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements were the result of detailed deliverations and of the experiences of his 4½ years in Government; he desired to explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and sighted policy he requested that his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.

The Fuehrer then stated:

The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space.

The German nation disposes of 85 million people, which, because of the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, form of homogeneous European racial body, which cannot be found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. If no political body exists in space, corresponding to the German racial body, then that is the consequence of several centuries of historical development, and should this political condition continue to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation (Volkstum) as its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the German element in AUSTRIA and in CZECHOSLOVAKIA is just as little possible as the preservation of the present state in GERMANY itself. Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, about 1-3 generations.

Before touching upon the question of solving the need for living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the German position with a good future can be attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal commerce and industry.

Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming this can be achieved the results are as follows:

A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but NOT total autarchy can be attained:

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H1146-0144

TRANSLAT[redacted]

1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw materials autarchy is feasible.

2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can NOT.

3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not possible.

4. Edible fats - possible.

B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered with a definite "NO".

The general increase of living standards, compared with 30 - 40 years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand an increase of personal consumption even among the producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture have been used for covering the increase in demands, therefore they represent no absolute increase in production. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world market could NOT be avoided.

The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring about an increased consumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the adult.

Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering the standard of living and by rationalization is impossible in a Continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home production will be possible, but NOT a wholesale alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as generally.

Participation in World Economy. There are limits to this which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial agreements do NOT offer any guarantee for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that since the World War (1914-18) an industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonize again approaches the condition which originally motivated colonization; in JAPAN and ITALY economic motives are the basis of their will to expand, the economic need will also drive GERMANY to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding economically.

The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. It is a pronounced military weakness of those States who base their existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are ruled by BRITAIN, it is more a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which

may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in GENEVA and in satisfied States. Should the security of our food position be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is NOT a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material producing territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect in one or two generations. What would be required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent generations. The development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root, has for this purpose the most favorable foundations in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all times - Roman Empire, British Empire - has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.

The question for GERMANY is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.

German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, ENGLAND and FRANCE, to whom a strong German colossus in the centre of EUROPE would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of GERMANY, both in EUROPE and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the building of German military strongpoints overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in Europe.

ENGLAND is NOT in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which ENGLAND HAS suffered owing to the transfer of ABYSSINIA to Italian ownership, a return of EAST AFRICA can no longer be expected. Any resistance on ENGLAND's part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are NOT in British hands, e.g. ANGOLA. French favors would probably be of the same nature.

A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when ENGLAND is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well-armed. The Fuhrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakeable. Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; since the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient ROME.

Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possessions only allied with other States and NOT by its own power. How could ENGLAND alone, for example, defend CANADA against an attack by AMERICA or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by JAPAN.

The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect.

H1146-0145

H1146-0146

a) IRELAND's tendency for independence.

b) Constitutional disputes in INDIA where ENGLAND, by her half-measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilize the nonfulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon against BRITAIN.

c) The weakening of the British position in the FAR EAST by JAPAN.

d) The opposition in the MEDITERRANEAN to Italy which - by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius - expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome of the ABYSSINIAN War is a loss of prestige for Britain which Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the MOHAMMEDAN world.

It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland is 9:1, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must NOT allow the level of our population to become too low.

France's position is more favorable than that of ENGLAND. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But FRANCE is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless we have to take the following into our political considerations as power factors:

BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA and the adjoining smaller States.

The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk. The battles of FREDERICK THE GREAT for SILECIA, and BISMARCK's wars against AUSTRIA and FRANCE had been a tremendous risk and the speed of PRUSSIAN action in 1870 had prevented AUSTRIA from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions "when" and "how". In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.

Case 1. Period 1943-45. After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The re-arming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers' Corps, are practically concluded. Our material equipment and armaments are modern, with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of "special weapons" cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.

In comparison with the re-armament, which will have been carried out at that time by the other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943/45, then, dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do NOT possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a "point of weakness in the regime". Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on the offensive.

What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45 no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.

On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing their upkeep, the ageing of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice than to act. If the Fuhrer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.

Case 2. Should the social tensions in FRANCE lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against GERMANY, then the time for action against CZECHOSLOVAKIA has come.

Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against CZECHOSLOVAKIA if FRANCE should be so tied up by a war against another State, that it cannot "proceed" against Germany.

For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the case of a conflict with FRANCE it would hardly be necessary to assume that CZECHOSLOVAKIA would declare war on the same day as FRANCE. However, CZECHOSLOVAKIA's desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on SILESIA, either towards the North or the West.

Once CZECHOSLOVAKIA is conquered - and a mutual frontier, GERMANY-HUNGARY is obtained - then a neutral attitude by POLAND in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with POLAND remain valid only as long as GERMANY's strength remains unshakeable; should GERMANY have any setbacks then an attack by POLAND against EAST PRUSSIA, perhaps also against POMERANIA, and SILESIA, must be taken into account.

Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943-45, then the behavior of FRANCE, POLAND and RUSSIA would probably have to be judged in the following manner:

The Fuhrer believes personally that in all probability ENGLAND and perhaps also FRANCE have already silently written off CZECHOSLOVAKIA, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleaned up by GERMANY. The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive factors in the non-participation of ENGLAND in a war against GERMANY. The British attitude would certainly NOT remain without influence on FRANCE's attitude. An attack by FRANCE without British support is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without England's support, it would also NOT be necessary to take into consideration a march by France through Belgium and Holland, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with France, as in every case it would have as consequence the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally, we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA. It must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia's defence measures will increase in strength from year to year, and that a consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian army will also be effected in the course of years. Although the population of Czechoslovakia in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5-6 million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million from Czechoslovakia and of 1 million

H1146-0147

from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to Germany militarily and politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes and the possibility of re-constituting new armies up to a strength of about 12 Divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population.

No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question since it would depend largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.

The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland's attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious Germany, with Russia in its rear.

Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this need be taken into consideration at all in view of Japan's attitude.

Should Case 2 occur - paralyzation of France by a Civil war - then the situation should be utilized at any time for operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany's most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.

The Fuhrer sees Case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from the existing tensions in the MEDITERRANEAN, and should it occur he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.

Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the war in Spain, the Fuhrer does NOT see an early end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by Franco, a further three years duration of war is within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view a 100 per cent victory by Franco is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should Franco be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of Italy on the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions on the Balearic Isles can NOT be tolerated either by France or by England and could lead to a war by France and England against Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in white (i.e. Franco's) hands, could participate on the side of Italy's enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via Germany. The Fuhrer believes that Italy's military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against France on the Western frontier and carry out operations against France from Libya against North African French colonial possessions.

As a leading of French-British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper Italy would be extremely difficult and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany, France will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan fighting forces.

If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must be assumed that England - being at war with Italy - would not decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British support a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be anticipated.

H1146-0148

The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made dependent on the course of the Italian-English-French war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military agreements with Italy, but of full independence and, by exploiting this unique favorable opportunity he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the "speed of lightning" (blitzartig schnell).

Feldmarschall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with Italy would NOT bind the French army to such an extent that it would NOT be in a position to commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the French forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against Italy to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications - which was pointed out particularly by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg - the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With regard to our offensive in a South-Easterly direction, Feldmarschall von Blomberg draw special attention to the strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which had assumed the character of a Maginot line and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.

Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the prevailing conditions he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on 10 November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuhrer who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to the remark by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that an Italian-English-French conflict be not as near as the Fuhrer appeared to assume, the Fuhrer stated that the date which appeared to him to be a possibility was summer 1938. In reply to statements by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch regarding England and France's attitude, the Fuhrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain's non-participation and that consequently he did not believe in military action by France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict already mentioned lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have to side with this attitude.

In view of the information given by the Fuhrer, Generaloberst Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain. The Fuhrer agreed to this in so far as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.

The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.

(Signed) HOSZBACH

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H1146-0149

H1146-0150

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 386-PS

18 November 1945.

I, EVE GLAZIER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 386-PS.

EVE GLAZIER
P/O, W.R.N.S.
37371.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 440-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
OKW/WFA No. 213/39 g.k. Chefs. (Top Secret, Chief Matter)
Department L (I)

Berlin, 20 Nov. 1939

Chief Matter
By officers only

8 Copies
Copy

TOP SECRET

Directive No. 8
for the conduct of the war.

1) The state of alert, to make the continuation of the initiated concentration of troops possible at any moment, must be maintained, for the time being. Only this will make it possible to exploit favorable weather conditions immediately.

The various components of the Armed Forces will make arrangements enabling them to stop the attack even if the order for such action is received by the High Command as late as D-1 at 2300 hours. The key-word

"Rhein" (-start attack)

or

"Elbe" (-withhold attack)

will be passed on to the High Commands at the latest by this time.

The High Commands of the Army and the Air Force are requested after having determined the day for attack, to notify Department L of the High Command of the Armed Forces immediately with regard to the mutually agreed hour of the commencement of the attack

2) Contrary to previous orders, all measures intended against the Netherlands are to be carried out without special orders at the start of the general attack.

The reaction of the Dutch Armed Forces cannot be foreseen. The entering of our troops will take the character of a friendly occupation wherever no opposition is encountered.

3) The Land-Operations are to be carried out on the basis of the assemble directive of 29 October.
The following is added to complete this directive:

a) All measures have to be taken to move the emphasis of the operation quickly from Army Group B to Army Group A if greater and quicker successes than at Army Group B should be obtained there as the present disposition of enemy's forces that would indicate.
b) The Dutch area, including the coastal West-Frisian Islands, without Texel for the time being, is to be seized as far as the Grebbe-Haas Line, until further notice.

4) The Navy is authorized to take blockade measures for sub-marines against the Belgian and, contrary to previous orders, also against Dutch harbors and waterways, in the night before the attack and from the time of the start of the blockade activities and the time of the land attack must also be kept as short as possible in the case of the use of submarines.

Combat actions against Dutch naval forces are only authorized, if they adopt a hostile attitude.

The Navy is charged with the coastal artillery defense of the coastal regions to be occupied, against attacks from the sea. Preparations have to be made accordingly.

5) The tasks of the Air Force remain unchanged. They have been supplemented by special orders, issued orally by the Fuehrer, concerning the landing

from the air and the support of the army by the seizure of the bridges west of Maastricht.

The 7th Air-borne Division will only be committed for landing activities from the air after the seizrure of bridges across the Albert Canal has been secured. The fastest means of transmission of this message between the High Command of the Army and the High Command of the Air Force must be guaranteed.

Localities, especially great open town, and the industries are not to be attacked either in the Dutch or the Belgian-Luxembourg area, without (urgent) military reasons.

6) The closing of the frontiers:
a) The border and news traffic across the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg frontiers is to be kept at its present volume until the beginning of the attack in order to maintain the element of surprise. Civilian authorities are not to participate in the preparations for the closing of the border until the start of the attack.

b) The Reich-Border is to be closed towards the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg for all non-military border and news traffic at the start of the attack. The Commander-inChief issues the orders to that effect to the military and civilian authorities concerned. The Highest Reich Authorities concerned, will be informed by the OKW (High Command of the Armed Forces) at the beginning of the attack that the measures for the closing of the borders will be issued immediately by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, even for the Dutch Border outside of the operational territory.

c) At first, restrictions in the border and news traffic will not be ordered after the start of the attack on the other Reich-Borders towards the neutral countries.
Further prepared measures for the surveillance of personal and News Traffic will be taken, if necessary.

Distribution:

By order

High Command of the Army	1st Copy
High Command of the Navy	2nd Copy
R.d.L. (Reichs-Ministry of the Air) and the High Command of the Air Force	3rd Copy

signed: Keitel

attested: von Trotha (?)

Captain

High Command of the Armed Forces:

Chief WFA	4th Copy
L	5-8th Copy

Distribution:

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(in handwriting) Acknowledged 21 October, initials illegible

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 440 PS

13 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translations of Document No. 440 PS

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt.,
O-1332102

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 447-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

Top Secret
Only thru officer

OKW
Armed Forces Operational Staff
Section L (IV/Qu)
44125/41 Top Secret

Fuehrer Hq, 13 March 1941
5 copies
4th copy

Subject: Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section L(I) #33408/40. Top Secret. 18 December 1940

Directives for Special Areas

To Order #21

(Case Barbarossa)

I. Area of Operations and executive power

1) The authorization to issue orders and the regulations regarding supply for an area of operations within the armed forces shall be set up by the High Command of the Armed Forces in East Prussia and in the General Gouvernement at the latest four weeks before operations are started. The proposal by the High Command of the Army (OKH) is being made in time, after an agreement with the Commander of the Luftwaffe (Ob.d.L.) has been reached.

It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the General Gouvernement an area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the Supreme Commander of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commander of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies.

2) The Russian territory which is to be occupied shall be divided up into individual states with governments of their own, according to special orders, as soon as military operations are concluded. From this the following is inferred:

a) The area of operations, created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Supreme Commander of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power in this area, and may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commanders of the Army Groups and Armies.

b) In the area of operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.

c) As soon as th area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own political administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its geneologic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into North (Baltic countries), Center (White Russia) and South (Ukraine). In these territories the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich who receive their orders from the Fuehrer.

H1146-0153

H1146-0154

3) For the execution of all military tasks within the areas under the political administration in the rear of the area of operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.

The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a Territorial Commander and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks.

a) Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political task.
b) Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry (see par. 4)
c) Exploitation of the country for the supply of the troops according to the needs of the OKH.
d) Military security of the whole area, mainly airports, routes of supply and supply-dumps against revolt, sabotage and enemy paratroops.
e) Traffic regulations.
f) Billeting for armed forces, police and organizations, and for PW's inasmuch as they remain in the administrative areas.

The commanding officer has the right, as opposed to the civilian agencies, to issue orders which are necessary for the execution of the military tasks. His orders supersede all others, also those of the commissioners of the Reich.

Service directives, mobilization orders and directives on the distribution of the necessary forces shall be issued separately.

The time for the assumption of command by the commanding officers will be ordered as soon as the military situation shall allow a change in the command without disrupting military operations. Until such time, the agencies set up by the OKH remain in office, operating according to the principles valid for the commanding officers.

4) The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has delegated the Chief of the "Wi Rü Amt" with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/WiRüAmt.

5) The majority of the Police Forces shall be under the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of the Reich. Requests for the employment of police forces in the area of operations on the part of the OKH are to be made as early as possible to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/ Section Defense.

6) The behavior of the troops towards the population and the tasks of the military courts shall be separately regulated, and commanded.

II. Personnel, Supply and Communication Traffic:

7) Special orders shall be issued by the OKW Armed Forces Operational Staff for the measures necessary before the beginning of operations for the restriction of travel, delivery of goods and communications to Russia.

8) As soon as operations begin, the German-Soviet Russian frontier and at a later stage the border at the rear of the area of operations will be closed by the OKH for any and all non-military traffic with the exception of the police organizations to be deployed by the Reichsfuehrer SS on the Fuehrer's orders. Billeting and feeding of these organizations will be taken care of by the OKH-Gen. Qu. who may for this purpose request from the Reichsfuehrer SS the assignment of liaison officers.

The border shall remain closed also for leading personalities of the highest government agencies and agencies of the Party. The OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff shall inform the highest government and Party agencies of this fact. The Supreme Commander of the Army and the agencies under him

H1146-0155

shall decide on exceptions.

Except for the special regulations applying to the police organizations of the Reichsfuehrer SS, applications for entrance-permits must be submitted to the Supreme Commander of the Army exclusively.

III. Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland.

9) The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW.

10) Police measures for the protection of the troops are permitted, independently from the granting of special rights.

Further orders in this shall be issued later.

11) Special orders shall be issued at a later date for the territories of these countries, on the following subjects:

Procurement of food and feed.
Housing and machinery.
Purchase and the shipment of merchandise.
Procurement of funds and wage-control.
Salaries.
Request for indemnity-payments.
Postal and telegraph services.
Traffic.
Jurisdiction.

Requests of units of the Armed Forces and agencies of the OKW from the respective governments regarding these subjects, are to be submitted to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section Defense not later than 27 March 1941.

IV. Directives regarding Sweden.

12) Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
signed: KEITEL

Distribution:

OKH	1st copy
OKM	2nd copy
R.d.L.u.O.K.L.	3rd copy
Armed Forces Operational Staff	4th copy
Section L	5th copy

(Translator's note: Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section Defense = Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab/Abt. Landesverteidigung)

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 447-PS

16 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 447-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 686-PS
OFFICE OF U.S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Copy to RK 26272 B

Decree of the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor

to strengthen German folkdom.

Oct 7th 1939.

The consequences of the Versailles have been removed in Europe. Now the Greater German Reich has the possibility to admit in its territory, Germans, who had to live abroad, and to resettle them, and to arrange the settlement of the groups of people, within her sphere of interest, in a way that there will be better distinction between them. I entrust the Reichsfuehrer SS with the execution of this task according to the following regulations:

I

The Reichsfuehrer SS has the obligation in accordance with my directives:

1. to bring back for final return into the Reich all German nationals and racial Germans in the foreign countries.
2. to eliminate the harmful influence of such alien parts of the population, which represent a danger to the Reich and German folk community
3. the forming of new German settlements by resettling and in particular by settling of the returning German citizens and racial Germans from abroad.

The Reichsfuehrer SS is authorized to take all necessary general and administrative measures for the execution of this obligation.

The Reichsfuehrer SS can assign certain living areas to the parts of the population in question in order to execute the tasks given to him in article 1 No.2.

II

In the occupied former Polish territories the Administration Chief of the East (Verwaltungschef Ober-Ost) carries out the tasks assigned to the Reichsfuehrer SS according to the latter's general orders. The Verwaltungschef Ober-Ost and the subordinated chiefs of administration of the military districts are responsible for the execution. Then measures have to be adjusted to the requirements of the military leadership.

Persons who are furnished special orders in execution of this task, are not subject to military jurisdiction in that respect.

III

The tasks assigned to the Reichsfuehrer SS, so far as the reorganization of German farmers is concerned will be executed by the Reich Minister for Nutrition and Agriculture following the general directives of the Reichsfuehrer SS.

Otherwise the Reichsfuehrer SS will make use, within the territory of the German Reich, for the execution of his task of the existing authorities and institutions of the Reich, the states and the communities as well as all other public institutions and the existing settlement societies.

H1146-0156

In case an agreement required by law and administrative organization cannot be reached about a measure to be taken, between the Reichsfuehrer SS and the competent higher Reichsauthority in the operational territory of the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres my decision has to be sought through the Reich Minister and the Chief of the Reich Chancellory.

IV

Negotiations with foreign governments and other authorities as well as with the racial Germans, as long as they are still abroad, will be conducted in cooperative with the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs (Reichsminister des Auswaertigen).

V

If land is required for the settlement within Germany of returning German citizens and racial Germans the law on providing land for purposes of the army of March 29th,1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt I page 467) and its executive regulations will be applied to provide the necessary land. The tasks of the Reich agency for providing land (Reichsstelle fuer Landbeschaffung) will be taken over by the agency designated by the Reichsfuehrer SS.

VI

The Reichsminister for Finance will provide the Reichsfuehrer SS with the necessary means for the execution of the measures.

Berlin 7 October 1939

The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor
signed: Adolf Hitler.
The chairman of the council ofminister
for all defences of the Reich
signed: Goering
General Field Marshal
The Reich Minister and the chief of the
Reich Chancellory
signed: Dr. Lammers
The chief of the high command of the
Armed Forces
signed: Keitel.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 686 PS

9 November 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt. (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 686-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg) USNR
391590

H1146-0157

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMINT 710-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Reich Marshal of the
Greater German Reich
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
Chairman of the Ministerial Council
for National Defense

Berlin, 31 July 1941

To:

The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service; SS-Gruppenfuehrer HEYDRICH

Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24 January 1939, which dealt with arriving at - through furtherance of emigration and evacuation, a solution of the Jewish problem, as advantageous as possible, I hereby charge you with making all necessary preparations in regard to organizational and financial matters for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe.

Wherever other governmental agencies are involved, these are to cooperate with you.

I charge you furthermore to send me, before long, an overall plan concerning the organizational, factual and material measures necessary for the accomplishment of the desired solution of the Jewish question.

signed: GOERING

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 710-PS

15 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 710-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

H1146-0158

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 789-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1146-0159

Penciled note: Duplicate

Nov. 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Fuehrer, to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Fuehrer gives the following speech:

The purpose of this conference it to give you an idea of the world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the face of future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of our armed forces was only possible in connection with the ideological (weltanschaulich) education of the German people by the Party. When I started my political task in 1919, my strong belief in final success was based on a thorough observation of the events of the day and the study of the reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never lost my belief in the midst of set-backs which were not spared me during my period of struggle. Providence has had the last word and brought me success. On top of that, I had a clear recognition of the probably course of historical events, and the firm will to make brutal decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when I after long internal conflict became a politician and took up the struggle against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I had, however, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to educate a minority which would take over the leadership. After 15 years, I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and many set-backs. When I came to power in 1933, a period of the most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the armed forces. First reorganization of the interior, abolishment of appearances of decay and defeatist ideas, education to heroism. While re-organizing the interior, I undertook the second task: to release Germany from its international ties. Two particular characteristics are to be pointed out: secession from the League of Nations and denunciation of the disarmament conferenc It was a hard decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the number of believers was very small. I was supported by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament. Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few be-lievers. In 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed service. After that militarization of the Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in me, was very small. Then the beginning of the fortification of the whole country especially in the west.

One year later, Austria came, this step also was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the east and then in the west or vice-versa. Moltke often made the same calculations in his time. Under pressure the decision came to fight with Poland first. One might accuse me of wanting to fight and fight again. In struggle I see the fate of all beings. Nobody can avoid a struggle if he does not want to lose out. The increasing number of people requires a larger living space (Lebensraum). My goal was to create a logical relation between the number of people and the space for them to live in. The struggle must start here. No people can get away from the solution of this task or else it must yield and gradually die out. That is taught by history. First migration of peoples to the southwest, then adaptation of the number of people to the small space by emigration. In the last years, adaptation of the people to insufficient space, by reducing the number of births. This would lead to the death and weakening of the blood of the people. If a people chooses that course all their weaknesses are mobilised. One yields to the force of the outside and uses this force against one's self by killing of the child. This means the greatest cowardice, decimation of the number, and loss of value. I decided a different way: adaptation of the living space to the number of people. One acknowledgement is important. The state has a meaning only if it supports the maintenance of its population potential. In our case 82 millions of people were concerned. That means the

H1146-0160

greatest responsibility. He who does not want to assume this responsibility is not worthy of belonging to the mass of the people. That gave me the strength to fight. It is one eternal problem to bring the number of Germans to a proper relationship to the available space. Security of the needed space. No calculated cleverness is of any help, solution only with the sword. A people unable to produce the strength for fight, must withdraw. Struggles are different than those of 100 years ago. Today we can speak of a racial fight. Today we fight for oilfields, rubber, treasures of the earth, etc. After the peace of Westphalia Germany disintegrated. Disintegration, impotence of the German Reich was determined by decree. This German impotence was removed by the creation of the Reich when Prussia realized her task. Then the opposition between France and England began. Since 1870 England has been against us. Bismarck and Moltke were certain that there would have to be one more action. The danger at that time was of a two-front war. Moltke was at times in favor of a preventive war. To take advantage of the slow progress of the Russian mobilization. German armed might was not fully employed. Insufficient sternness of the leading personalities. The basic thought of Moltke was the offensive. He never thought of the defense. Many opportunities were missed after Moltke's death. The solution was only possible by attacking a country at a favorable moment. Political and military leadership always declared that it was not yet ready. In 1914 there came the war on several fronts. It did not bring the solution of these problems. Today the second act of this drama is being written. For the first time in 67 years it must be made clear that we do not have a two-front war to wage. That which has been desired since 1870 and considered as impossible of achievement has come to pass. For the first time in history we have to fight on only one front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time whether I should strike in the east and then in the west. Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was decided that the east was to be attacked first. If the Polish war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our armed forces. The most glorious appearance in history. Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and materiel. Now the eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is as follows: The opponent in the west lies behind his fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with him. The decisive question is: how long can we endure this situation? Russia is at present not dangerous. It is weakened by many incidents today. Moreover, we have a pact with Russia. Pacts, however, are only held as long as they serve the purpose. Russia will hold herself to it only so long as Russia considers it to be to her benefit. Even Bismarck thought so. Let one think of the pact to assure our back. Now Russia has far reaching goals, above all the strengthening of her position in the Baltic. We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the West. Further Russia is striving to increase her influence on the Balkans and is striving toward the Persian Gulf. That is also the goal of our foreign policy. Russia will do that which she considers to benefit her. At the present moment it has retired from internationalism. In case she renounces this, she will proceed to Pan-Slavism. It is difficult to see into the future. It is a fact that at the present time the Russian army is of little worth. For the next one or two years the present situation will remain.

Much depends on Italy, above all on Mussolini, whose death could alter everything. Italy has a great goal for the consolidation of her empire. Those who carry this idea are fascism and the Duce, personally. The court is opposed to that. As long as the Duce lives, then it can be calculated that Italy will seize every opportunity to reach her imperialistic goal. However, it is too much to ask of Italy, that it should join in the battle before Germany has seized the offensive in the west: Just so Russia did not attack until we had marched into Poland. Otherwise Italy will think that France has only to deal with Italy, since Germany is sitting behind its West Wall. Italy will not attack until Germany has taken the offensive against France. Just as the death of Stalin, so the death of the Duce can bring danger to us. Just how easily the death of a statesman can come I myself have experienced recently. The time must be used to the full, otherwise one will suddenly find himself faced with a new situation. As long as Italy maintains this position then no danger from Jugoslavia is to be feared. Just so is the neutrality of Rumania achieved by the position of Russia. Scandinavia is hostile to us because of Marxistic influences, but is neutral now. America is still not dangerous to us because of its neutrality laws. The strengthening of our opponents by America

is still not important. The position of Japan is still uncertain, it is not yet certain whether she will join against England.

Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is favorable now, in 6 months it might not be so anymore.

As the last factor I must name my own person in all modesty: irreplaceable. Neither a military nor a civil person could replace me. Assassination attempts may be repeated. I am convinced of the powers of my intellect and of decision. Wars are always ended only by the destruction of the opponent. Everyone who believes differently is irresponsible. Time is working for our adversary. Now there is a relationship of forces which can never be more propitious, but can only deteriorate for us. The enemy will not make peace when the relationship of forces is unfavorable for us. No compromise. Sternness against ourselves. I shall strike and not capitulate. The fate of the Reich depends only on me. I shall deal accordingly. Today we have a superiority such as we have never had before. After 1914 our opponents disarmed themselves of their own accord. England disregarded the construction of her fleet. The fleet is no longer sufficiently large to safeguard the shipping lanes. Only two modern new constructions: Rodney and Nelson. New construction activity only in the cruisers of the Washington class, which were, however, an unsatisfactory type. The new measures can become effective only in 1941. In the Abyssinian war England did not have enough strength to occupy the Tana Sea. At Malta, Gibraltar and London little anti-aircraft protection. Since 1937 a renewal of rearmament. At present however, only a small number of divisions, which must form the nucleus of new divisions. Material for the army being gathered together from all over the world. Not before next summer is a positive action to be expected. The British army has only a symbolic meaning. Rearmament in the air is proceeding. The first phase will end in the spring of 1940. Anti-aircraft has only guns from the last war. A German flyer is safe from English anti-aircraft fire at 6000 meters altitude. The navy will not be fully rearmed before one to two years (1 - 2 Jahren). I have the greatest experience in rearmament and I know the difficulties which must be overcome therein.

After 1914 France reduced the length of service. After 1914 decrease of military might. Only in some special branches are we inferior. Only the French Navy was modernized. In the time after the war the French army deteriorated. There were no changes until Germany rearmed and announced her demands.

In summary:

1) The number of active organizations in Germany is greatest.
2) Superiority of the Luftwaffe.
3) Anti-aircraft beyond all competition.
4) Tank corps
5) Large number of anti-tank guns, five times as many as 1914 machine guns.
6) German artillery has great superiority because of the 10.5 gun.
7) French superiority in howitzers and mortars does not exist.

Numerical superiority, but also the value of the individual soldier is greater than for the others. I am most deeply pained when I hear the opinion that the German army is not individually as valuable as it should be. The infantry in Poland did not accomplish what one should have expected from it. Lax discipline. I believe that the soldiers must be judged in their relative value in comparison with the opponent. There is no doubt that our armed forces are the best. Every German infantryman is better than the French. Not the exhiliration of patriotism but tough determination. I am told that the troops will only advance if the officers lead the way. In 1914 that was also the case. I am told that we were better trained then. In reality we were only better trained on the drill field, but not for the war. I must pay the present leadership the compliment that it is better than it was in 1914. Mention of the collapse while storming Liege. There was nothing like this in the campaign in Poland.

Five million Germans have been called to the colors. Of what importance if a few of them collapse. Daring in the army, navy and Luftwaffe. I can not bear it when one says the army is not in good shape. Everything lies

in the hands of the military leader. I can do anything with the German soldier if he is well led. We have succeeded with our small navy in clearing the North Sea of the British. Recognition of the small navy, especially the High Command of the Navy.

We have a Luftwaffe which has succeeded in safeguarding the entire living space of the Germans.

The land army achieved outstanding things in Poland. Even in the West it was not shown that the German soldier is inferior to the French.

Revolution from within is impossible. We are superior to the enemy numerically in the West. Behind the Army stands the strongest armaments industry of the world.

I am disturbed by the stronger and stronger appearance of the English. The English are a tough enemy. Above all on defence. There is no doubt that England will be very much represented in France at the latest in six to eight months.

We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger. That could lead to the paralizing of the German power of resistance. Every hope of compromise is childish: Victory or defeat! The question is not the fate of a national-socialistic Germany, but who is to dominate Europe in the future. The question is worthy of the greatest efforts. Certainly England and France will assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed. England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium and Holland the sympathies are all for France and England. Mention of the incident at Venlo: The man who was shot was not an Englishman, but a Dutch General Staff officer. This was kept silent in the press. The Dutch government asked that the body of the Dutch officer be given up. This is one of their greatest stupidities. The Dutch press does not even mention the incident anymore. At a given time I shall use that to motivate my action. If the French army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it will be too late for us. We must anticipate them. One more thing. U-boat, Mines, and Luftwaffe (also for Mines) can strike England effectively, if we have a better starting point. Now a flight to England demands so much fuel that sufficient bomb loads cannot be carried. The invention of a new type mine is of greatest importance for the Navy. Aircraft will be the chief mine layers now. We shall sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared. This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different starting point. England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be compared with the decision of Friedrich the Great before the first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to capitulation. Everything depended on Friedrich the Great. Even the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great. My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it as possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question as to whether the attack will be successful no one can answer. Everything depends upon the favorable instant. The military conditions are favorable. A prerequisite however, is that the leadership must give an example of fanatical unity from above. There would not be any failures if the leaders always had the courage a rifleman must have.

Individual acknowledgements: The enemy must be beaten only by attack. Chances are different today than during the offensive of 1918. Numerically we can use more than 100 divisions. With respect to men, reserves can be supplied. The material situation is good. Moreover that which is not

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 789-PS
(cont.)

ready today must be ready tomorrow. The whole thing means the end of the World War, not just of a single action. It concerns not just a single question but the existence or non-exsistence of the nation.

I ask you to pass on the spirit of determination to the lower echelons

1) The decision is irrevocable.
2) The only prospect for success, if the whole armed forces are determined.

The spirit of the great men of our history must hearten us all. Fate demands from us no more than from the great men of German history. As long as I live I shall think only of the victory of my people. I shall shrink from nothing and shall destroy everyone who is opposed to me. I have decided to live my life so that I can stand unshamed if I have to die. I want to destroy the enemy. Behind me stands the German people, whose morale can only grow worse. Only he who struggles with destiny can have a good intuition. In the last years I have experienced many examples of intuition. Even in the present development I see the prophecy.

If we come through this struggle victoriously - and we shall come through victoriously - our time will enter into the history of our people. I shall stand or fall in this struggle. I shall never survive the defeat of my people. No capitulation to the outside forces, no revolution from the interior forces.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 789-PS

3 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document 789-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 798-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

The Führer's speech to the Cammanders in Chief on 22 August 1939.

I have called you together to give you a picture of the political situation, in order that you may have insight into the individual elements on which I have based my decision to act and in order to strengthen your confidence.

After this we will discuss military details.

It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in spring, but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot close one's eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the West. But this plan, which was agreeable to me, could not be executed, since essentialspoints have changed. It became clear to me, that Poland would attack us in case of a conflict with the West. Poland wants access to the sea. The further development became obvious after the occupation of the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an inopportune moment. I enumerate as reasons for this reflection:

1)First of all two personal constitutions:

My own personality and that of Mussolini.

Essentially it depends on me, my existence, because of my political activities. Furthermore the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidance of the whole German people as I do. There will probably never again be a man in the future with more authority than I have. My existence is therefore a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot.

The second personal factor is the Duce. His existence is also decisive. If something happens to him, Italy's loyalty to the alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the Italian court is against the Duce. Above all, the court sees in the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with the strongest nerves in Italy.

The third factor favorable for us is Franco. We can ask only benovolent neutrality from Spain. But this depends on Franco's personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist party of our internal unity.

On the other side a negative picture as far as decisive personalities are concerned. There is no outstanding personality in England or France.

For us it is easy to make decision. We have nothing to lose; we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few years. Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice, we must act. Our opponents risk much and can gain only a little. England's stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below average. No personalities. No masters, no men of action.

Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorable for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy, France, and England. In the Orient tension, which leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan world.

The English empire did not emerge from the last war stronger strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was achieved. Conflict between England and Ireland. The South African Union became more independent. Concessions had to be made to India. England is in great danger. Unhealthy industries. A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 798-PS
Contd.

France's position has also deteriorated particularly in the Mediterranean.

Further favorable factors for us are these:

Since Albania there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans. Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal situation.

Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal's death, Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady, weak men.

All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in 2 to 3 years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore conflict better now.

The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically, but militarily it was questionable, since it was achieved throughta bluff of the political leaders. It is necessary to test the military. If at all possible, not by general settlement, but by solving individual tasks.

The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My propositions to Poland(Danzig corridor) were disturbed by England's intervention. Poland changed her tone toward us. The initiative cannot be allowed to pass to the others. This moment is more favorable then in 2 to 3 years. An attempt on my life or Mussolini's could change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much as a military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike or to be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.

Reference to previous risks.

I would have been stoned if I had not carried my point. The most dangerous step was the invasion of the neutral zone. Only a week before, I got a warning through France. I have always accepted a great risk in the conviction that it may succeed.

Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.

The following special reasons strengthen my idea. England and France are obligated, neither is in a position for it. There is no actual rearmament in England, just propaganda. It has done much damage that many reluctant Germans said and wrote to Englishmen after the solution of the Czech question; The Führer carried his point because you lost your nerve, because you capitulated too soon. This explains the present propaganda war. The English speak of a war of nerves. It is one element of this war of nerves forpresent the increase of armament. But how is British rearmament in actual fact. The construction program of the Navy for 1938 has not yet been filled. Only mobilization of the reserve fleet. Purchase of fishing steamers. Considerable strengthening of the Navy, not before 1941 or 1942.

Little has been done on land. England will be able to send a maximum of 3 divisions to the continent. A little has been done for the air force, but it is only a beginning. AA defense is in its beginning stages. At the moment England has only 150 AA guns. The new AA gun has been ordered. It will take a long time until enough have been produced. Fire directors are lacking. England is still vulnerable from the air. This can change in 2 to 3 years. At the moment the English air force has only 130,000 men, France 72,000 men, Poland 15,000 men. England does not want the conflict to break out for two or three years.

The following is characteristic for England. Poland wanted a loan from England for rearmament. England, however, only gave credit in order to make sure that Poland buys in England, although England cannot deliver. This means that England does not really want to support Poland. She does not risk 8 million pounds in Poland, although she put half a billion into China. England's position in the world is very precarious. She will not accept any risks.

France lacks men(decline of the birth rate). Little has been done for rearmament. The artillery is antiquated. France did not want to enter on this adventure. The West has only two possibilities to fight against us:

1)Blockade: It will not be effective because of our autarchy and because we have sources of aid in the east.

2) Attack from the west from the Maginot line: I consider this impossible.

Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgium, and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well as Skandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries. Actually England cannot help Poland. There remains an attack on Italy. A military attack is out of the question. No one is counting on a long war. If Mr. von Brandutch had told me that I would need 4 years to conquer Poland I would have replied: then it cannot be done. It is nonsense to say that England wants to wage a long war.

We will hold our position in the West until we have conquered Poland. We must be conscious of our great production. It is much bigger than in 1914-1918.

The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become our emeny after the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not count on my great power of resolution. Our enemies are little worms. I saw them in Munich.

I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the England offer. Russia has no interest in maintaining Poland and Stalin knows that it is the end of his regime no matter whether his soldiers come out of a war victorious or beaten. Litvinow's replacement was decisive. I brought about the change toward Russia gradually. In connection with the commercial treaty we got into political conversation. Proposal of a non-agression pact. Then came a general proposal from Russia. Four days ago I took a special step, which brought it about that Russia answered yesterday that she is ready to sign. The personal contract with Stalin is established. The day after tomorrow von Ribbentrop will conclude the treaty. Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted her.

We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute some Schweinehund will make a proposal for mediation.

The political arm is set farther. A beginning has been made for the destruction of England's hegemony. The way is open for the soldier, after I have made the political preparations.

Today's publication of the non-agression pact with Russia hit like a shell. The consequences cannot be overlooked. Stalin also said that this course will be of benefit to both countries. The effect on Poland will be tremendous.

Goering answers with thanks to the Führer and the assurance that the armed forces will do their duty.

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H1146-0166

H1146-0167

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 798-PS
Contd.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 798-PS ;

15 Nov 1945.

I, Virginia von Schon, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 798-PS.

Virginia von Schon
046318

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1014-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

SECOND SPEECH BY THE FUHRER ON 22 Aug '39.

It may also turn out differently regarding England and France. One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a trade-barrier, not on blockade, and with severance of relations. Most iron determination on our side. Retreat before nothing. Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers. Struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long as she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors, greatest confidences, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by getting used to heaviest strain. A long period of peace would not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect everything. Manly bearing. It is not machines that fight each other, but men. We have the better quality of men. Mental factors are decisive. The opposite camp has weaker people. In 1918, the Nation fell down because the mental prerequisites were not sufficient. Frederic the Great secured final success only through his mental power.

Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective. Quick decision because of the season.

I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war,- never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked, later on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory.

Have no pity. Brutal attitude. 80 million people shall get what is their right. Their existence has to be secured. The strongest has the Right. Greatest severity.

Quick decision necessary. Unshakable faith in the German soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders give way.

First aim; advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every newly created Polish force shall again be broken at once. Constant war of atrition.

New German frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly a protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until complete elimination.

Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the requirements. The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday morning.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1014-PS.

12 Oct. 1945.

I, FRED MILLERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf 0-133 55 67, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1014-PS.

FRED MILLERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
0-133 55 67.

H1146-0168

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1015i-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1146-0169

The Reich Marshal of the
Greater German Reich

Berlin W8, 30 May 1942
Leipziger Str. 3

Dear Party member Rosenberg:

Your Einsatzstab for the seizure of cultural goods in Paris, I believe, has been wrongly reported to you as if it were dealing in works of art itself. I know the task of the Einsatzstab very well and must assert that there is no agency to which I am able to express such unrestricted praise for its continued work and readiness as to this agency proper with all its collaborators. Presumably I have given cause for the reputation of dealing in works of art because I have asked some especially experienced gentlemen if anywhere during their stay in Paris or France they should hear of any pictures or other art objects to be sold by art dealers or private individuals to look at those objects and to inform me if there should be anything of interest for me. Since the latter was often the case, I have then again asked the gentlemen to do me the favor to acquire the objects for me for which purpose I have kept a depot ready for them. If thus some gentlemen got very busy to make contracts with art dealers it was exclusively a personal favor which was done for me for the benefit of building up my collection. Since very many prospective buyers endeavor to seize art objects in the occupied territory, I can well imagine that perhaps out of ignorance of the circumstances, but perhaps also out of envy they have caused the gentlemen of your Einsatzstab to be suspected wrongly.

I feel it my duty to give you this information and to ask you that it may remain this way. On the other hand I also support personally the work of your Einsatzstab wherever I can do so, and a great part of the seized cultural goods can be accounted for because I was able to assist the Einsatzstab by my organizations.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours,

signed: Hermann GOERING

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1015i-PS

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26 September 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1015i-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1117-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Reichs Marshal of the
Greater German Reich

Headquarters, 1, May 1941

The battle against the Jews, Freemasons and other affiliated forces of opposite "Weltanschauung" is a foremost task of National Socialism during the war.

I therefore welcome the decision of Reichsleiter ROSENBERG to form staffs in all occupied territories for the purpose of safeguarding all research material and cultural goods of the above-mentioned groups, and transporting them to Germany.

All party, State and Wehrmacht Services are therefore requested to give all possible support and assistance to the Chief of Staff of Reichsleiter ROSENBERG's staffs, Reichshauptstellenleiter Party Comrade UTIKAL, and his deputy DRK- Reldfuehrer Party Comrade von Beer, in the discharge of their duties. The above-mentioned persons are requested to report to us on their work, particularly on any difficulties that might arise.

signed: GOERING.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1117-PS

Nov 26,1945

I,FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf., O-1335567,hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document no. 1117-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
O-1335567

H1146-0170

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1157 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Rü I c.

Top Secret

(Handwritten note:-) 2nd Copy Kapitän Zdd (?) has come back.
3rd destroyed 12 May (initials)
4th Copy to Maj. Gaedke. 16 May Ha.

4 Copies
1st copy

(illegible notations)

Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces
at 1000 hours on 29th April 1941

I.

Welcome

Purpose of meeting:- introduction to the organizational structure of the economic sector of the action.

Barbarossa - Oldenburg.

As already known, the Fuehrer, contrary to previous procedure, has ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand of all economic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal with the overall direction of the economic administration in the area of operations and in the areas under political administration.

The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an economic general staff, working under the director of the industrial armament office (Chef Wi Rü Amt).

Under the Reich Marshal and the economic general staff, the supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself is the

Economic Staff Oldenburg for special duties

under the command of Major General (Generalleutnant) Schubert.

His subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided are:

5 economic inspectorates
23 economic commands and
12 sub-offices, which are distributed among important places within the area of the economic commands.

These offices are used in the

military rear area;

the idea is that in the territory of each Army Group, an economic inspectorate is to be established at the seat of the commander of the military rear area, and that this inspectorate will supervise the economic exploitation of the territory.

A distinction must be made between the military rear area on the one hand and the battle area proper and the rear area of the army on the other hand. In the last two economic matters are dealt with by the IV Econ (IV Wi) of the Army Headquarters Commands, i.e. the liaison officer of the industrial armament office within the supreme command of the armed forces at the army headquarters commands. For the battle area, he has attached to him: technical battalions, reconnaissance and recovery troops for raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural machinery, in particular tractors and means of production.

In the territory between the battle and the military rear area, the rear area of the Army, group IV Econs at the various field commands are placed at the disposal of the liaison officer of the industrial armaments office in order to support the army headquarter commands specialists responsible for supplying the troops from the country's resources and for preparing the subsequent general economic exploitation.

H1146-0171

While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates, economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in the locality.

The new feature inherent in the organization under the command of the Economic Staff Oldenburg is that it does not only deal with military industry, but comprises the entire economic field. Consequently, all offices are no longer to be designated as offices of the military industries or armaments, but quite generally as economic inspectorates, economic commands etc.

This also corresponds with the internal organization of the individual offices which, from the Economic Staff Oldenburg down to the economic commands, requires a standard sub-division into three large groups, i.e.

Group M

dealing with

troops' requirements,

armaments,

industrial transport organization

Group L

which concerns itself with all questions of food and agriculture, and

Group W

which is in charge of the entire field of

trade and industry, including raw materials and suppliers,

further

questions of forestay,
finance and banking,
enemy property,
commerce and exchange of commodities
and manpower allocation.

Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within the field of activities of Group W are dealt with by General v. Hanneken.

Before giving further details of the particulars of organization and staffing of Group M, of which we have to take charge, here is a short summary on the planned

II.

Local Sub-Division

(Map already handed over) may entries explain code-names.
Of the 5 inspectorates, 4 have been established from the outset, while the 5th remains in reserve for an assignment temporarily undecided.

1.) Leningrad (Holstein)
with economic commands at
Vilna
Riga
Reval
Leningrad
Murmansk

and sub-offices at
Wologda
Archangel.

H1146-0172

2.) Moscow (Saxony)
with economic commands at

Minsk
Moscow
Tula
Gorki

and sub-offices at

Briansk
Jaroslawl
Rybinsk

3.) Kiev (Baden)
with economic commands at

Lddz
Kiev
Kishinev
Odessa
Charkov
Knjepropetrovsk
Stalino
Rostov
Stalingrad

and sub-offices at

Sevastopol
Kerch
Voronesh
Kursk

Finally

4.) Baku (Westphalia)
with economic commands at

Krasnodar
Grozny
Tiflis
Baku

and a sub-office at

Batum.

Besides the 5th inspectorate, with the code-name of Hesse, an economic command (Borkum) and 2 sub-offices are held in reserve.

III.

The question is now how best to take into account local and technical requirements in staffing the individual offices.

In the Economic Staff Oldenburg and in the economic inspectorates, which in all essentials have the same organization, a differentiation according to geographical points of view appears unnecessary, as in each of the gigantic fields of activity every type of question arises and therefore all departments must be staffed.

The gentlemen will therefore find in the strength reports, which are in their hands, both in the Economic Staff Oldenburg and in all economic inspectorates, after each C.O. and his personal assistant a staff group, which in accordance with the scheme submitted to you contains:

the adjutants's office,
the office for the establishment of the authorities,
counter-intelligence
signals and communications,
command of the staff quartermaster,
messing officer and
interpreter.

H1146-0173

In the same manner, Group M is to be staffed uniformly with all branches of the armed forces (army, navy, air, administration) and the transport, technical, general and military supplies divisions. It is impossible to effect any economics here.

Economic commands also start from the common denominator of an normal strength which is likewise submitted to you. It is however neither necessary nor desirable to fill it in all economic commands to the full extent or in an equal measure; the decisive factors here are the individual peculiarities of the various regions.

In all economic commands, the posts in the staff group, transport, technical and general offices will have to be filled. But whether the individual branches of the armed forces will to be represented in the respective economic command will depend essentially on whether the branch of the armed forces in question has any interests of any significance to look after in the territory.

It must be borne in mind thatthe whole organization requires a gigantic staff apparatus and that, in view of the general lack of qualified personnel, only such posts can be filled as are justified by practical necessity.

The branches of the armed forces will therefore have to decide in which of the 23 economic commands they wish to be represented. To fill all 4 offices of army, navy, air and administration will be necessary only in a few centrally situated spots. If on the other hand in some cases all branches of the armed forces require no representation, we would substitute for the planned division into 4 parts, a joint office for armament industry and staff it from the Office of Industrial Armament.

In the interests of speed - the establishment has to be completed by the 15th May - we have to request the branches of the armed forces to communicate their decision to the Office of Industrial Armament by Friday 2nd May.

In order to prepare to a large extent and to facilitate this decision, Captain (Cav.) Jonas, who has a profound knowledge in this field, has compiled a list, on which after the name of each economic command he has indicated by means of the initial of the branch of the armed forces in question which of these branches is in his opinion likely ... represent ...by an office.

The material has been submitted to you in the form of the lengthy treatiseR., in particular in the form of the economic map and the list showing all firms which are important from the point of view of industrial armaments. In order, however, to assist the gentlemen to form their own opinion in the short time at our disposal, Captain (Cav) Jonas will now illustrate the peculiarities of the different areas in the field of industrial armament by means of a short lecture:-

Lecture Captain (Cav.) J o n a s .

Further Points to be discussed

a) In the interests of staff economy, we want to staff some of the above-mentione authorities by enlisting personnel from authorities already existing in occupied territories, e.g. the Moscow Economic Inspectorate is to be staffed by the armamen industry office (Rü In A) to be withdrawn from France.
Murmansk Economic Command is to be staffed from Norway
Moscow Economic Command by Troppau Armament Command
Lodz Economic Command by Radom Armament Command
Sevastopol Sub-Office by Aarhus Sub-Office.
Even though these units will have to be brought up to the required strength and supplemented, their employment at least creates a basis and thus effects a considerable economy in staff.

b) Which members of branches of the armed forces are already earmarked for Rü VI?
c) In which economic commands are the commander or for instance the head of the transport office to be appointed from the members of a branch of the armed forces which has an overriding interest?

H1146-0174

H1146-0175

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1157 PS

11 November 1945

I, PFC ERNST W. COHN, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German Languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1157 PS.

ERNST W. COHN,
PFC
33925738.

Exhibit USA 585
Filed Jan. 8, 1946

H1146-0176

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1183-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Page 1:

COPY

The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
Department Arbeitseinsatz

Berlin SW 11, 29 Jan 1942
Saarlandstr. 96.

V a 552/27

Express Letter!

To:-

the Government of the Government-General
Main Labor Division, Cracow:

the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories,
Labor and Social Division, Oslo
via the bureau of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories..

The Reich Commissioner for the occupied Dutch territories,
The Hague:

the Military Administrator for Belgium and Northern France,
Economic Division, Group VII (Arbeitseinsatz), Brussels.

the Military Administrator in France,
Administrative Staff, Economic Division, Paris;

the Plenipotentiary for Economics in Serbia
Commanding Officer, Semlin near Belgrade;

the Chief of the Civilian Administration in Luxemburg;

The Chief of the Civilian Administration in Lorraine, Metz;

and the Chief of the Civilian Administration in Alsace, Straszburg.

Subject: Increased mobilization of man-power for the German Reich from the occupied territories and preparations for mobilization by force.

On the one hand, the labor shortage which was rendered more acute by the draft for the Wehrmacht, and on the other hand, the increased scope of the armament problem in the German Reich, render it necessary that man-power for service in the Reich be recruited from the occupied territories to a much greater extent than heretofore, in order to relieve the shortage of labor. Therefore, any and all methods must be adopted which make possible the transportation, without exception and delay, for employment in the German Reich, of man-power in the occupied territories which is unemployed or which can be released for use in Germany after most careful screening.

To the High Command of the Armed Forces
Wi Rü Amt
Berlin W 35

Page 2:

This mobilization shall first of all, as heretofore, be carried out on a voluntary basis. For this reason, the recruiting effort for employment in the German Reich must be strengthened considerably. But if satisfactory results are to be obtained, the German authorities,

H1146-0177

who are functioning in the occupied territories, must be able to exert any pressure necessary to support the voluntary recruiting of labor for employment in Germany. Accordingly, to the extent that may be necessary, the regulations in force in the occupied territories in regard to shift in employment and withdrawal of support upon refusal to work, must be tightened. Supplementary regulations concerning shift in employment must above all ensure that older personnel who are freed must be exchanged for younger personnel to make up for it, so that the latter may be made available for the Reich. A far-reaching decrease in the amount of relief granted by Public Welfare must also be effected in order to induce laborers to accept employment in the Reich. Unemployment relief must be set so low that the amount in comparison with the average wages in the Reich and the possibilities there for sending remittances home ma, serve as an inducement to accept employment in the Reich. When refusal to accept work in the Reich is not justified, the compensation must be reduced to an amount barely enough for subsistence, or even be cancelled. In this connection, partial withdrawal of ration cards and assignment to particularly heavy obligatory labor may be considered.

However, all misgivings must give way before the necessity of supplying the deficit in man-power caused by excessive draft calls into the Armed Forces, in order to avoid detriment to the armament industry. For this purpose the forcible mobilization of workers from the occupied territories cannot be disregarded, in case the voluntary recruiting is unsuccessful. The mere possibility of mobilization by force will, in many cases, make recruiting easier.

Page 3:

Therefore, I ask you immediately to take any measures in your district which will promote the employment of workers in the German Reich on a voluntary basis. I herewith request you to prepare for publication regulations applying to forced mobilization of laborers from your territory for Germany, so that they may be decreed at once, in case recruiting on a voluntary basis will not have the desired result, that is relief of the man-power shortage in the Reich. I request you to inform me of the measures taken by you.

Copy for cognizance. Signed Dr. Mansfeld Attested by:
(illegible*
employee

- - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1183-PS

21 November 1945.

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/Sgt, AUS, 33,812,169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document 1183-PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/S AUS
33,812,169

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1193-PS

The Reich Marshall
of the Greater German Reich
Deputy for the Four Year Plan
The State Secretary

Berlin W 8
14 November 1941
Leipziger Str. 3

V. P. 19008/2 Secret.

S E C R E T!

In the annexes I submit, in three copies, a note on the result of a conference which was held on 7 November 1941 by the Reich Marshall and which concerned the

Employment of Soviet Russians

Meanwhile the Reich Marshall has ordered (cf. V of the note) that the utilization of those Russians who are not under the armed forces (prisoners of war and free workers) should be centrally directed in the Reich, including the protectorate and the General Government, as well as in the Reich commissarates by his agency Arbeitseinsatz. To perform its functions, it will avail itself of the general administration of the Arbeitseinsatz, and in the occupied Eastern territories of the organization for the Arbeitseinsatz which is at the disposal of the Economic Staff East, respectively the Reich commissar, general commissar, etc.

The Reich Marshall has made the agency Arbeitsensatz responsible for a rapid and appropriate solution of all problems which are connected with the utilization of the Russians in the civilian domain. He requests that the responsible agencies should acknowledge the importance of this matter by fullest cooperation and should help in eliminating the existing difficulties to the best of their abilities.

The Reich Marshall expects to receive on 15 December 1941 the first report of the agency Arbeitseinsatz as to what extent the directives issued by him on 7 November have been set into practice.

Signed Koerner

Authenticated

Schwingle
Ministry Registrar

1193-PS
Translation

H1146-0178

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1193-PS

Conference of 7 November 1941 about the Employment of Soviet Russians

H1146-0179

The Reich Marshall gave the following directives for the Arbeitseinsatz of the Soviet Russians:

I. The stronger labor reserves in the zone of the interior are also decisive for the war.

The Russian workers have proved their productive capacity during the development of the huge Russian industry. Therefore it must be made available to the Reich from now on. Objections against this order of the Fuehrer are of the secondary nature. The disadvantages which can be created by the Arbeitseinsatz have to be reduced to a minimum: the task especially of counter-intelligence and security police.

II. The Russian in the zone of operations.

He is to be employed particularly in building roads and railroads, in clearing work, clearing of mines, and in building airports. The German construction battalions have to be dissolved to a great extent (Example: Air Forces!); the German skilled workers belong to the war industry; it is not their task to shovel and to break stones, the Russian is there for that.

III. The Russian in the territories of the Reich Commissar and of the General Government.

The same principles apply as in II. Furthermore, stronger utilization in agriculture; if machines are lacking, human hands have to produce what the Reich has to request from the agricultural sector in the East. Furthermore, sufficient native labor has to be provided for the ruthless exploitation of Russian coal mines.

IV. The Russian in the Reich territory including the Protectorate.

The number of the employed depends on the requirement. By determining the requirement, it is to be considered that workers of other states who produce little and eat much are to be shipped out of the Reich and that in the future the German woman should come less into the foreground in the labor process. Beside the Russian prisoners of war, free Russian workers should also be used.

A. The Russian prisoner of war.

1. The selection has to take place already in the collecting camps, beyond the Reich border. The profession and physical condition are decisive. At the same time screening as to nationality and according to the requirements of the security police and counter-intelligence must take place.

2. The transportation has to be organized just as the selection and not improvised. The prisoners are to be forwarded rapidly. Their feeding should be orderly and their guarding unconditionally secured.

3. Officers are to be excluded from the work as much as possible, commissars as a matter of principle.

4. The Russian belongs in first line to the following work places (in order of priorities):

Mining
Railroad maintenance (including repair shops and construction of vehicles)
War industry (tanks, artillery pieces, airplane parts)
Agriculture
Building industry
Large scale work shops (shoe shops!)
Special units for urgent, occasional and emergency work

5. The following apply to the method of employment:

Principally closed group employment (at least 20). Exceptions only with express permission. In the agriculture in first place the great enterprises come into consideration; besides rotating employment of closed units in small farms day after day. In industry including mining establishments of "Russian enterprises" as an ideal condition (exclusively Russian workers under German supervision) to be striven for.

6. Housing: In closed camps (barracks).

7. Guards: During work, members of the armed forces, but also German workers who have to perform auxiliary police functions. The strictest and fastest activity is decisive for security measures. In general, there are no further steps in the scale of punishment between restriction of food and executions according to material law.

8. Clothing: Creating of a standardized work suit is to the point. The first clothing is secured according to the High Command of the Armed Forces. Wooden shoes are the rule. Underwear is scarcely known to or customary to the Russians.

9. Rations. The Russian is easily satisfied. Therefore he should be fed lightly and without serious infractions upon our food balance. He should not be spoiled or accustomed to the German food, but he should be satisfied and kept in the productive capacity which corresponds to his assignment.

B. The free Russian worker.

Employment and treatment will not be handled in practice differently than for Russian prisoners of war. In both categories, particularly good production can be acknowledged by a limited distribution of luxury items. Sufficient, adequate nourishment is also the main thing for the free workers.

As to the working conditions of the free Russian, the following is to be considered.

1. He can receive a small allowance.

2. His relatives should be provided for.

3. Since his productive power is placed at the disposal of the employer at a cheap price, a financial compensation with the employer is to be taken into consideration

H1146-0180

4. Subjects of the Baltic State who are old residents can receive privileges. At the most their cash allowance can be made equal to the wages which are provided for the Poles who are in the Reich. The general wage standard in the East has to be taken into consideration in this matter.

5. Ukranians have no special privileges. The Fuehrer has ordered that in the future they should not be released from war captivity.

6. The Russian employment should under no conditions create a prejudice in the East as to the problem of salaries. Every financial measure taken in this field has to originate from the consideration that the lowest wages in the East, according to a directive of the Fuehrer, are prerequisites for the settlement of the cost of war and for the clearing of the war debts of the Reich after the end of the war.

   Infractions will be punished with strictest measures.

   This logically applies for every furthering of "social aspirations" in the Russian colonial territory.

7. The Russian free workers obtain a badge which makes them recognizable as such.

V. The Reich Marshall reserves for himself a special decree about the organization of the Russian Arbeitseinsatz, number and obligatory membership (Bedarfszugehörigkeit), obligatory registration (Bedarfsanmeldung). All recruiting and every shipment which are not conducted through the organization are prohibited. Recruiting and employment of prisoners of war are to be conducted in a unified way and are organizationally to be coupled with one another.

Signed von Normann

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1193-PS

November 16. 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt. (jg) USNR, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1193-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg) USNR
391590

H1146-0181

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1206 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

DRAFT

RU (IV) Berlin, November 11 1941

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NOTES NOTES
on outlines layed down by the Reichsmarschall in the meeting of 7 November 1941 in the Reich Ministry for Air (RLM)

SUBJECT: Employment of laborers in war industries.

The Fuehrer's point of view as to employment of prisoners of war in war industries has changed basically. So far a total of 5 million prisoners of war -employed so far 2 million.

Directives for employment:
Frenchmen: Individual employment, transposition into armament industry (RU-wirtschaft)
Serbs : Preferably agriculture
Poles : If feasible no individual employment achievement of Russian armament industry surpasses the German one. Assembly line-work, a great many mechanical devices with relatively few skilled workers.

Readiness of Russians in the operational area to work is strong. In the Ukraine and other areas discharged prisoners of war already work as free labor. In Krivoy Rog, large numbers of workers are available due to the destruction of the factories.

EMPLOYMENT OF RUSSIAN PW's

As a rule, employment in groups ("geschlossener Arbeitseinsatz) no individual employment, not even in agriculture. Guard personnel, not only soldiers but also foremen, at least during the working time proper. As a rule soldiers in the camp.

Employment in:

1) Operational area
2) Reich Commissariates (occupied territories in the east)
3) General Government
4) Interior and Protectorate is to be differentiated.

For 1): In the operational area take preferable into consideration:
a) Railroads
b) High way construction
Very important that in the Ukraine some roads be built with increased speed, not by German skilled labor but by Russian PW's.
c) Clearing work
d) Agriculture
The Ukraine being conquered, we now finally have to secure the feeding of the German people. If feasible, also Frenchmen and Belgians are to be used for directing the Russian farmworkers in the eastern area. If farm machinery is lacking, employ masses of workers. Transplantation of German farmers only where actual success can be expected.
e) Railroad-repair-factories etc.
Best supervision: "Field kitchen". Quick evacuation from operational area necessary. Losses during transport very heavy (Escaping and joining with partisan and robber bands).
Barbed wire hard to get. (Discarding of barbed wire fences in East Prussia desirable)
Leave Asiatic people in operational area if possible.
From construction battalions 69,000 workers have been transferred to the armament industry: replacement by prisoner of war battalions.

H1146-0182

Again and again skilled workers are being found in the construction battalions (fraisiers etc). Investigation by army desirable. Express will of the Fuehrer, that every skilled worker is used in the proper place. If necessary, repeated checking should be instituted.

For 2) The same applies to employment in Reich Commissariates.

For 3) The above is also applicable to the Government Generale
Attention is to be paid to avoiding of unnecessary transport of machinery, as thereby often the available manpower in the Gouvernementis not fully utilized and, on the other hand, the machinery cannot be made use of for a long time in other places.

For 4) In the Interior and the Protectorate. it would be ideal if entire factories could be manned by Russian PW's except the employees necessary for direction. For employment in the Interior and the Protectorate the following are to have priority:

a) At the top coal mining industry.
Order by the Fuehrer to investigate all mines as to suitability for employment of Russian. At times manning the entire plant with Russians laborers.

b) Transportation (construction of locomotives and cars, repair-shops)
Railroad-repair and industry workers are to be sought out from the PW's. Railroad is most important means of transportation in the East.

c) Armament industries
Preferably factories of armor and guns. Possibly also construction of parts for airplane engines. Suitable complete sections of factories to be manned exclusively by Russians. For the remainder employment in columns. Use in factories of tool machinery, production of farm tractors, generators etc.
In emergency, erect in indivual places barracks for occasional workers which are used as unloading details and similar purposes.
(Reich Minister of the Interior through communal authorities).

OKW/AWA is competent for transporting Russian PW's, employment through "Planning Board for Employment of all PW's" ("Planstelle für den Einsatz für alle Kriegsgefangenen"). If necessary, offices of Reich Commissariates.

No employment where danger to men or their supply exists, i.e. factories exposed to explosives, waterworks, powerworks, etc. No contact with German population, especially no "solidarity". German worker as a rule foreman of Russians.

Food is a matter of the Four Years' Plan. Supply their own food (cats, horses etc.)

Clothes, billeting, messing somewhat better then at home where part of the people live in caverns.

Supply of shoes for Russians as a rule vooden shoes, if necessary install Russian shoe repair shops.

Examination of physical fitness, in order to avoid importation of diseases.

Clearing of mines as a rule by Russians if possible by selected Russian engineers.

Employment offices for civilian workers to be kept separate from those for PW's. In this respect the wage-problem is to be considered. Furthermore families in Russia have to share the support. As a rule employment in closed groups. (geschlossener Einsatz)

Some points as to general Arbeitseinsatz

Rather employ PW's than unsuitable foreign workers Seige Poles, Dutchmen, etc. if necessary as PW's and employ them as such, if work through free contract connot be obtained. Strong action.

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General employment of all German women repudiated by the Fuehrer.

Where Russians can be employed, labor service is not to be used. Labor service to be used where greatest effect is produced, even if the principle of education through labor service is curtailed thereby. War situation to be taken into consideration.

As a matter of principle central interests precede local interests, therefore no resistance from Reich commissaries and other local authorities against Arbeitseinsatz in the homeland.

Savings in wages are to be made up by compensatory contributions of the business.

Express order by the Fuehrer. Under no circumstances may the wage level in the East be raised or assimilated to the wages in western Germany. Strong action is imperative against solicitors who offer high wages.

It is intended to issue a basically new regulation of wages for foreign workers.

Foreigners not to be treated like German workers, on the other hand do no provoke inferiority complex in foreigners by posters.

The welfare installations of the Labor Front (DAF) are under no circumstances to be used for Poles or Eastern workers.

All agencies are to promote maximum utilization of Russian manpower.

Employment of Russians not to be improvised, but first to be thoroughly organized in the operational area. Speed is necessary, as the mass of manpower is decreasing daily by losses (lack of food and billets).

Make provisions to decrease the excessive number of escaping prisoners. Especially in and around Berlin strictest guard necessary.

illegible initials

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1206 PS

15 November 1945

I, WILLARD E. SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a ture and correct translation of Document No. 1206 PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg) USNR
391590

H1146-0184

Exhibit USA 590
Filed Jan. 8, 1946

H1146-0185

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1208-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1938

SECRET

Reich Justice Ministry

(various numbers and notes)

The Commissioner of the Four Year Plan

to

(various illegible notations)

the highest Reich authorities,

Reich Justice Ministry
14 Dec 1938

the leaders and heads of branches of the party and the affiliated organizations,

the district leaders,

the Reich governors,

the state governments,

the Chief Presidents and Presidents of the governments,

the Reich commissars for the Saar territory
for the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich
for the Sudeten German districts.

to message:
to the Reich leaders of the NSDAP.

In agreement with the representatives of the leader I hereby order the following:

I

1) The elimination of Jews from the German economic life is the task of the state and therefore is exclusively the duty of the authorities and agencies expressly designated for that.

2) As far as special installations have been created for this purpose, they require the approval of the Reich minister of economy or they are to be dissolved.

II

The taking over of Jewish businesses and other fortunes from Jewish possession has to be affected only on a strictly lawful basis according to the directives issued for this purpose. Transactions which were made since 1 Nov 1938 controdictory thereto, will be concelled.

III

Only the Reich is entitled to the benefit from the elimination of the Jews of out the German economical life.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1208-PS
CONT'D

Persons and agencies which have illegally benefited from the transfer of Jewish businesses or other fortunes from Jewish possession, may therefore be ordered to pay a compensation tax in favor of the Reich.

Berlin, 10 December 1938

The Commissar for the Four Year Plan

signed GOERING

General Fieldmarshall

To be circulated Dept. IV

Messrs:	Read		Messrs:	Read	
~~DR. VOLKMAR~~			~~DR. PAETZOLD~~		
ANZ	Initialed	10/1	~~DR. POHLE~~		
DR. BECKER	"	11/1	~~DR. PRITSCH~~		
BRAUNS	"	14/1	REINECK	Initialed	14/1
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to V a 445/38 Secret

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1208-PS

16 November 1945

I, Pfc. ERNST M. COHN, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1208-PS.

Pfc. ERNST M. COHN
33925738

Filed Jan 7, 1946
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VOLUME I

THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DEFENDANT

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FOR CRIMES AGAINST THE PEACE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

ROBERT H. JACKSON
U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

OF COUNSEL: SEYMOUR M. PEYSER, Major, JAGD
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